U.S. v. Layne

• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-6288.,No. 01-6399.,01-6288.,01-6399.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Krystal T. LAYNE (01-6288); William Dick (01-6399), Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 464

324 F.3d 464

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Krystal T. LAYNE (01-6288); William Dick (01-6399), Defendants-Appellants.

No. 01-6288.

No. 01-6399.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 2003.

Decided and Filed April 1, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul W. Laymon, Jr. (briefed), Assistant United States Attorney, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff-Appellee, U.S.

R. Dee Hobbs (briefed), Bell & Hobbs, Chattanooga, TN, for Defendant-Appellant, Krystal T. Layne.

Rita C. LaLumia (briefed), Asst. Public Defender, Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee, Inc., Chattanooga, TN, for Defendant-Appellant, William Dick.

Before COLE, GILMAN, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.^*

OPINION

COLE, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-Appellants William Dick and Krystal Tate Layne ("Defendants") were convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with the intent to distribute the same. Defendants now appeal the sentences they received as a result of the district court's application of United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) in their cases. Defendants: (1) complain that the district court erroneously concluded that they operated a methamphetamine laboratory that posed a substantial risk of harm to human life, triggering the application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A); and (2) challenge the constitutionality of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. As explained in more detail below, we now AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

The essential facts in this case are undisputed. On February 21, 2001, based on information obtained from a confidential informant, law enforcement officers of the Chattanooga, Tennessee Police Department and the local Drug Enforcement Agency office obtained and executed a search warrant on an apartment rented by William Dick on Mountain Creek Road in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Upon executing the warrant, the officers discovered Krystal Tate Layne and Bryan Ritchie in the apartment. Ritchie had ephedrine in his pants and Layne had methamphetamine in her mouth. Dick returned shortly after the officers arrived.

Dick, Layne, and Ritchie had been in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine using the ephedrine reduction method. When the warrant was executed, they had finished the "cooking" process and were waiting for the liquid methamphetamine produced to cool so that they could separate certain liquids and gas from the mixture. During the search, the officers recovered various items, including flammable and toxic chemicals commonly used during the cooking process, from throughout Dick's apartment.

Defendants had been operating this methamphetamine laboratory in Dick's apartment for at least two weeks. The apartment was located in a densely settled area. Defendants used methamphetamine while operating the laboratory, which made the operation more dangerous. The ephedrine reduction method of manufacturing methamphetamine involves the use of numerous dangerous and toxic chemicals, and creates, as byproducts, toxic gases, which are carcinogenic when inhaled. By the time of the search, Defendants had reached the stage of the process during which toxic, carcinogenic phosphine or phosgene gas is produced, but had not yet reached the final stage of the manufacturing process during which hydriodic gas, which is also toxic, is produced.

Dick and Layne were charged, along with Ritchie, whose appeal is not now before this Court, in a March 13, 2001 indictment alleging that the trio conspired, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On May 18, 2001, Dick and Layne each pleaded guilty to the single count against them.

On October 5, 2001, the district court held a sentencing hearing at which it considered Defendants' timely objections to the application of Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) in their cases. Section 2D1.1(b)(6)(A), which is now found at § 2D1.1(b)(5)(B), but remains substantially similar, applies where the offense involved a methamphetamine laboratory that caused a substantial risk of harm to human life or the environment. When applicable, the provision generally requires a three-level increase of a defendant's offense level. However, if an increase of three levels will not result in an offense level of twenty-seven, this provision provides that the offense level should be automatically increased to twenty-seven.

After hearing testimony and argument, the district court concluded that the offense committed by Defendants involved the operation of a methamphetamine laboratory that created a substantial risk of harm to human life, and, therefore, denied Defendants' objections to the application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A).

The district court attributed 19.4 grams of methamphetamine mixture to each of Defendants. As a result, Defendants each had a Base Offense Level of eighteen. The district court then applied the specific offense characteristic set out in § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) and increased each of Defendants' offense levels by nine, to twenty-seven. The district court next adjusted Defendants' offense levels downward by three levels for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to Guideline §§ 3E1.1(a), (b), to reach a Total Offense Level of 24. Defendants were each found to be in Criminal History Category IV.¹ The district court sentenced Defendants each to serve eighty-seven months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The district court later memorialized its ruling in a November 13, 2001 memorandum and order.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A)

When reviewing the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review a district court's findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 844-45 (6th Cir.2001). The underlying facts in this case are uncontested. Whether the district court properly found the existence of a substantial risk of harm to human life or the environment within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) is a mixed question of law and fact, and, as such, it is subject to de novo review. See United States v. Georgia, 279 F.3d 384, 386-87 (6th Cir.2002). Once the district court has found the existence of a substantial risk of harm, the application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) is mandatory and is reviewed de novo. Cf. United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 389 (6th Cir.2002) (discussing Guidelines § 3C1.1, the obstruction of justice enhancement). The application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) is an issue of first impression as neither this Court nor any of our sister circuits have addressed its application.

At the time of the offense committed in this case, February 21, 2001, Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) read:

If the offense (i) involved the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine; and (ii) created a substantial risk of harm to (I) human life other than a life described in subsection (b)(6)(B)[, which concerns harm to a minor or incompetent]; or (II) the environment, increase by 3 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 27, increase to level 27.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supp. to app. C, amendment 608 (2001).

Section 2D1.1(b)(6)(A) was created by an emergency amendment to the Guidelines, Amendment 608, effective December 16, 2000. Id. Amendment 608 was intended to address "the directive in section 102 (the `substantial risk directive') of the Methamphetamine and Club Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 ..., Pub.L. 106-878." Id.² The Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 (the "Act") required that the Sentencing Commission accomplish the following:

[I]n carrying out the substantial risk directive to provide the following enhancements —... (A) if the offense created a substantial risk of harm to human life (other than a life described in subparagraph (B)) or the environment, increase the base offense level for the offense —

(i) by not less than 3 offense levels above the applicable level in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(ii) if the resulting base offense level after an increase or under clause (I) would be less than level 27, to not less than level 27....

Id.

The Act was designed to stop the "methamphetamine epidemic in America." H.R. REP. 106-878, at *22 (Sept. 21, 2000). The House of Representatives explained the hazards associated with the "dangerous manufacturing process" for methamphetamine:

[M]ethamphetamine can be made from readily available and legal chemicals and substances, and ... it poses serious dangers to both human life and to the environment.... these chemicals and substances are utilized in a manufacturing process that is unstable, volatile, and highly combustible. Even small amounts of these chemicals, when mixed improperly, can cause explosions and fires. For every one pound of methamphetamine that is produced, approximately five pounds of toxic and often lethal waste products may be left behind at the laboratory site, or disposed of in rivers, kitchen sinks, or sewage systems in an effort to conceal evidence of illegal manufacturing. More disturbing is that most of these laboratories are situated in residences, motels, trailers, and vans, and often times are operated in the presence of children.

Id. at *22-*23.

The Act did not define "substantial risk of harm," so the Sentencing Commission provided factors to be considered in determining whether a substantial risk of harm was posed. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supp. to app. C, amendment 608 (2001). In particular, Application Note 21(A) to the former § 2D1.1 listed the following factors that a court may consider when determining the existence of a substantial risk of harm within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(6):

(A)Factors to Consider. — In determining, for purposes of subsection (b)(6), whether the offense created a substantial risk of harm to human life or the environment, the court may consider factors such as the...