U.S. v. Isler
| Decision Date | 16 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-1673.,No. 04-1566.,No. 04-1565.,04-1565.,04-1566.,04-1673. |
| Citation | 429 F.3d 19 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Charles H. ISLER, Defendant, Appellant. United States of America, Appellee, v. Bilal Abdul Rashid, Defendant, Appellant. United States of America, Appellee, v. Charles C. Brown, Defendant, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
James E. Methe, for appellant Charles H. Isler.
William J. Murphy, with whom Murphy & Fay, LLP was on brief, for appellant Bilal Abdul Rashid.
Tamara A. Barney, with whom MacFadyen, Gescheidt & O'Brien was on brief, for appellant Charles C. Brown.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Robert Clark Corrente, United States Attorney, and Adi Goldstein, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge,* and HOWARD, Circuit Judge.
In these consolidated criminal appeals, defendants Charles Brown, Charles Isler, and Bilal Abdul Rashid challenge their convictions and sentences for participating in a cocaine base distribution conspiracy. We affirm the convictions and Brown's sentence, but vacate Isler and Rashid's sentences.
We present the facts in the light most favorable to the verdicts. See United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir.2003).
On the afternoon of June 3, 2003, Detective Scott Partridge of the Providence Police Department was surveilling the rear of Brown's multi-family house from an adjacent yard. The house had previously been the subject of extensive surveillance, and the Providence police had executed a number of controlled buys of cocaine base from the first floor apartment. As Partridge watched, Brown pulled his car into his house's yard, which was empty except for an old junk car. Brown exited the car carrying a cheese puff container and a brown paper bag. Partridge saw Brown remove a plastic bag containing a white substance from the paper bag and place it in the false bottom of the container. Brown then returned the container to his car and entered the first floor apartment with the bag and its remaining contents. No one else entered or left the house.
Approximately half an hour later, Partridge and several other officers executed a search warrant for the apartment. Two of the officers covered the front door, and the rest entered through the back. All were clad in black windbreakers bearing the legend "Providence Police" in large, yellow letters. Partridge's team proceeded to the rear door of the first floor apartment, announced its presence, received no response, and then forcibly entered. The entry took considerable effort: the rear door was heavily fortified with steel bars, had no handle, and could be opened (from either side) only with a key for the heavy deadbolt lock. Also, a second interior door was wedged in tightly inside the fortified exterior door. Notably, the exterior door contained a four by six inch "cut out" and a large kitchen knife was hidden in the door's interior panel.
Brown, Isler, and Rashid were standing near the kitchen table when the officers entered through the back entrance, and attempted to flee through the front door. But upon hearing the other officers outside, they reversed field and attempted to force their way past the original entry team. A violent struggle ensued, and the defendants were subdued. Brown had $65 upon his person, Rashid had $1078, and Isler had $515.
The apartment was small and sparsely furnished, except for the kitchen. On the kitchen table, surrounded by three chairs, the officers found monitors for a sophisticated surveillance system comprised of several cameras, a motion sensor, an intercom, and a pair of exterior lights—one red and the other green. On the same table was the paper bag that Brown had carried into the apartment. Inside the paper bag were two plastic bags containing 142.45 grams of cocaine base. Also on the table were a digital scale, plastic bags, plastic bags with their corners snipped off, scissors, baking soda, a razor, a cooking plate with cocaine base residue, $250 in cash, two cell phones, a pager, and Isler's wallet and keys. The only key for the deadbolt lock on the fortified rear door hung on a hook near the table.
The officers also collected 26 small packages containing 6.328 grams of cocaine base from an overflowing toilet in a nearby bathroom. A search of Brown's car yielded the cheese puff container, which contained an additional 16.73 grams of cocaine base.
All three defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base (Count I), see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base (Count II), see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A). In addition, based on the narcotics found in his car, Brown was charged with possession with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of cocaine base (Count III), see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B).
