U.S. v. Iverson

• Decision Date: 22 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-5118,78-5118
• Citation: 588 F.2d 194
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy Dean IVERSON, Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar. *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 194

588 F.2d 194

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy Dean IVERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-5118

Summary Calendar. ^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 22, 1979.

Francis P. Maher, Laredo, Tex., for defendant-appellant.

Jamie C. Boyd, U. S. Atty., LeRoy M. Jahn, John E. Murphy, Asst. U. S. Attys., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH and HILL, Circuit Judges.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

Roy Dean Iverson was charged with assault with intent to commit rape. 18 U.S.C.A. § 113(a). He was tried and convicted by a jury and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4205(a). He now appeals his conviction which we affirm. Iverson did in fact commit the assault. His defense strategems at trial and his assignments of error on appeal revolve around the insanity defense; he has maintained that he was insane at the time of the assault.

Initially, he argues that the facts surrounding the assault were sufficiently bizarre for this Court to hold that the District Court should have granted a motion for judgment of acquittal and to reverse his conviction. We cannot agree.

The evidence disclosed several indications of aberrant behavior. Iverson was a mental patient and a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic. He left the Lackland Air Force Base Hospital against medical advice only a few hours before the assault. He assaulted the victim in broad daylight in view of passers-by. He was wearing a heavy coat on a very warm day. He acted strangely during and after the assault.

It is clear that the issue of Iverson's sanity at the time of the offense was placed in question by the evidence of the events surrounding the assault. Consequently, the Government had the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Iverson was sane at the time of the attempted rape. E. g., Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1967) and cases cited. At trial, the uncontroverted expert testimony by the psychiatrist who had examined Iverson both before and after the incident established that Iverson, although a paranoid schizophrenic, was oriented as to time and place, had normal comprehension, had a reasonable attention span, and spoke in a normal coherent manner. According to the psychiatrist there was no question as to Iverson's mental competency, and he was not considered dangerous either to himself or to any member of the community. The psychiatrist also testified that, on the date of the assault, Iverson could determine right from wrong and had the ability to conform his actions to the requirements of the law.

Clearly, on the state of this record, there was sufficient evidence to reach the jury on the issue of insanity, and the District Court was correct in submitting the issue to the jury for its determination. E. g., United States v. Phillips, 519 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 796, 46 L.Ed.2d 650 (1976); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969) (En banc ). In light of the expert testimony, and in the total absence of any significant evidence produced to contradict it, a reasonable-minded jury would not necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt on Iverson's sanity, and the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was proper. E. g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 476 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pinner, 561 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1977). Moreover, when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Government with all inferences and credibility choices made to support the jury's verdict, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Seastrunk, 580 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1978), this court can only conclude that the evidence may be viewed as establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Iverson was legally sane at the time of the assault. E. g., United States v. Kossa, 562 F.2d 959, 960 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Manetta, 551 F.2d 1352, 1355 (5th Cir. 1977).

Iverson also takes issue with the District Court's instructions to the jury, regarding insanity:

The test for insanity is as follows:

A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.

In other words, you should find the defendant not guilty if you find that at the time of the alleged assault he was, by reason of mental disease or illness, either (I) unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or (II) unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

This is precisely the charge on insanity adopted as the standard by this Court, En banc, in Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d at 916, and the standard which this Court has consistently approved since its adoption. E. g., United States v. Pilkington, 583 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Manetta, 551 F.2d at 1355; United States v. Cohen 530 F.2d 43, 46 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 149, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846, 97 S.Ct. 130, 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976).

Iverson's complaint regarding the charge is that he never placed his capability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct in issue and thus that the District Court erred in giving the complete instruction as required by this Court. He further contends that the District Court should have simply limited the instruction to the question whether Iverson could conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. He seems to insist that the two-prong test of Blake restricted his defense of insanity when it obviously expanded it; for, if the jury had found that Iverson was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law but was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct, it would have been required to acquit him under instruction.

There is no question that the issue of a defendant's sanity at the time he committed the offense is an element which the Government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d at 912. In United States v. Manetta, 551 F.2d at 1357-58, this Court explained the unique procedure following in insanity cases:

The confusion results from the order in which the evidence is taken. Going back to cases in which sanity is not made an issue the 'usual' cases the order of presentation of evidence is that the government presents evidence alleged to prove the guilt of the defendant; the defendant moves forward, if the defendant elects to do so, with exculpatory evidence then the government, if it wishes to do so, presents 'rebuttal' evidence, seeking to rebut that which has been offered by the defendant. Because 'rebuttal' evidence usually comprises the total of all evidence presented after the defendant has rested, that phase of the trial has become known as the 'rebuttal' phase. As has been seen, in a case where the issue of sanity or insanity is presented, the order is much...