United States v. Williams, Criminal Action No. 1:20-cr-00121 (CJN)

• Decision Date: 10 December 2020
• Docket Number: Criminal Action No. 1:20-cr-00121 (CJN)
• Citation: 507 F.Supp.3d 181
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Tavonte WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

507 F.Supp.3d 181

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Tavonte WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.

Criminal Action No. 1:20-cr-00121 (CJN)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed December 10, 2020

Steven B. Wasserman, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

John Peter Marston, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant Tavonte Williams.

Eugene Ohm, Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant Theodore B. Douglas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CARL J. NICHOLS, United States District Judge

Defendants Tavonte Williams and Theodore Douglas are each charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Currently before the Court are a series of pretrial motions from both Defendants and the government. The government moves to admit other crimes evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and to impeach Defendants’ testimony with their prior convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. See generally Government's Motion to Admit Other Crimes Evidence and To Impeach the Defendants’ with their Prior Convictions ("Gov.’s Mot. to Admit Evid."), ECF 28. Williams moves the court to sever his trial from Douglas's and to suppress an undercover officer's identification of him. See generally Williams's Motion to Sever Defendants’ Trials ("Williams's Mot. to Sever"), ECF 29; see also generally Williams's Motion to Suppress Identification ("William's Mot. to Supp. Id."), ECF 30. Douglas moves to suppress tangible evidence and statements obtained from his arrest and to suppress an undercover officer's identification of him. See generally Douglas's Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence ("Douglas's Mot. to Supp. Evid."), ECF 31; see also generally Douglas's Motion to Suppress Identification Testimony ("Douglas's Mot. to Supp. Id."), ECF 33. The Court grants the government's motion in part and denies it in part, and denies Defendants’ motions.

I. Background

On the afternoon of April 22, 2020, the Narcotics and Special Investigations Division ("NSID") of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") conducted an undercover operation in the 2300 block of 15^th Street, Northeast, Washington, D.C. See Motions Hearing Transcript ("Tr.") at 20. During this operation, an undercover officer, while sitting in an unmarked vehicle, observed an individual (later identified as Defendant Douglas) standing in a walkway between two buildings. Tr. at 30. Officer Jackson testified that he was about fifteen yards from the individual with a clear line of sight. Tr. at 30. Shortly thereafter, another individual (later identified as Defendant Williams) approached Douglas. Tr. at 30. According to Officer Jackson, Williams handed Douglas a black backpack in exchange for what appeared to be money, although Officer Jackson stated that he could not be sure that it was not some other light-colored object. Tr. at 29–30. Officer Jackson observed that Douglas quickly concealed the backpack, placing it on his back and putting his jacket on over it. Tr. at 30. Officer Jackson suspected that he had observed a transaction involving "either a large quantity of narcotics or possibly a firearm." Tr. at 39. He put a "lookout" over the police radio, describing what he had witnessed and asking for uniformed NSID officers in the area to respond. Govt. Ex. 3.

Responding to Officer Jackson's lookout, two uniformed officers approached Douglas in the same general location where Officer Jackson observed the backpack exchange. Tr. at 139–40. Officer Poupart greeted Douglas and the two other men with whom he was talking, advised Douglas that he was being stopped as part of an investigation, and guided Douglas away from the other two individuals by touching his arm. See BWC of Ofc. Poupart , ECF 34-1, at 2:11–2:36. Officer Poupart then placed Douglas in handcuffs and frisked him to determine if he had any weapons on his person. Id. Officer Poupart felt what he says he immediately knew to be a firearm in the backpack underneath Douglas's jacket. