U.S. v. Lewis

• Citation: 547 F.2d 1030
• Decision Date: 22 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1238,76-1238
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William Clyde LEWIS, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 1030

547 F.2d 1030

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William Clyde LEWIS, Appellant.

No. 76-1238.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 13, 1976.

Decided Dec. 28, 1976.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 22, 1977.

See 97 S.Ct. 1149.

Thomas M. Bradshaw, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

Robert B. Schneider, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee; Bert C. Hurn, U. S. Atty., Anthony P. Nugent, Kansas City, Mo., on brief.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRIGHT and WEBSTER, Circuit Judges.

WEBSTER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant William Clyde Lewis was indicted on two counts of bank robbery. ¹ Count I alleged that appellant and Sylvester Young robbed the Goppert Bank and Trust Company in Kansas City, Missouri, on or about May 16, 1975. Count II alleged that appellant and Young robbed the Central Bank in Kansas City on or about August 28, 1975. In a jury trial in which he was tried separately appellant was convicted of the offense charged under Count I and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the offense charged in Count II, and this count was dismissed by the District Court. ² On appeal, appellant contends (1) that he should have been granted a severance of counts, (2) that identification evidence should have been suppressed, (3) that his counsel should have been permitted to voir dire the jury, and (4) that the government made improper remarks in closing. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. Severance of Counts

Prior to trial appellant moved for a severance of counts, which the District Court denied. Appellant concedes that the counts were properly joined under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a) because the offenses charged were of "similar character," but he contends that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his motion for severance because of the degree of prejudice which necessarily resulted from a joint trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. ³

Appellant's claim of prejudice is based upon two separate grounds: (1) that the evidence of each robbery would have cumulative effect in the minds of the jurors which would prevent them from making an independent determination of guilt or innocence on each count; and (2) that a joint trial impermissibly interfered with his trial strategy of asserting an alibi only as to Count II. ⁴

The question of prejudice arising from joinder is addressed to the sound discretion of the District Court, and we may reverse only upon a finding of clear prejudice and abuse of discretion. United States v. Riley, 530 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961, 95 S.Ct. 1349, 43 L.Ed.2d 437 (1975).

In this case, appellant failed to renew his motion for severance either at the close of the government's case or at the conclusion of all the evidence. Such failure ordinarily constitutes waiver of the claim that a severance should have been granted. United States v. Johnson, 540 F.2d 954 at 959 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. West, 517 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948, 96 S.Ct. 365, 46 L.Ed.2d 283 (1975); United States v. Franklin, 452 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Porter, 441 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 238, 30 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971). We nonetheless review the claims of prejudice under the plain error doctrine. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).

A.

Here, the evidence of each crime was simple and distinct, and there was little danger of the jury cumulating the evidence. See Robinson v. United States, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 459 F.2d 847, 856 (1972); United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 622, 59 S.Ct. 793, 83 L.Ed. 1500 (1939); ⁵ cf. United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976); Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (1964). Moreover, the failure of the jury to arrive at a verdict on Count II supports an inference that the evidence of one crime did not have a cumulative effect upon the jury. The jury obviously discriminated between the evidence on each count. See United States v. Berlin, 472 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1973); Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 906 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832, 85 S.Ct. 62, 13 L.Ed.2d 40 (1964).

B.

Joinder of multiple counts arising from separate occurrences does expose a defendant to some potential difficulty in presenting separate and distinct defenses. Thus, a defendant may be willing to take the stand and testify as to one count but might prefer to remain silent and put the government to its proof on another count. The risk of exposing himself to cross-examination on one count in order to testify as to the other presents a dilemma which obviously contains the seeds of prejudice. See Baker v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 401 F.2d 958, 976-77 (1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S.Ct. 367, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970); Cross v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (1964).

Appellant did not take the stand nor does he contend that he would have done so if the counts had been tried separately. He gave the District Court no notice of this claim of prejudice. We do not regard the notice of alibi as to one count as providing such notice. If a severance were mandatory whenever a defendant chose to utilize a defense as to only one count, "a court would be divested of all control over the matter of severance and the choice would be entrusted to the defendant." See Holmes v. Gray, 526 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1975); Baker v. United States, supra, 401 F.2d at 976. See also Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 857, 87 S.Ct. 105, 17 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). ⁶ It is speculative to assume from the verdict that failure to adduce evidence of an alibi on Count I created an inference of guilt in the minds of the jury. Cf. Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 292, 21 L.Ed.2d 270 (1968). The District Court carefully admonished the jury in its opening instructions that the defendant never had the duty of producing any evidence or calling any witnesses. No challenge is made to the District Court's charge to the jury. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant's motion nor in the subsequent failure to order severance after evidence had been adduced.

II. Identification Evidence

At trial three employees of the Goppert Bank who were present at the bank during the robbery made positive in-court identifications of appellant as one of the robbers and also testified that they had made pretrial identifications of him at a lineup. Appellant contends on appeal that this evidence should have been suppressed on the ground the pretrial identifications were the result of unduly suggestive police procedures.

The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to suppress the identification testimony. At that hearing police officers and F.B.I. agents testified that on August 29, 1975, appellant was exhibited in a lineup with five other Negro males. Each witness was asked not to discuss his or her conclusions with the other witnesses. Each witness viewed the lineup separately. A form was provided on which the witness was asked to note the identification of a suspect by marking a box the number of which corresponded with a tag hanging from the suspect's neck. No indication of any kind was given to the witness that a particular man in the lineup was believed to be the robber. The three Goppert bank employees who later identified appellant in court selected him from the lineup as the robber. ⁷

It is appellant's contention that while there was no evidence of impermissibly suggestive conduct by police during the lineup, the makeup of the lineup was calculated to pinpoint appellant as the probable suspect. The same witnesses who identified him at the lineup had described the robber to police in varying heights and weights; they all agreed that he was a Negro male with light complexion and a receding hairline. We have studied this issue carefully in light of the three months which had elapsed between the robbery and the lineup. ⁸

A color photograph of the lineup was before the court during the evidentiary hearing and was a part of the record on appeal. After hearing the evidence, the District Court found that it was "a fair lineup, that it was carried out according to mandate of the law and there was no possible prejudice to the defendant."

A lineup should be conducted so that any identification made by a witness is not tainted by suggestive procedures. When such suggestiveness occurs, the court must examine the lineup to determine whether it "was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that (the defendant) was denied due process of law." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). If the lineup is found somewhat suggestive but not unconstitutionally so, the court must then inquire as to "whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive." ⁹ Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). See United States v. Jackson, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 509 F.2d 499, 505 (1974); Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 402-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016, 95 S.Ct. 2424, 44 L.Ed.2d 685 (1975). See also Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286, 293 (8th Cir. 1976).

There was nothing impermissibly suggestive about the clothing of the men in the lineup. All were Negro males. While appellant was the shortest of the six men, he was not significantly so; none of the men was unusually tall and all were within a range of about four inches. Whil...