U.S. v. Lawson, 98-2157
| Decision Date | 09 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-2157,98-2157 |
| Citation | 173 F.3d 666 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bobbie Lee LAWSON, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John W. Rogers, Columbia, MO, argued, for Appellant.
Lawrence E. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Jefferson, City, MO, argued (Stephen L. Hill, Jr., on the brief), for Appellee.
Before: McMILLIAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
Bobbie Lee Lawson was convicted of four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). 1 The district court 2 sentenced Lawson to 235 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On appeal, Lawson contends that (1) the reading of the government's stipulation, which stated that Lawson had three prior felony convictions but did not state the name or nature of these convictions, prejudiced the jury and violated Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); 3 (2) the district court erred in refusing to sever Count Four which, like Counts One, Two, and Three, charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm; and (3) the district court erred in submitting certain jury instructions because they did not accurately state the law. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
On March 27, 1994, Lawson pawned a Smith and Wesson, Model 49, .38 caliber revolver at King's Row Antiques and Pawn ("King's Row") in Fulton, Missouri. In exchange, Lawson received a fifty dollar loan. This firearm was manufactured in Springfield, Massachusetts. On April 2, 1994, Lawson returned to King's Row, paid the outstanding charges, and took the firearm out of pawn. On April 25, 1994, Lawson again returned to King's Row and pawned the same firearm. 4
On December 6, 1994, Michael Lee Nickens, Sr. reported to the Fulton, Missouri Police Department that Lawson and he had been involved in a dispute and that Lawson had shot at him. After the police responded and surrounded Lawson's residence, the police discovered that Lawson had suffered a gunshot wound to the abdomen. Following Lawson's surrender, police searched the residence which Lawson shared with his mother, Goldie Mae Cross. In a trash can located near the entrance to the bedroom where the officers had observed Lawson prior to this surrender, the officers discovered a Harrington and Richardson, Model 632, .32 caliber revolver. This firearm was manufactured in Gardner, Massachusetts. 5
On December 14, 1994, after finding that Lawson previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, the federal grand jury returned an Indictment charging Lawson with three counts 6 of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On October 25, 1995, Lawson entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the Indictment pursuant to a written Plea Agreement. On January 30, 1996, the district court sentenced Lawson to 180 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Lawson appealed his sentence, asking that this Court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because the district court allegedly did not inform Lawson of the possible maximum sentence or the effects of a violation of his supervised release. On June 20, 1997, this Court vacated Lawson's conviction and sentence and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 7
On September 4, 1997, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, recharging Lawson with the three previous counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and adding a fourth count which also charged Lawson with being a felon in possession of a firearm, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On October 21, 1997, Lawson filed a motion to sever Count Four of the Superseding Indictment from Counts One, Two, and Three. In addition, Lawson filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence of his prior criminal convictions and offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year. The district court denied both motions.
On December 10, 1997, after a two-day trial, the jury found Lawson guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced Lawson to 235 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Lawson appeals.
As his first point on appeal, Lawson argues that the district court erred in rejecting his proposed stipulation 8 that he previously had been convicted of a felony and in permitting the reading of the government's stipulation 9 that Lawson had three prior felony convictions which spanned the time period of 1968 to 1990. Lawson contends that, by admitting this evidence, the district court allowed the government to paint Lawson as a career criminal which lured the jury into a sequence of bad character reasoning. This career criminal image created a substantial risk of unfair prejudice to Lawson's defense, in violation of Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185, 191, 117 S.Ct. 644.
The government counters that the district court did not err in allowing the reading of a stipulation that Lawson had three prior felony convictions because this stipulation did not mention the name or nature of the felonies. Therefore, the government concludes that this stipulation did not violate Old Chief because the sole issue in Old Chief was "whether a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns ... an offer [to stipulate] and admits the full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations." Id. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 644 (emphasis added).
We agree with the government's analysis of the particular issue in Old Chief. In Old Chief, a majority of the Supreme Court determined that:
there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. That risk will vary from case to case ... but will be substantial whenever the official record offered by the Government would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning.
Id. at 185, 117 S.Ct. 644 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Blake, 107 F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir.1997) (same). However, this case presents a slightly different issue. Although the parties dispute whether the district court's rejection of Lawson's offer to stipulate and the reading of the government's stipulation setting forth the dates and jurisdiction for three of Lawson's prior convictions sufficed to trigger Old Chief, we do not need to reach this issue.
The reason that we do not reach this issue is because, "[t]o warrant relief under Old Chief, the asserted error must not be harmless." United States v. Harris, 137 F.3d 1058, 1060 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 120, 142 L.Ed.2d 96 (1998). Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an error is harmless if it "does not affect substantial rights." Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). We interpret Rule 52(a) to require reversal of a conviction "only if the jury may have been substantially swayed by improperly admitted evidence." Taylor, 122 F.3d at 688 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
In the instant case, even if we assume, without deciding, that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government's stipulation and that the government had the burden to prove that the asserted error was harmless, we nonetheless conclude that any error was, in fact, harmless because the evidence of Lawson's guilt was overwhelming.
Lawson agreed to stipulate to the first element of the offense: that he previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Regarding the second element, the government produced overwhelming evidence at trial of Lawson's knowing possession of the firearm in Counts One, Two, and Three. The owner/proprietor of King's Row, Millard Lander, identified Lawson in court and testified that Lawson brought a Smith & Wesson, Model 49, .38 caliber to King's Row to pawn, signed a pawn receipt, later returned to the pawn shop to take the same firearm out of pawn, and subsequently repawned this firearm to Mr. Lander. Mr. Lander also produced various pawn shop documents that recorded these pawn transactions, and a handwriting expert testified that Lawson's known signature matched the signatures on these pawn documents.
The government similarly produced overwhelming evidence of Lawson's knowing possession of the firearm in Count Four. Michael Nickens testified that he saw Lawson carrying a revolver and that Lawson shot this revolver at Nickens. When police officers executed a search warrant at Lawson's residence, 10 they found a Harrington & Richardson, Model 632, .32 caliber revolver in a trash can located near an entrance to the bedroom where the officers had seen Lawson immediately prior to his arrest.
Finally, the third element of the offense--that the firearms that Lawson possessed had been in or had affected interstate commerce--was also proven beyond a reasonable doubt with overwhelming evidence. Both parties agreed to the government's reading of the following stipulation at trial: Tr. II-21. We find that this stipulation satisfies "the minimal nexus that the firearms have been, at some time, in interstate commerce," that is, that the firearms at some point prior to Lawson's possession in Fulton, Missouri, crossed a state line. United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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