U.S. v. Lovelace

Decision Date08 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. CR. 03-162(RJL).,CR. 03-162(RJL).
PartiesUNITED STATES v. Dantonio Marquies LOVELACE, and Darryl Dewayne Sedgewick
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Charles Joseph Harkins, Jr., U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Joanne Roney Hepworth, Law Offices of Joanne Roney Hepworth, Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, Joseph Roll Conte, Washington, DC, Anthony Jones, Riverdale, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEON, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendant Dantonio Marquies Lovelace's ("Lovelace") motions to suppress narcotics and an automatic handgun seized from him, as well as statements he made at the station house after his arrest on December 14, 2002. Co-defendant Darryl Dewayne Sedgewick ("Sedgewick") joins in defendant Lovelace's motion seeking to suppress the cocaine base seized from his person on the same occasion. Both defendants argue, in effect, that the police officers who stopped them lacked the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop of either of them, and defendant Lovelace further asserts that the statements he made following his arrest were involuntary. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees and DENIES both motions to suppress in their entirety.

Factual Background

At hearings held on these motions,1 Officer Joshua Branson of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") testified that at approximately 1:30 a.m. on December 14, 2002, he and Officer John Sucato were on uniformed patrol on the 3100 block of Naylor Road, S.E., Washington, D.C., when they observed a green, four-door Cadillac parked in the parking lot in front of 3111 Naylor Road. According to Branson, the vehicle was running and was occupied by three individuals. The driver was later identified as defendant Sedgewick, and the individual in the front passenger seat was later identified as defendant Lovelace. The vehicle was parked approximately five to ten feet from, and parallel to, the sidewalk running along Naylor Road. Branson was familiar with this parking lot and had made several narcotics-related arrests there.

Upon seeing the Cadillac, Officer Branson slowly pulled his cruiser into the parking lot so that he and Officer Sucato could investigate further. Officer Branson stopped approximately five plus feet from the Cadillac in a "nose to nose" position such that the driver would not have been able to drive forward without bumping into his cruiser. As he came to a stop in the parking lot and was exiting his cruiser Branson noticed that there was a black male standing outside of the passenger door of the Cadillac, engaging in what appeared to him to be a "hand to hand transaction." Upon seeing the cruiser, the black male turned and walked away from the scene. Officers Branson and Sucato exited their vehicle and immediately recognized the smell of marijuana emanating from the Cadillac. Branson walked around the back of the cruiser to the driver side door of the Cadillac, and engaged Sedgewick in conversation. Sucato walked to the passenger door of the Cadillac. While speaking with Sedgewick, Branson noticed a clear plastic cup of brown liquid in the cup holder near Sedgewick. Branson asked what was in the cup, and Sedgewick told him that the liquid was Remy Martin. Sedgewick was placed under arrest for possession of an open container of liquor in his car. A search of his person incident to the arrest yielded a large plastic bag containing small white rocks, weighing approximately 4.7 grams, which later field-tested positive for cocaine base.

While Officer Branson was speaking with Sedgewick, Officer Sucato noticed defendant Lovelace make reaching motions towards his waistband. Lovelace was removed from the vehicle and Branson conducted a pat-down search of Lovelace, which yielded a 9mm Lorcin semi-automatic handgun hidden in his waistband. A search of Lovelace's coat and pants pockets additionally yielded four clear plastic bags of a green weed-like substance, which later field-tested positive for THC, and two blue plastic bags containing a white rock substance, which field-tested positive for cocaine base. After Lovelace was transported to the police station, a more thorough search of his coat yielded a large white rock, approximately two inches in length, weighing approximately 25.5 grams, inside the lining of his coat. It too field-tested positive for cocaine base. In addition, after being provided his Miranda warnings, Lovelace gave Officer Branson a written, signed statement that he now seeks to suppress.

Discussion
I. Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized from Lovelace and Sedgewick in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer needs neither a warrant, nor probable cause, to conduct a brief investigatory stop of a suspect if he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1164 (D.C.Cir.2003). The defendants' arguments for suppression of the evidence seized from them are twofold. First, they argue that Officers Branson and Sucato effected an unlawful stop when they pulled into the parking lot and stopped in a position that blocked defendant Sedgewick from moving his vehicle. Second, defendant Lovelace argues that assuming, arguendo, that blocking the Cadillac did not constitute a stop, the officers had no probable cause to seize and search him because his mere presence in a vehicle containing contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the parking of the cruiser was not a stop and that the subsequent stop and pat-down of defendant Lovelace was permissible under Terry.

A. Blocking the Cadillac as a "Stop" or "Seizure"

A seizure arises "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen..." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Whether a defendant's liberty has been restrained is a function of whether a reasonable person under those circumstances, would have believed he was not free to leave the officer's presence. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C.Cir.1977); United States v. Eaglin, 759 F.Supp. 25, 26 (D.D.C.1991). Merely "approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer questions" or identifying oneself as a police officer is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). However, "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled" might be enough to constitute a seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536, 539-40 (D.C.Cir.1992).

In this case, the officers' act of placing their cruiser in a position that partially blocked the parked Cadillac's mobility was not a sufficient "show of authority" that would necessarily cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave the scene by other means. Indeed, the young man who appeared to be engaging in a hand to hand transaction with defendant Lovelace walked away undisturbed.2 Moreover, the officers' act of pulling into the parking lot and stopping in front of the Cadillac cannot reasonably be construed as the type of physical or verbal intimidation necessary under the Supreme Court's Mendenhall analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d at 540-41 (D.C.Cir.1992) (defendant had been seized where armed officer positioned himself directly behind defendant, commanded him to stop, and was so close that the defendant "had nowhere to go"); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1992) (defendant had been seized when narcotics officer asked for consent to search defendant's bag, and took and retained the defendant's driver's license, thereby preventing the defendant from leaving); United States v. Eaglin, 759 F.Supp. at 26-27 (defendant had been seized where two officers jumped from their vehicle, yelled "police," and displayed their guns as they approached the defendant, who was walking down the sidewalk). And while the D.C. Circuit has evaluated investigatory stops involving the blocking of defendants' vehicles to determine whether police conduct rose to the level of an arrest, other intimidating or threatening factors were present in those cases when they concluded a seizure had occurred. See United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1415 (D.C.Cir.1992) (defendant was seized when police pulled defendant off of the road, parked patrol cars in front and in back of defendant's car, and approached defendant's car to question him); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 36 (D.C.Cir.1981) (defendant was stopped when police blocked his car and approached with guns drawn); see also United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1317 (D.C.Cir.2000) (finding that district court was not obligated to conclude that the defendant was seized when the police officer pulled into a parking lot, blocking his car, because the defendant provided little factual support for his argument). Thus, in light of the circumstances presented here, and in the absence of any precedent to the contrary, the Court finds that the officers did not need reasonable articulable suspicion to pull into the parking lot and stop their cruiser in front of the Cadillac because doing so did not constitute a stop under Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

B. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion to Remove Lovelace from the Cadillac

Defendant Lovelace argues, in effect, that...

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  • United States v. Williams
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    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
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