U.S. v. Huddleston
Decision Date | 30 April 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 85-1938,85-1938 |
Citation | 811 F.2d 974 |
Parties | 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 864 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guy Rufus HUDDLESTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Don Ferris, Ann Arbor, Mich., for defendant-appellant.
Phyllis M. Golden, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KEITH and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
On Petition for Rehearing. The appellant, Guy Rufus Huddleston, was convicted on one count of a two count indictment charging him with having violated 18 U.S.C. Secs. 659 and 2315 by possessing and selling certain stolen videotapes. We reversed the conviction, in a decision reported at 802 F.2d 874 (6th Cir., 1986) holding that evidence of prior misconduct of a similar nature should not have been admitted in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the goods involved in the prior transaction were stolen. The government has petitioned for rehearing. That petition is granted, and in light of the recent decision of another panel of this court in United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir.1986), we now conclude that the clear and convincing evidence standard does not govern the admissibility of "similar acts" evidence sought to be admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard adopted in Ebens, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the similar acts in question here. Resolving the other issues raised by Appellant Huddleston in favor of the government, we shall affirm the judgment of the district court.
As stated in our earlier opinion, Mr. Huddleston challenges the admission of evidence that he had been involved in the sale of certain television sets at $28 each and the attempted sale to an FBI agent of certain stolen appliances. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows
When a court considers admitting such evidence, a two-step analysis must be undertaken. First, the court must decide whether the evidence would serve a permissible purpose such as one of those listed in the second sentence of Rule 404(b). United States v. Dabish, 708 F.2d 240, 242 (6th Cir.1983). If so, the court must consider whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Id.
The evidence challenged by Mr. Huddleston, including the evidence of his prior dealings in $28 television sets, was admitted, as the trial court instructed the jury, only for whatever bearing it might have on "Defendant's intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident in this case." The government contended that Mr. Huddleston had been engaged in a pattern of illegal activity, and that this tended to prove he knew the videotapes were stolen.
The evidence of Mr. Huddleston's other activities could reasonably be thought to have a high probative value. The televisions and the Memorex tapes both came from the same supplier, a truckdriver, and when the goods were presented to him, Mr. Huddleston did not ascertain what their source was, nor did he ask to see the truckdriver's bill of sale. Both the television sets and the tapes were sold at prices well below their value, and, in the case of the tapes, below the cost of manufacture. Other goods handled by Mr. Huddleston were shown to have been stolen, and a tape recording confirmed the testimony of the FBI agent that Mr. Huddleston referred to some of them as "hot." Taken as a whole, the evidence strongly indicated, as the government argued, that appellant was engaged in a pattern of illegal activity.
The evidence relating to the television sets was no more prejudicial than that relating to other merchandise supplied by the truckdriver, and the trial judge's charge to the jury minimized any risk of prejudice:
"You have heard evidence of the defendant's possession of goods other than the tapes involved in this case.
The defendant is not on trial for activities pertaining to any goods other than the tapes.
This evidence is admitted only as it may bear on defendant's intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident in this case.
It is not to be used by you to prove the character of the person to show that he acted in conformity with that character."
There is conflict among the circuits as to whether the government must prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant engaged in the prior bad act. In United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1091 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1737, 48 L.Ed.2d 202 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, in an opinion written by Judge Friendly, that if "the aggregate of the evidence" is sufficient to permit a finding, beyond reasonable doubt, of criminal intent as to the crime charged, a "preponderance [of the evidence] standard is sufficient" for the subsidiary facts offered to establish such intent. Judge Friendly said that the contrary view set forth in cases such as United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1973), "appears to rest on a misconception." 524 F.2d at 1090. This court has now endorsed Judge Friendly's view, citing Leonard in support of the proposition that "[c]ourts may admit evidence of prior bad acts if the proof shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff did in fact commit the act." United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir.1986) (emphasis supplied).
In a carefully reasoned opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc soon after the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective, that court also adopted Judge Friendly's view and overruled United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991, supra. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979). Noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence "place greater emphasis on admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence" than the Supreme Court had done earlier, the Beechum court held that:
582 F.2d 898, 910 n. 13 & 913 (5th Cir.1978).
The logic of the en banc decision in Beechum corresponds to that applied by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Brand, 79 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 655, 56 S.Ct. 381, 80 L.Ed. 466 (1936). In Brand, which affirmed a conviction for transporting a stolen automobile, the court rejected the doctrine "that evidence of the receipt of other stolen goods is not admissible unless the prosecution proves that the accused knew them to have been stolen." Id. at 606. We are disposed to follow these well-reasoned decisions in preference to the contrary view adopted, initially, in some other circuits before the Federal Rules of Evidence came into existence. The contrary view seems to have been based on concerns now dealt with adequately in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Even if the trial court did err in this case by letting the jury know about the television sets, the error was harmless. One can say here, "with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). The "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard announced in Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), dealt only with error of constitutional dimension, and any erroneous evidentiary ruling in this case was clearly not of constitutional magnitude.
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