At trial, the government called several officers and forensic specialists, and the government's case included expert testimony that the surveillance equipment, barricaded doors, and cut out1 on the exterior door were indicative of a drug house. Only Brown testified for the defense. He testified that he had been let in by three unidentified men who left moments before the raid; that he was present only to collect rent from his tenant; that there were no drugs in the house or his car; that he had never seen Rashid or Isler before the raid; that Rashid was there to purchase his tenant's minivan; that Isler was sitting in a bedroom (possibly listening to music); that there were at least four cars in the yard at the time of the raid; that he tried to let the police in when they knocked but they ordered him away from the door; that the defendants did not try to flee or resist; and that the security and surveillance equipment had been installed by the previous owner and/or was typical for homes in the area.
The jury convicted Brown on all counts. The jury also convicted both Isler and Rashid, but held them responsible for less than 5 grams of cocaine base on both counts (and not for the 50 or more grams originally charged in the indictment). Isler and Rashid were sentenced to 262 and 210 months' imprisonment, respectively. Brown received a mandatory life sentence because he had two prior felony narcotics convictions. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
The defendants challenge their convictions and sentences on several grounds. The primary appellate issues are (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Isler and Rashid's convictions; (2) whether the district court erroneously permitted detailed cross-examination concerning Brown's prior convictions; (3) whether the court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony from one of the government's experts; (4) whether the government's closing argument was inappropriate and prejudicial; (5) whether the court should have applied the rule of lenity to sentence Brown to a shorter prison term because the relevant provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are ambiguous; and (6) whether the defendants are entitled to resentencing under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).2
Rashid and Isler claim that the district court erroneously denied their motions for acquittal because the government demonstrated only that they were "merely present" at the drug raid.3 See United States v. Llinas, 373 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir.2004)(government must prove more than mere presence to obtain drug conspiracy conviction). Isler and Rashid maintain that they did not own the house, that the three defendants had never met before the raid, that neither Rashid nor Isler was ever in the house before the raid, and that there was no evidence that they possessed or agreed to possess the narcotics.
We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. See Boulerice, 325 F.3d at 79. We will affirm if, after reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we conclude that a rational jury could find the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Isler and Rashid argue as though only direct evidence can support their convictions. But of course, this is not so; indeed the government may rely entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove the charged offense. See United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146, 150 (1st Cir.2002); see also United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir.1991)(a conspiracy can be demonstrated by "a development and a collocation of circumstances")(internal citation and quotation omitted). As we have explained:
The defendant's presence at a place where contraband is found may or may not be purely coincidental. The attendant circumstances tell the tale—and the culpability of a defendant's presence hinges upon whether the circumstances fairly imply participatory involvement. In other words, a defendant's "mere presence" argument will fail in situations where the "mere" is lacking.
United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.1993).
The facts surrounding Isler and Rashid's arrest permitted the jury to find that they were more than merely present. Detective Partridge saw Brown bring a substance that proved to be cocaine base into the house. When the officers burst through the heavily fortified back door, Isler, Rashid, and Brown were the only persons in the apartment and were standing near the kitchen table with three chairs. On the kitchen table were the monitors for an elaborate surveillance system, a quantity of cocaine base suggestive of narcotics distribution (and not personal use), cash, Isler's wallet and keys, and various drug packaging paraphernalia. In the bathroom, a few feet away, was evidence of a hasty and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Rodriguez-Berrios
...its prejudicial impact, the use to which evidence was put, and the relative strengths of the parties' cases.'" United States v. Isler, 429 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Morales, 382 F.3d 12, 17 (1st The erroneously-admitted accusations were repetitious of other......
-
U.S. v. Turner
...Turner appeals his conviction and sentence. I. We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, see United States v. Isler, 429 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2005), reserving a discussion of additional facts for our Turner and his fellow conspirators Carmello Merlino (Merlino), Steph......
-
U.S. v. Maher
...Hamilton shook him awake, he was "seized." This argument, not raised before the reply brief, is forfeited. See United States v. Isler, 429 F.3d 19, 30 n. 12 (1st Cir.2005). Even if not forfeited, it would fail. Just because Maher was so soundly asleep (or unconscious) that Officer Hamilton ......
-
U.S. v. Allen, 05-2705.
...repeated refusals to ameliorate the definitional disparity between § 841(b) and the post-1993 Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Isler, 429 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir.2005) ("this court has concluded that the term `cocaine base' in Section 841(b) includes all forms of cocaine base (not simp......