U.S. v. Herbert Bryant Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 January 1791 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1440,75-1440 |
| Citation | 177 U.S.App.D.C. 152,543 F.2d 299 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. HERBERT BRYANT INCORPORATED, et al. . Argued 8 April 1976. Decided 6 July 1976. Kathryn A. Oberly, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant. Wallace H. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, David W. Miller, Jacques B. Gelin and Lawrence E. Shearer, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellant. Agustus C. Epps, Richmond, Va., with whom Charles F. Midkiff, Richmond, Va., Robert F. Condon and Michael E. Kris, were on the brief for appellee, Robinson Terminal Warehouse Corp., argued for all appellees. Cyril D. Calley, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for appellee City of Alexandria. J. Howard Middleton, Jr., Alexandria, Va., entered an appearance for appellee City of Alexandria. Albert E. Brault, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, Old Dominion Boat Club. William E. O'Neill, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellees, Potomac Arms Corp. and John C. Richards. W. Curtis Sewell, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellees, Crenshaw and Norton and Co., Inc. Jo V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, The Texas Co. John J. Adams, Richmond, Va., was on the brief for appellees, Robinson Realty Corp. and Virginia Electric and Power Co. Leonard C. Greenebaum, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, Thomas H. Andrews, Inc. Plato Cacheris, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for appellee Norton and Co. Robert E. Nagle, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellee Old Town Yacht Basin, Inc. George H. Clark, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellee, Slater's Lane, Inc. John J. Adams, Richmond, Va., entered an appearance for appellees Sand & Gravel Properties, Inc., and Southern Railway Co. Mark Foster, entered an appearance for appellees Crenshaw. Before McGOWAN, ROBINSON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY. WILKEY, Circuit Judge: This i |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Kathryn A. Oberly, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant. Wallace H. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, David W. Miller, Jacques B. Gelin and Lawrence E. Shearer, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellant.
Agustus C. Epps, Richmond, Va., with whom Charles F. Midkiff, Richmond, Va., Robert F. Condon and Michael E. Kris, were on the brief for appellee, Robinson Terminal Warehouse Corp., argued for all appellees.
Cyril D. Calley, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for appellee City of Alexandria. J. Howard Middleton, Jr., Alexandria, Va., entered an appearance for appellee City of Alexandria.
Albert E. Brault, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, Old Dominion Boat Club.
William E. O'Neill, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellees, Potomac Arms Corp. and John C. Richards.
W. Curtis Sewell, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellees, Crenshaw and Norton and Co., Inc.
Jo V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, The Texas Co.
John J. Adams, Richmond, Va., was on the brief for appellees, Robinson Realty Corp. and Virginia Electric and Power Co.
Leonard C. Greenebaum, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellee, Thomas H. Andrews, Inc.
Plato Cacheris, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for appellee Norton and Co.
Robert E. Nagle, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellee Old Town Yacht Basin, Inc.
George H. Clark, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellee, Slater's Lane, Inc.
John J. Adams, Richmond, Va., entered an appearance for appellees Sand & Gravel Properties, Inc., and Southern Railway Co.
Mark Foster, entered an appearance for appellees Crenshaw.
Before McGOWAN, ROBINSON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
This is an appeal by the United States from a memorandum and order 1 of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Corcoran, J.) dismissing as to thirty of thirty-six named defendants the Government's action to quiet title to certain lands along the Alexandria, Virginia, waterfront. 2 The lands involved are submerged and artificially created fast lands which have been added to the Alexandria waterfront since 24 January 1791, the date the State of Maryland ceded to the United States the land now comprising the District of Columbia. The United States' action was brought pursuant to section 1 of the Act of 27 April 1912, ch. 96, 37 Stat. 93 (hereinafter the 1912 Act), as affirmed by section 103 of the Act of 31 October 1945, ch. 443, 59 Stat. 552 (hereinafter the 1945 Act).
Appellees, record owners or interest holders of Alexandria waterfront property, challenged the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to entertain an action to quiet title to real property located on the Virginia side of the pierhead line between the interception of the pierhead line and Second Street, Alexandria, and the interception of the pierhead line and the southeastern Maryland-District of Columbia boundary line. Appellees asserted that sections 101 and 102 of the 1945 Act 3 settled the longstanding boundary dispute between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia by establishing a new boundary at the pierhead line, and that any action to quiet title to real property on the Virginia side of this new boundary must be brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Although the United States opposed appellees' motions to dismiss on the ground that section 103 of the 1945 Act expressly preserved the District Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate actions brought by the United States to quiet title to lands along the Alexandria waterfront, the District Court concluded that as to thirty of the named defendants it was without jurisdiction and on 29 January 1975 dismissed the Government's action against those defendants. 4 We agree with the position of the United States, and therefore reverse the decision of the District Court.
