U.S. v. Hicks

• Decision Date: 27 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-CR-80335-DT.,96-CR-80335-DT.
• Citation: 967 F.Supp. 242
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Undry HICKS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

967 F.Supp. 242

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Undry HICKS, Defendant.

No. 96-CR-80335-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

May 27, 1997.

Robert W. Haviland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Flint, MI, for Plaintiff.

Cornelius Pitts, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND IDENTIFICATION AND DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY,

BRADY

DISCLOSURE, AND FOR AGENTS TO RETAIN ROUGH

NOTES AS MOOT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the November 6, 1996 Superseding Indictment in this case, Defendant Carlos Undry Hicks is charged with: (1) Distributing crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) on November 8, 1995; (2) Distributing crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) on November 16, 1995; (3) Distributing and Aiding and Abetting Distribution of crack cocaine on February 14, 1996; and (4) Murdering Daniel Duffie, a federal witness who testified against Defendant during grand jury proceedings, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a), on October 10, 1996.

This matter is before the Court on several pre-trial motions filed by Defendant on January 29, 1997, including: (1) Motion to Suppress Statements; (2) Motion to Suppress Identification; (3) Motion for Discovery and Brady Disclosure; and (4) Motion for Government Agents and Law Enforcement Officers to Retain Rough Notes. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and conducted a hearing on this matter, including taking testimony, the Court is now prepared to rule on this matter. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Statement Prior to Arrest.

After the Flint police were notified of the shooting of Daniel Duffie¹, the police received information that the shooter was wearing a black ¾ length leather jacket and a pull-over and that some individuals involved in the shooting had entered a residence located at 121 E. Russell. Thus, several officers from the Flint Police Department went to 121 E. Russell. According to Officer Smith, one of the responding officers, he and the other officers cautiously approached the residence with their weapons drawn. Upon knocking at the door, the officers were admitted into the residence by a woman who they presumed was the owner. Next, the officers proceeded through the doorway with their weapons drawn and then into the immediately adjacent living room where they observed 5 people. After determining that the scene was not volatile, the officers returned their weapons to their holsters² and patted down the 5 people to ensure that they were not armed. In his testimony, Officer Smith stated that, at this time, no one was free to leave. Subsequently, Officer Smith observed a black leather jacket and a green pull-over hung over the back of the chair in which Defendant was sitting. Upon seeing the jacket and the pull-over, Officer Smith picked the items up, and referring to the items, asked generally to the 5 people in the room: "Whose is this?" Defendant responded that the items were his. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to the Criminal Investigations Bureau of the Flint Police Department.

B. The Identification at the Police Department.

Upon arriving at the Police Department, two officers escorted Defendant to the second floor. Upon entering a hallway on the second floor, a man who was seated at the opposite end of the hallway spontaneously identified Defendant as the shooter of Daniel Duffie. This man had been an eyewitness to the shooting an hour earlier, although he did not know that the officers had indeed arrested Defendant for this crime.

At the time the man identified Defendant, Defendant was handcuffed and one of the escorting officers was in front of Defendant and the other was behind him. As soon as the officers heard the man identify Defendant, they immediately placed Defendant in a room off the hallway and closed the door. The officers did not know that the eyewitness would be in the hallway and they were not aware of his relationship to the shooting until after he identified Defendant.

C. The Eyewitness' Testimony.

At the hearing on these pending motions, the eyewitness explained how he came to identify Defendant at the Police Department. Specifically, he testified that late in the evening on October 10, 1996 he was driving his car near Grant's Market at the intersection of Ruth and M.L. King, Jr. in Flint, MI. At this time, he observed the shooter, who was carrying a gun, run towards another car that was approximately 15 feet away on the other side of the intersection. Because the area was well-lighted by street lights, the eyewitness got a clear look at the shooter which was firmly impressed in his mind due to these troubling circumstances. Thereafter, the eyewitness observed the shooter approach the driver's side front door of the car and fire several shots at the driver. Then, the eyewitness drove into the Grant's Market parking lot and watched the shooter fire more shots before the shooter fled the scene.

Next, the eyewitness approached the car of the victim and determined that he had been fatally shot. As the eyewitness was attempting to contact law enforcement authorities at a nearby residence, the police arrived at the scene. Subsequently, the eyewitness went to the Flint Police Department for questioning. While he was in a hallway at the Police Department waiting to talk with the police, other officers brought Defendant down the hallway at the opposite end, whereupon the eyewitness spontaneously identified Defendant as the shooter. At the hearing, the eyewitness indicated that less than an hour had elapsed between the crime and this identification.

D. The Statements After the Miranda Rights.

At some point after the identification, Sgt. Warren of the Flint Police Department advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. After being so advised, Defendant allegedly replied that he did not feel like he should say anything because he had been indicted. Being unaware of what indictment Defendant was talking about³ since Defendant had not yet been charged with the shooting, Sgt. Warren continued to interview Defendant. During this interview, Defendant admitted that he had been at Grant's Market that evening, even though initially he had denied this. Thereafter, Defendant specifically refused to answer any more questions.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Statements Regarding the Jackets.

In his Motion to Suppress, Defendant argues that his admission to Officer Smith that he owned the black leather jacket and the green pull-over should be suppressed since this admission was the product of custodial interrogation. The Government, however, contends that Defendant was not in custody and therefore, that Defendant's statement regarding the jacket and the pull-over should not be suppressed.

It is well-established that a suspect cannot be subjected to custodial interrogation until he has been advised of his rights consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Thus, any statements that a suspect makes while he is in custody and is being interrogated cannot be admitted at trial unless the suspect was first advised of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the Court must first determine if Defendant was in custody, and then, if necessary, determine if he was interrogated.

1. The Supreme Court Cases.

The starting point for determining whether or not Defendant was in custody is Miranda itself. Here, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

In two subsequent cases, the Court held that suspects were not in custody for Miranda purposes even though they were invited or voluntarily escorted to the police station; told that they were not under arrest; and then subsequently subjected to questioning which elicited incriminating statements. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983). These two cases, read together, stand for the following proposition: "[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520 (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714). Moreover, Miranda warnings are not triggered merely because an individual who is being questioned by law enforcement officers is a suspect or is the focus of criminal investigation. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. Finally, courts should inquire "how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

2. The Courts of Appeals Cases.

In applying this Supreme Court precedent, the Courts of Appeals have relied on a totality of circumstances approach to determine whether an objectively reasonable person in the defendant's position would have concluded that he was not free to leave or to ask the police to leave the place where the questioning was occurring. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 807, 810 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 247 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Howard, 991 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949, 114 S.Ct. 395, 126 L.Ed.2d 343 (1993); United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir.1988).

In applying this approach, several Courts of Appeals have found that when police question a suspect in a residence, these circumstances often...