U.S. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 01 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. CRIM. 3:00CR00026.,CRIM. 3:00CR00026.
• Citation: 136 F.Supp.2d 553
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Coleman Leake JOHNSON.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

136 F.Supp.2d 553

UNITED STATES of America, v. Coleman Leake JOHNSON.

No. CRIM. 3:00CR00026.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

March 1, 2001.

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Thomas K. Bondurant, Jr., Anthony P. Giorno, Assist. U.S. Attorneys, Roanaoke, VA, for U.S.

Frederick T. Heblich, Jr., Charlottesville, VA, Gerald T. Zerkin, Zerkin & Assoc., Richmond, VA, Scott L. Reichle, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MOON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on various motions in limine filed by the Defendant, Coleman Leake Johnson. The Court will now address each motion individually.

I. Defendant's Motion to Strike Aggravating Factors

The Defendant moves the Court to strike statutory aggravating factors (a)¹ and (e),² and each of the non-statutory aggravating factors³ set forth in the Government's Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty ("Notice"). Before addressing the specifics of the Defendant's challenges, it worth while to briefly review the sentencing roles served by the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq.

The Supreme Court has held that, "[t]o pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must `genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.'" Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)). The requisite narrowing of death-eligible defendants occurs at the penalty phase of the case.

If a defendant is convicted of a crime for which the death penalty is authorized, the task of determining whether to impose the death penalty will fall upon the jury. The jury must pass through several sequential steps before a sentence of death may be imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq.; United States v. Davis, 912 F.Supp. 938 (E.D.La.1996). If the Government fails to carry its burden as to any of the statutorily-prescribed steps, the jury may not consider a sentence of death.

First, the jury must decide the threshold issue of whether the defendant committed the capital offense with the requisite "intent." 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D). Then, only if the jurors unanimously conclude that one of the four intent criteria outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D) has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, can they move on to the second step in the process.

Assuming the jury finds that the defendant acted with at least one of the enumerated mental states, it must then consider the specific statutory aggravating factors for which notice has been given to determine which, if any, exist. See id. at § 3592(c). To move on from the eligibility phase to the selection phase, the jury must first find that the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at § 3593(d).

If the jurors make such a finding, they may then "consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists." Id. Further, the defendant may put before the jury proof of any mitigating factors he believes weighs against a sentence of death. See id. at § 3592(a). The Government has the burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury's finding as to that factor must be unanimous. See id. at § 3593(c), (d). The Defendant's burden of establishing any mitigating factor is by a preponderance of the information, and unanimity amongst jurors is not required. See id.

To assist jurors in distinguishing between those who deserve to be executed and those who do not, the FDPA asks jurors to conduct a balancing analysis and "to consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist." Id. at § 3593(e). Based upon this consideration, the jury is required to recommend by unanimous vote whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. See id.

There remain, of course, limits to what information may be presented to the jury during the penalty phase. Given the risk that "the weighing process may be impermissibly skewed if the sentencing jury considers an invalid factor," Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 398, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999), the Court will now set forth the standard for assessing, and then individually assess, the adequacy of each of the challenged factors.

First, an aggravating factor must not be overbroad. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). "[T]he circumstances may not apply to every defendant convicted of murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder." Id. (citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993)).

Second, the aggravating factor must not be unconstitutionally vague. See id. (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980)). Vagueness is ascertained by assessing whether an aggravating factor is defined in terms too vague to provide sufficient guidance to the sentencer. See id. (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)). The factor must have "some common-sense core meaning ... that criminal juries should be capable of understanding." Id.

Third, the aggravating factor must be "sufficiently relevant to the question of who should live and who should die." Davis, 912 F.Supp. at 943; see Arave, 507 U.S. at 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534; United States v. Friend, 92 F.Supp.2d 534, 541 (E.D.Va. 2000). The factor must be "focused on circumstances that are considered by a civilized society to be particularly relevant to the sentencing decision." Friend, 92 F.Supp.2d at 541 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Fourth, it is essential that the aggravating factor be measured "in perspective of the fundamental requirement of heightened reliability that is keystone to making `the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'" Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)). The need for "heightened reliability" in making such a decision is driven by the fact that a death sentence is qualitatively different from any other sentence. Id. Heightened reliability comes into play in assessing overbreadth, vagueness, and relevance. As to overbreadth, the requirement of heightened reliability assures that the proposed factor imposes an "inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence," and, in so doing, prohibits factors that apply to almost all murders. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (citation omitted). As to vagueness, heightened reliability serves to underscore the requirement that the factor must genuinely narrow those eligible for the death penalty, see id., while also serving to foreclose an unacceptable risk of randomness in the sentencing process. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 974-75, 114 S.Ct. 2630; Friend, 92 F.Supp.2d at 542. Finally, as to relevance, heightened reliability controls the quality of the information given to the jury in the sentencing phase, thereby assuring that the sentencer only receives evidence which bears on the selection of who, among those eligible for death, should die and who should live. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192, 96 S.Ct. 2909; Friend, 92 F.Supp.2d at 542.

A. Statutory Aggravating Factors

1. Death During Commission of Another Crime

The Defendant contends that it is improper to use a crime that is predicate of the capital offense itself as a statutory aggravating factor. He argues that the use of the statutory aggravating factor of "Death During Commission of Another Crime," 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1), is improper for it is duplicative of the underlying death-eligible offense, and would impermissibly enable the Government to use the same conduct for the dual purpose of conviction and sentencing. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F.Supp. 1478 (D.Colo. 1996); United States v. Kaczynski, 1997 WL 716487 (E.D.Cal.1997). By allowing the jury to weigh as an aggravating factor a crime which they had already necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant alleges that the jury will begin its weighing process with the scales already tipped toward death. See McVeigh, 944 F.Supp. at 1489-90; Kaczynski, 1997 WL 716487 at *23. The Defendant further claims that the use of this factor would violate the requirements of relevance and heightened reliability.

This Court is not the first to respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the McVeigh and Kaczynski courts. See United States v. Frank, 8 F.Supp.2d 253 (S.D.N.Y.1998); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y.2001). To begin, "[t]here is nothing wrong with permitting the jury during sentencing to consider crimes for which [the defendant] has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d at 301 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 91 F.Supp.2d 90, 108-09 (D.D.C.2000)). "This is especially true when Congress has legislated that a defendant's concurrent commission of certain crimes shall be a probative consideration as to the gravity of the murder." Id. at 301. By passing 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and making it a death eligible offense, Congress necessarily made the determination that the offense itself, when resulting in a death, is particularly relevant and related to the decision of who should live and who should die.

Further, ignoring the crime at sentencing would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence holding that the jury must take into account the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the...