This dispute, both in its present jurisdictional posture and in its substantive aspects relating to title, arises out of a one-hundred-and-thirty-year-old boundary dispute between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia. The dispute began in 1846 when Congress retroceded to Virginia the land it had ceded to the United States for the creation of a federal city. 5
The United States takes the position, with which we agree, that, since this retrocession included only those lands which Virginia had originally ceded in 1791, the boundary in 1846 between the District of Columbia and Virginia became the high-water mark on the Virginia side of the Potomac River as of 24 January 1791. Any land, either submerged or fast, on the District of Columbia side of the 1791 high-water mark remained in the District of Columbia since it was part of the 24 January 1791 Maryland cession to the United States.
In order to clarify and protect federal interests along the Alexandria waterfront, Congress in 1912 enacted the following statute:
. . . That for the purpose of establishing and making clear the title of the United States it shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the United States to institute as soon as may be, or whenever in his judgment it is deemed proper, a suit or suits in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (now the United States District Court for the District of Columbia) against all persons and corporations, or others, who may have, or pretend to have, any right, title, claim, or interest adverse to the complete title of the United States in and to any part or parcel of the land or water in the District of Columbia in, under, and adjacent to the Potomac River, the Anacostia River or Eastern Branch, and Rock Creek, including the shores and submerged or partly submerged land, as well as the beds of said waterways, and also the upland immediately adjacent thereto, including made lands, flats, and marsh lands. 6
However, no general action to adjudicate title to lands lying along the Alexandria waterfront was initiated until 21 December 1973 when the United States filed the suit now before this court.
Since 1912 the Alexandria waterfront has been extended (artificially and perhaps naturally) into the Potomac River at several places, and jurisdictional uncertainties increasingly have plagued law enforcement activities in the area. To alleviate this problem, Congress passed the 1945 Act to "establish a definite clear-cut boundary line, easy to recognize and convenient for police and court jurisdiction. . . ." 7 By ceding concurrent jurisdiction to the Commonwealth of Virginia over all lands located between the pierhead line and the mean high-water mark of 1791, this statute established the pierhead line as the new jurisdictional boundary between Virginia and the District of Columbia, at least for law enforcement (i. e., police and court) purposes.
Section 103 of the 1945 Act, however, specifically preserved the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to determine the title to lands lying along the Alexandria waterfront:
Sec. 103. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as relinquishing any right, title, or interest of the United States to the lands lying between the mean high-water mark as it existed January 24, 1791, and the boundary line as described in section 101; or to limit the right of the United States to establish its title to any of said lands as provided by Act of Congress of April 27, 1912 (37 Stat. 93); or the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States for the District of Columbia to hear and determine suits to establish the title of the United States in all lands in the bed, marshes, and lowlands of the Potomac River, and other lands as described by said Act below the mean high-water mark of January 24, 1791 . . .. 8
The jurisdictional issue in this case turns entirely upon an interpretation of four interrelated statutory provisions: section 1 of the 1912 Act and sections 101, 102, and 103 of the 1945 Act.
In section 1 of the 1912 Act, Congress directed the Attorney General of the United States to institute suits in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (the predecessor of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia) to establish and make clear the title of the United States to submerged and fast lands along the Potomac River within the boundaries of the District of Columbia as it then existed. 9 These four italicized words are critical to the outcome of this case. In view of the District Court's and appellees' heavy reliance on the fact that section 1 of the 1912 Act only directs the Attorney General to bring suits in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against entities who may have an interest adverse to the United States' interest in lands "in the District of Columbia," 10 the pivotal question becomes: what lands (fast or submerged) were "in the District of Columbia" in 1912 when Congress used this language?
After the 1931 Supreme Court decision in Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, Inc., 11 it is indisputable that in 1912 the jurisdictional boundary (for all purposes) between Virginia and the District of Columbia was the high-water mark of the Potomac River on the Virginia side as of 24 January 1791, not the pierhead line later established in 1945 for law enforcement and perhaps other purposes. In Smoot, speaking through Justice Holmes, the Court e...
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