U.S. v. Johns, 83-1595

• Citation: 728 F.2d 953
• Decision Date: 01 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-1595,83-1595
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Yvonne Cooks JOHNS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 953

728 F.2d 953

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Yvonne Cooks JOHNS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 83-1595.

United States Court of Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 4, 1983.

Decided March 1, 1984.

Kay L. Pomeranz, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

James A. Lewis, Asst. U.S. Atty., Springfield, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BAUER and ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. ^*

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

Yvonne Cooks Johns pled guilty to kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201, and was sentenced to a term of fifty years. The sole issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to raise a bona fide doubt about Johns' competency. We hold that there was, and therefore remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

The defendant was charged with kidnapping in an indictment returned February 9, 1983. Counsel was appointed, and at the opening of a hearing on February 15, the following colloquy ensued:

Court: How do you plead?

Noll [defense attorney]: Not guilty.

Johns: I pled [sic] guilty, Your Honor.

Noll: Not guilty, Your Honor.

Johns: Yes, I do. I want to plead guilty. I am guilty. I plead guilty.

Mr. Noll, again over his client's objections, suggested a short recess. When the hearing resumed, Mr. Noll requested leave to withdraw as Johns' counsel, informing the court that his client's desire to plead guilty was against his recommendation. Judge Ackerman questioned the defendant about her plea, and her understanding of counsel's reasons for opposing the plea. The defendant responded:

Your Honor, forgive me, but the mockery is over. The lord reigneth in me. I cannot plead innocent or not guilty to something I am guilty of. I am guilty. I do plead guilty.

Judge Ackerman then questioned the defendant about her background. He ascertained that Johns had completed high school and two years of "x-ray school," that she had come to Illinois to work in a house of prostitution where she had remained for a week, that she had no friends or relatives in the area, and that she had never been in trouble with the law or treated for mental illness. Judge Ackerman then carefully outlined the rights that the defendant would be relinquishing with a guilty plea, and questioned the defendant about her understanding of these rights. Johns replied that she understood, and the following colloquy ensued:

Johns: My grief is over, and--it's over. I would also like to waive my right to an attorney because I don't need one.

Court: Okay.

Johns: The lord is my attorney.

Court: Okay. We will get to that in just a minute. Are you okay? Do you want a short recess?

Johns: No.

Johns was then sworn and questioned by the judge concerning the factual basis of her plea. Johns insisted that no one helped her commit the kidnapping, despite having told several inconsistent stories to various law enforcement authorities. The judge asked Johns again whether she had ever been treated for mental illness, and Johns replied that she had not. He then asked Mr. Noll if he believed Johns was competent. Noll replied that she was. The judge tentatively accepted Johns' guilty plea, but advised the defendant that it was unwise to proceed without a lawyer. The defendant replied:

I am able to represent--God is my defense. I am--I don't need--I don't need anyone.

Mr. Noll was then allowed to withdraw as Johns' attorney.

At a presentencing hearing on February 24, Judge Ackerman told the defendant that he wanted to be sure she understood the consequences of both her guilty plea and her decision to proceed pro se. In response to questioning by the judge, the defendant either did not respond or answered merely "yes" or "no." At the March 25 sentencing hearing, the following discussion ensued:

Court: Miss Johns, do you want to say anything to the Court? You want to say anything before sentence is imposed?

Johns: No.

Court: Would you--I know this is a formal place.... Would you like to talk to me? Would you like to tell me anything that you think I ought to know ... to make your sentence less or make me understand more your situation or perspective?

See what I mean?

Would you like to tell me about this?

Receiving no response, the judge left the bench to sit with the defendant and asked three more times if the defendant had any response to the government's case. Again, the defendant said nothing. The judge then asked whether the defendant had read the presentence report. The defendant said she had not, and then that she had read some of it. The judge suggested a short recess so she could read the report, but the defendant refused:

Court: You say no, you don't want to?

Johns: I believe in Jesus Christ.

Court: You believe in the Lord. I understand, but--

Johns: I believe in Christ.

Court: Yes. Okay. I understand that. How about the presentence report. Have you read it?

Johns: I really have no more to say.

Court: You have no more to say?

Johns: (Shook head.)

Within one month of the sentencing hearing, the defendant was transferred to the hospital at Alderson Penitentiary in West Virginia. She remained in the hospital for one month and on May 27, 1983, was transferred to the Female Psychiatric Service Ward at the Federal Correctional Center in Lexington, Kentucky.

II.

If a court is presented with circumstances that raise a bona fide doubt about a defendant's "present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding," or call into question a defendant's "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings," Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam), the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent. United States v. Chavez, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 733, 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1976); Wolcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879, 90 S.Ct. 156, 24 L.Ed.2d 137 (1969). In federal courts, if reasonable cause exists to doubt a defendant's competence at any time after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence, a court must sua sponte order a psychiatric examination of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4244. ¹ Once a good-faith doubt exists, the court may not rule on the defendant's competency before it orders the Sec. 4244 examination. United States v. Metcalfe, 698 F.2d 877, 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1886, 76 L.Ed.2d 814 (1983); Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251, 1255 (8th Cir.1975). ² When a court had made findings about the competency of a defendant, we will overturn those findings only upon a showing that they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1980), and cases cited therein. But when there has been no psychiatric examination or judicial determination, our review is comprehensive. See United States v. Chavez, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.1981).

At the first hearing before Judge Ackerman, the defendant contradicted her attorney, who evidently had believed until that moment that the defendant intended to plead not guilty. The attorney requested that he be allowed to withdraw because his client's plea placed him in a "difficult position," but maintained that "this woman needs assistance of counsel." The defendant soon after waived assistance of counsel, stating "The lord is my attorney." The defendant's actions and statements, coupled with the fact that she pled guilty at an early stage of the proceedings with no attempt to bargain, should have raised suspicion about her ability to "consult with [her] attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). See United States v. Chavez, 656 F.2d 512, 519 (9th Cir.1981) (court considered similar factors as evidence raising bona fide doubt).

Suspicions about the defendant's competency reached the level of a bona fide doubt at the defendant's next two pro se appearances before the court. The defendant often remained silent when questioned by the judge. When she did reply, her responses were either monosyllabic or nonresponsive. For instance, in response to the court's inquiry about whether she wanted to read the presentence report, the defendant replied, "I believe in Jesus Christ." See Osborne v. Thompson, 481 F.Supp. 162 (M.D.Tenn.1979), aff'd, 610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.1979). When asked at least three times if she would say anything to the court before sentencing, the defendant remained silent. See Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 85-86 (2d Cir.1976) (to protect defendant's right of allocution, court should not proceed to sentencing where defendant's nonresponsive replies raise doubt about competency).

The government contends that the defendant's testimony relating the factual basis of her plea indicates an ability to recall and recount the underlying circumstances of the charge. However, at the sentencing hearing, the government attorney told the court:

[T]he stories Miss Johns has told--told on many occasions to various people within and without law enforcement communities can only be said to be inconsistent.... The only thing consistent about her statement is that it always seems to evolve from a previous statement she's given based upon whatever new information she learns.... I think that every time there is a new piece of information that contradicts something she said previously, she is more than willing to say, oh, yes, I did that also.

The government also points to the care with which the trial judge advised the defendant of the rights she was relinquishing by deciding to plead guilty and proceed pro se. Judge Ackerman's concern that the defendant be fully apprised of the import of her decisions is evident from the record. The record does not demonstrate,...