U.S. v. Lafley

• Decision Date: 01 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–30132.,10–30132.
• Citation: 11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11376,656 F.3d 936,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13495
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Charles Wade LAFLEY, a/k/a Wade Lafley, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

656 F.3d 936

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,376

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,495

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Charles Wade LAFLEY, a/k/a Wade Lafley, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–30132.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 9, 2011.Filed Sept. 1, 2011.

John Rhodes, Assistant Federal Defender, and Briana Schwandt, Legal Intern, Federal Defenders of Montana, Missoula, MT, for the defendant-appellant.Leif Johnson and Timothy J. Racicot, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and C. Casey Forbes, Law Intern., Missoula, MT, for the plaintiff-appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 6:00–cr–00019–DWM–2.Before: D.W. NELSON, SIDNEY R. THOMAS, and SUSAN P. GRABER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question whether a convicted methamphetamine dealer is entitled, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb–4, to use marijuana during his period of supervised release. In the circumstances presented by this case, the district court declined to suspend the mandatory supervised release condition prohibiting such use. We affirm.

I

Lafley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846. He was sentenced to 110 months of imprisonment to be followed by 60 months of supervised release. The court imposed conditions of supervised release prohibiting Lafley from committing “another federal, state, or local crime,” from “possess[ing] a controlled substance without a valid prescription,” and from “consuming, possessing or ingesting alcoholic beverages.” Lafley served his term of imprisonment and began serving his term of supervised release.

While on supervised release, Lafley tested positive for marijuana. According to his probation officer's report, when he was confronted with the positive test he “readily admitted his use and advised he had been feeling very stressed, nearly suicidal, and thought about returning to prison.” Lafley rejected inpatient treatment through the Veterans Administration, but he did adjust his prescription medication and continued outpatient treatment. Accordingly, and because Lafley tested negative for marijuana, the probation officer's subsequent report recommended that the court take no further action. The court accepted the officer's recommendation.

Subsequently, the probation officer filed a petition for a warrant for Lafley's arrest. The petition alleged two violations of the terms of Lafley's supervised release: that he consumed alcohol and that he refused to participate in substance abuse testing. The court issued an arrest warrant. An amended petition additionally alleged that when the warrant was executed, Lafley was driving on a suspended license and possessed marijuana. Lafley pleaded guilty to violations of state law and was sentenced to ten days in jail and a $530 fine.

At his revocation hearing, Lafley admitted the allegations in the amended petition. Relying on his admissions, the court found him in violation of the conditions of supervised release. However, Lafley and witnesses who spoke on his behalf argued that he was a changed man.¹ The court offered Lafley “one more chance” and delayed the imposition of sentence for four months.²

At the subsequent disposition hearing, Lafley and his lawyer testified that, over the prior four months, Lafley had procured a driver's license and auto insurance, bought a car, found a place to live, and attended treatment. Lafley's lawyer stated that Lafley was no longer “drinking alcohol, he's not getting into fights, he's not making drugs, he's not dealing drugs, he's not robbing places. He's working hard to be a respectful citizen as well as a respected citizen.” Lafley's lawyer concluded: “And he's worked hard to comply with the conditions of his release, although there is this marijuana issue.”

Apparently, Lafley had joined the Montana Cannabis Ministries and procured a medical marijuana card.³ Lafley admitted to using marijuana once, a month before his hearing, stating that he was “spiritually moved at the time to do so.” On the basis of his beliefs as a member of the Ministries, he argued that his free exercise rights under the First Amendment entitled him to a religious exemption to Standard Condition Number 7 that would allow his continued use of marijuana for religious purposes.⁴

Lafley called two witnesses to testify as to his religious beliefs. Randy Leibenguth, a leader of the Montana Cannabis Ministries, is “a Cannabis Sacrament Minister, a dispensary owner, and a D.J., who has lived between the cities of Bozeman and Belgrade, Montana[,] for the past seven years.” ⁵ Lucas Mulvaugh “is a minister at the Montana Cannabis Ministries and acts as the spiritual advisor.” In his allocution, Lafley testified to his rehabilitation, aided by his association with the Ministries, and his desire to continue that association—and to continue partaking in its “religious sacrament,” marijuana.⁶

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court sentenced Lafley to three months of incarceration followed by 57 months of supervised release. The court expressed doubt as to whether the Ministries is a religion, stating, “with ... all due respect ... it doesn't sound like a religion to me, it sounds like a way to smoke marijuana,” The court rejected Lafley's First Amendment challenge. Although Lafley had not specifically asserted a claim under RFRA, the district court rejected the applicability of the Act, citing United States v. Israel, 317 F.3d 768 (7th Cir.2003). In Israel, the Seventh Circuit rejected a Rastafarian's claim that he did not violate a condition of his supervised release because his sacramental use of marijuana was protected by RFRA.

When the court inquired of counsel whether Lafley had any final objections to his sentence, Lafley's lawyer responded: “Not beyond the religious freedom argument the[c]ourt has addressed.” Over that objection, the court imposed conditions of supervised release that prohibit Lafley from “commit[ting] any federal, state or local crime” and from “possess[ing] any controlled substance.” The court specified that Lafley could not “use ... medical marijuana” or use marijuana as a member of the Ministries. The court's written judgment included Standard Condition Number 7, providing that during the term of Lafley's supervised release he “shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance” and “shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance ... except as prescribed by a physician.”

The district court later issued a written order explaining its reasoning for denying Lafley's objection to the Condition. The court focused on Lafley's First Amendment claim but also held that, even if Lafley had raised a RFRA claim—and, further, even if he qualified for the Act's protections because the Condition would substantially burden his sincere religious belief—“the Act would not provide the relief he seeks ... because [the Condition] serves ‘a compelling government interest in the least restrictive manner possible’ ” (quoting Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir.2002)). Lafley timely appealed.

II

On appeal, Lafley does not challenge the Condition on First Amendment grounds. Rather, he argues that insofar as the Condition prohibits his religious use of marijuana during his term of supervised release, it violates RFRA.

RFRA provides, in relevant part:

(a) In general

Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Exception

Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1.⁷ “A person whose religious practices are burdened in violation of RFRA ‘may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.’ ” O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 424, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c)).

Thus, RFRA requires a two-step analysis. A claimant under the Act must first establish a prima facie case by showing that the government action at issue “works a substantial burden on his ability to freely practice his religion.” Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1222; see Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1068; United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (a claimant “may only invoke RFRA if his beliefs are both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief” (internal quotation marks omitted)). If a claimant establishes a substantial burden on his exercise of religion, the challenged government action may nonetheless be upheld if the government “demonstrates” that the action “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and is implemented by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b); see also id. § 2000bb–2(3) (“the term ‘demonstrates' means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion”); Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1068.

The district court did not reach the question whether Lafley had established a prima facie case or whether Montana Cannabis Ministries constituted a religion entitled to protection under RFRA, reasoning that the government satisfied its burden at the second step of the RFRA analysis. Therefore, we consider the arguments pertaining to that stage of analysis and decline to reach any other question.⁸

A

The government has a compelling interest in denying a convicted drug felon a religious exemption that would permit him to use drugs while serving his term of...