U.S. v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 03 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1040,89-1040
• Citation: 918 F.2d 236
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Walter V. JACKSON, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 236

918 F.2d 236

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Walter V. JACKSON, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 89-1040.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard April 3, 1990.

Decided Nov. 1, 1990.

John P. Slattery, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Ronald A. Wysocki was on brief for defendant, appellant.

Paul V. Kelly, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., was on brief for the U.S.

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Following a five-day jury trial, defendant Walter Jackson was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). ¹ Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e), Jackson was sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison. On appeal, he asserts that the district court committed reversible error in refusing to suppress the firearm, in permitting the government to withhold the identity of its informant, and in admitting into evidence post-arrest statements which Jackson made to law enforcement officers. Lastly, Jackson maintains that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. As we conclude that all claims are without merit, we affirm.

I

After receiving neighborhood reports concerning suspicious activity at a residence in Hyannis, Massachusetts, local police established an intermittent surveillance which confirmed that various persons, among them convicted felons known to have had past involvement with illegal drugs, frequently would drive up to the residence, enter for short periods, then drive away. During the evening of March 8, 1988, Jackson, known to the police as a convicted felon with an extensive criminal record that included drug law violations, was observed entering the residence. Soon after, the police learned from a confidential informant that Jackson had been seen conducting a drug transaction inside the same residence and that he was in possession of a handgun.

While on surveillance the following evening, the police received information from the same informant that Jackson again had been observed selling cocaine inside the Hyannis residence, while in possession of a gun. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Jackson was observed leaving the residence in the company of a male, later identified as Anthony Edwards, and a female, Stephanie Holmes, Jackson's sister. The three entered a vehicle and began to leave, with Jackson driving. Two police cruisers, their blue lights flashing, pulled up behind the Jackson vehicle which then took what could be considered evasive action. The police cruisers blocked the Jackson vehicle and approached it with weapons drawn. As they did so, the police saw Jackson and Edwards make furtive hand movements in the front seat. The police ordered the occupants to place their hands on the dashboard. The suspects did not immediately comply.

The police ordered Edwards out of the car, pat-frisked him, and discovered a small packet containing a white substance which Edwards identified as cocaine. Edwards, Jackson and Holmes were arrested. Edwards and Jackson were handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser. The police then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and seized the firearm here in question, and a small baggie of cocaine, from inside the console between the front seats. After Jackson was arrested and administered Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), he admitted that the cocaine belonged to him, but said the firearm did not. Jackson repeated the same admission several days later.

II

Jackson asserts that the district court erroneously denied the motion to suppress the firearm. He argues that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him; therefore the evidence discovered during the automobile search conducted after the unlawful arrest must be suppressed as the tainted fruits of the unlawful arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The district court ruled there was probable cause to arrest Jackson before the vehicle was stopped; hence the search and seizure were lawful. We uphold the denial of the motion to suppress, on an alternative ground.

These police actions--blocking the Jackson vehicle and frisking Edwards--did not transcend an investigatory stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). The police may conduct an investigatory stop by blocking the egress of a vehicle in which a criminal suspect is riding, see, e.g., United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961 n. 15 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Vargas, 633 F.2d 891, 896 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir.1985), and may approach the vehicle with weapons at the ready on a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are armed, see, e.g., United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir.1986); Jones, 759 F.2d at 638; United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 249-50 (2d Cir.1981).

There is no evidence that anything that occurred prior to the formal arrest of Edwards and Jackson was inconsistent with a valid investigatory stop. Although the government concedes that the police stopped the vehicle for the purpose of arresting Jackson, the officers' intention, in itself, would not convert an investigatory stop into an arrest. Vargas, 633 F.2d at 896 n. 10 ("That the agents subjectively intended to effect an arrest should not be controlling when the objective circumstances are consistent with an investigatory stop."). Thus, neither the manner of effecting the investigatory stop, nor the officers' intention to effect an arrest, converted the present investigatory stop into an arrest. See Jackson, 652 F.2d at 250 ("we decline to find that an arrest occurred solely because of [the officers'] subjective belief").

We now examine whether the vehicle search incident to the investigatory stop was reasonable under the Terry doctrine. Our review is directed at two inquiries: first, whether the investigatory stop was justified at its inception; second, whether the conduct of the officers, after the stop and prior to any arrest, was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 783 (1st Cir.1989) ("In reviewing the reasonableness of a Terry stop, a court must consider all of the relevant circumstances, which are not to be dissected and viewed singly; rather they must be considered as a whole.") (quoting United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.1988)).

An investigatory stop is permissible on a reasonable suspicion that a "person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227, 105 S.Ct. 675, 679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Soule, 908 F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1st Cir.1990).

The Hensley standard was satisfied in the present case. Although the police possessed no eyewitness evidence of criminal activity, except through their informant, "a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent," may, "taken together," raise a reasonable suspicion warranting further investigation. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1587, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880-81). Prior to stopping the Jackson vehicle, the police possessed reliable information from neighborhood residents concerning suspicious activities at the Hyannis house. The information was confirmed on at least three occasions through intermittent surveillance conducted by an officer with nine years' experience in the investigation of drug cases. The police observed that known felons, with past involvement in illicit drug activities, were frequenting the Hyannis house. The police were aware of Jackson's extensive criminal record, including his history of illegal drug activity. In addition, the confidential informant provided the police with detailed information concerning Jackson's personal participation in two drug transactions at the Hyannis house that evening. ²

Whether or not the cogency of the information possessed by the police prior to the investigatory stop amounted to probable cause for Jackson's arrest, as the district court found, there can be no doubt that it raised the requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. See id. 109 S.Ct. at 1585 ("[T]he level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.").

We conclude, furthermore, that the nature and scope of the police actions, subsequent to the lawful investigatory stop and prior to any arrest, were reasonably related to the suspicious circumstances which warranted the stop. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3480-81; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333-34, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam); Lott, 870 F.2d at 783; Gilliard, 847 F.2d at 24. There was good reason to suspect that the occupants of the Jackson vehicle were armed and dangerous. The officers were informed that Jackson, a known felon, was seen conducting two drug transactions at the Hyannis house, while in possession of a firearm. Furthermore, law enforcement officers know from experience that firearms are often found in the presence of illegal drugs, see, e.g., United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir.1990) ("in drug trafficking[,] firearms have become 'tools of the trade' "); accord United States v. Green, 887 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1989).

Once the Hyannis police discovered the cocaine concealed on Edwards's person there was probable cause to arrest Edwards, and the police were permitted to...