U.S. v. Howard

• Decision Date: 26 March 1979
• Docket Number: 78-5048,Nos. 78-5047,s. 78-5047
• Citation: 590 F.2d 564
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James E. HOWARD, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Berry L. PALMER, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 564

590 F.2d 564

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James E. HOWARD, Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Berry L. PALMER, Appellant.

Nos. 78-5047, 78-5048.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 6, 1978.

Decided Jan. 16, 1979.

Certiorari Denied March 26, 1979.

See 99 S.Ct. 1547

Leslie L. Gladstone, Baltimore, Md., for appellants.

Aaron Kadish, Baltimore, Md., on brief, for appellant Berry Lee Palmer.

Robert P. Trout, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md. (Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty. and Gale E. Rasin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges.

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Appellants Berry Lee Palmer and James Howard were both charged in the first count of a two-count indictment with conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; the second count charged Howard alone with engaging in a "continuing criminal enterprise" in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. A jury trial resulted in guilty verdicts against both on all charges. ¹ Finding no reversible error in the conduct of the trial, we affirm.

The government's proof at trial showed that between 1975 and 1977 James Howard ran a drug distribution network in York and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, using his minor children and a number of prostitute-addicts and dealers to sell heroin that he bought in Baltimore, Maryland. Berry Lee Palmer was one of the dealers. Much of the testimony at trial came from persons who had pleaded guilty and agreed to co-operate, from unindicted co-conspirators, and from addict-witnesses who had purchased heroin from Howard or Palmer. Several witnesses described in detail their activities as dealers for Howard, and also gave testimony regarding Palmer's activities as a dealer. Other witnesses testified that they had purchased heroin directly from Howard, either for cash or, in some instances, in return for sexual favors. Finally, a number of witnesses testified that they had purchased heroin "on the street" from Palmer.

First. Howard argues that the second count of the indictment should have been dismissed for non-specificity. The second count charged that the acts alleged in the first count were undertaken "in concert with at least five other persons with respect to whom the defendant JAMES E. HOWARD, a/k/a Crusher, occupied a position of organizer, a supervisory position, and any other position of management, . . ." These other persons were not named in this count, and we agree that under the circumstances of this case, the indictment alone does not "tell the defendant all that he needs to know for his defense . . . ." United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1297 (4th Cir. 1969) (citations omitted). However, this is not the end of the inquiry. In ruling that the indictment was sufficient, the trial judge relied on the case of United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975). There it was said:

In like vein, Sperling's claim that the indictment was legally deficient is little short of fatuous. He asserts that Count Two (charging continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848) was defective because it failed to specify the names of the persons with whom he acted in concert and as to whom he occupied a position of organizer, and because it failed to specify each violation constituting the continuing series of violations proscribed by the statute. These contentions are wholly devoid of merit. Count Two tracts the statutory language. It contains every element of the offense charged. . . . Moreover, Sperling was provided with a bill of particulars which identified eight persons as to whom he occupied a position of organizer, supervisor or manager. . . .

The indictment as amplified by the bill of particulars made it crystal clear to Sperling that this was the nature of the government's case and Afforded him an opportunity fairly and adequately to prepare his defense. . . .

506 F.2d at 1344-45 (emphasis added).

Here, as in Sperling, the government furnished a bill of particulars in response to Howard's request for the names of the persons as to whom he occupied a position of organizer, supervisor or manager. However, the language of that response is at issue.

"(T)he government states that those persons Include the co-defendants and the individuals named in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Count One of the indictment. (Emphasis added)

Howard's counsel complains that he could not adequately prepare a defense where the government was free to introduce evidence as to persons other than the 27 encompassed in the response the implication of the language "those persons Include (the 27 named persons)."

Although we agree that the government's language was ill-advised, and we disapprove its refusal to change that language, we note that no proof was submitted at trial as to any persons other than those specified in the bill of particulars. Therefore, no prejudice resulted which would warrant our reversing Howard's conviction, and we hold that the indictment as amplified by the bill of particulars afforded Howard an opportunity fairly and adequately to prepare his defense.

Second. In 1977 Howard was convicted in the York County Court of Common Pleas, York, Pennsylvania, of one count of heroin distribution. State trooper Lucinda Hammond, whose undercover activities led to the successful state prosecution, also testified at the conspiracy trial. Since evidence from the state trial was introduced to show that the crime committed in Pennsylvania was one of a continuing series of violations required for conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848, Howard argues that the government was obligated to follow its " Petite Policy," ² the dual prosecution guidelines formulated by the Department of Justice.

This argument is without merit. We agree with the trial judge that the federal charges large scale conspiracy over an extended period of time are totally different in nature and degree from the charge for which Howard was tried in Pennsylvania, and that the federal charges included different acts. Thus the Petite question did not come into play. And in any event, the Petite policy has consistently been held to be a mere housekeeping provision; "the general rule is that a defendant has no right to have an otherwise valid conviction vacated because government attorneys fail to comply with departmental policy on dual prosecutions." United States v. Musgrove, 581 F.2d 406, at 407 (4th Cir. 1978), and cases cited therein. Compare United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970) (government compliance with regulation having force of law).

Third. Howard argues that his conviction should be reversed because his trial did not begin until 95 days after he was incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. ³

Howard was incarcerated on August 11, 1977, immediately after his arrest. On the following day he was hospitalized for treatment of heart irregularities and remained hospitalized until August 22. Trial did not begin until November 14.

Trial was originally scheduled to begin on October 19; however, counsel for a co-defendant (who eventually pleaded guilty) requested a continuance until the first week in November to accommodate his schedule. Howard's counsel then informed the court by letter that, in light of co-counsel's inability to go to trial as scheduled and further in light of his own schedule, trial on or after November 10 would be satisfactory to him.

After trial had been set for November 14, Howard's counsel moved for dismissal or in the alternative for Howard's release from custody. The trial court denied the motion, United States v. Howard, 440 F.Supp. 1106 (D.Md.1977), holding that the defendant and his counsel were partially at fault for the delay and thus the interim provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3164, were not violated. Alternatively, the court held that Howard's ten-day period of hospitalization, which would be excludable from the time computation under the permanent provisions of the Act, were also excludable under the interim provisions of the Act. ⁴

We find it unnecessary to determine whether the excludable time periods of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) are applicable to the interim provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3164, although we note that there is a split of authority on this issue. Compare United States v. Corley, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 548 F.2d 1043 (1976) (time periods applicable) With United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Krohn, 560 F.2d 293, 295 and n. 2 (7th Cir. 1977) (time periods not applicable).

First, we agree with the district court that Howard's counsel was partially at fault for the trial delay; although the initial delay until the first week of November was beyond his control, Cf. United States v. Becker, 585 F.2d 703, at 708 (4th Cir. 1978), he then requested, as an accommodation to his own schedule, that the trial be set on or after November 10. Simple mathematics shows that this requested date was 91 days after Howard's incarceration a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.

In any event, the sanction for non-compliance with the interim limits is release, not dismissal of the indictment. ⁵ Counsel cannot point to any prejudice occasioned by the court's failure to release Howard, other than a vague allegation that Howard at liberty may have been able to persuade a certain witness, who had been subpoenaed by the prosecution but was not called at trial, to testify on his behalf. However, at trial counsel informed the court that his client did not wish to request the issuance of a bench warrant to compel her presence; he did not make a proffer of the content of her expected testimony; and he did not move for a continuance to secure her appearance. In short, the allegation of prejudice from the court's...