U.S. v. Klayer

Citation707 F.2d 892
Decision Date23 May 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-5228,82-5228
Parties12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1909 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles W. KLAYER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

John B. Southard, Jr. (argued), Middletown, Ky. (court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.

Ronald E. Meredith, U.S. Atty., Hancy Jones, III, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge, PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge, and HILLMAN, District Judge. *

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.

This is a direct appeal by Charles W. Klayer (Klayer) from his convictions for mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1341, 1343, in a jury trial in the Western District of Kentucky. Klayer, who was previously convicted by a federal jury on 16 counts of bank fraud, now raises three assignments of error addressing the conduct of the trial judge, the propriety of testimony by his ex-wife, and the introduction into evidence for impeachment purposes of Klayer's prior conviction in the event that he elected to testify.

The trial of the instant case was accomplished in a single day and involved simply the charge that Klayer had filed a fraudulent insurance claim for a $4,000 silver tray which he listed as having been stolen. His wife, however, repudiated Klayer's assertion and testified that they, the Klayers, never owned a silver tea service tray. The jury convicted Klayer. The trial judge, having considered the defendant's prior record of convictions, imposed a five-year prison sentence on each of two counts to be served concurrently. The present timely appeal ensued.

Initially, Klayer argues that the conduct and demeanor of the trial judge conveyed a bias against the defendant in the presence of the jury that denied him a fair trial. A review of the record forcefully discloses that the conduct complained of was simply basic trial management and resulted from counsel's lack of familiarity with elementary rules of federal practice and procedure.

While this Court has long adhered to the firm position that a trial judge must maintain "impartiality in demeanor as well as in actions", United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir.1979), this Court has also explicitly recognized that "[i]f the attorneys in a case are unprepared or obstreperous, judicial intervention is often called for." Id. On review of the record in the instant case, it is apparent that appellant's characterization of the nature and scope of the trial judge's conduct is plainly without merit.

Klayer's second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in permitting his ex-wife, Connie Bryant (Bryant), to testify that the Klayers never owned a $4,000 silver tea service tray and that she refused her ex-husband's request to sign the fraudulent insurance claim. The district judge ruled that Bryant was competent to testify to all but "confidential marital communications" and that Klayer had no general privilege to foreclose her competent testimony.

Fed.R.Evid. 501 provides that, except as otherwise explicitly prescribed or when controlled by state law, the privilege of a witness is to "be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980), the Supreme Court analyzed the common law privilege of the accused to preclude the testimony of a spouse. The Court found that the underlying concept of the legal unity of a husband and wife was both "outmoded" in light of the legal status acquired by women, and "unpersuasive" as a contemporary model of marital harmony. Id. at 52, 100 S.Ct. at 913. Consequently, the Court concluded that " 'reason and experience' no longer justify so sweeping a rule" as that which permitted a defendant to completely bar the testimony of a spouse. Id. at 53, 100 S.Ct. at 913. Instead, Trammel pronounced the rule that "the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely." Id.

Having determined that no privilege based upon the legal relationship of husband and wife between defendant and the witness would be recognized in the defendant, the Trammel Court stated that a privilege founded upon the expectation of confidentiality in private communications between spouses would meet the "reason and experience" test of Rule 501. Id. at 51, 100 S.Ct. at 912. Trammel specifically noted that the holdings of Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14, 54 S.Ct. 279, 280, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934) ("Communications between the spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been confidential, and hence they are privileged."), and Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951), remained valid. Id. 445 U.S. at 45, n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 909, n. 5, 51, 100 S.Ct. at 912. The Court observed, however, that private marital communications do not encompass "[evidence] of communications made in the presence of third persons." Id. See also Weinstein's Evidence, Privileges p 501, p. 501-29, n. 17 (1982).

In the case at bar, Klayer argues that it was error to receive the following testimony:

Q. [by the assistant U.S. attorney]: What contact [with the insurance company] did you have?

A. [by Klayer's ex-wife, Connie Bryant]: Charles called me, and I was in a meeting at the office, one of my schools. Charles called me and said he was at the--with the insurance adjuster and asked my permission to sign the papers for the claim. I asked--I said, "No, I'd rather he didn't sign my name to any papers," and he explained it was all very simple, you know. He wanted my permission. And I said no. And at that time the insurance adjuster was on the phone.

It is significant...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • State v. Varszegi
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 19, 1996
    ...and does not address the outcome of the appeal. See United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892, 895 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S.Ct. 180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983); United States v. Vanderbosch, 610 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir.197......
  • U.S. v. Irons
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • July 28, 2009
    ...of these communications because the defendant did not know that they were being monitored or recorded.2 Cf. United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir.1983) (holding that telephone conversation was not protected by the marital communications privilege when both husband and wife kne......
  • U.S. v. Robinson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • May 31, 1985
    ...340 U.S. 332, 333, 71 S.Ct. 301, 302, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1241 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983). This privilege, however, applies only to conduct an......
  • U.S. v. Sims
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • February 28, 1985
    ...retains the privilege to foreclose testimony regarding confidential marital communications under Blau and Wolfle. See United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 A number of circuits have developed a "joint participants" ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2015 Contents
    • July 31, 2015
    ...Cir. 1978). Use of convictions where suspended sentences were received is permissible for impeachment purposes. United States v. Klayer , 707 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 104 S.Ct. 180 (1983). Defendant may be impeached by prior convictions , even though the conviction was on ap......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2016 Contents
    • July 31, 2016
    ...Cir. 1978). Use of convictions where suspended sentences were received is permissible for impeachment purposes. United States v. Klayer , 707 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 104 S.Ct. 180 (1983). Defendant may be impeached by prior convictions , even though the conviction was on ap......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2017 Contents
    • July 31, 2017
    ...Cir. 1978). Use of convictions where suspended sentences were received is permissible for impeachment purposes. United States v. Klayer , 707 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 104 S.Ct. 180 (1983). Defendant may be impeached by prior convictions , even though the conviction was on ap......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2018 Contents
    • July 31, 2018
    ...Cir. 1978). Use of convictions where suspended sentences were received is permissible for impeachment purposes. United States v. Klayer , 707 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 104 S.Ct. 180 (1983). Defendant may be impeached by prior convictions , even though the conviction was on ap......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT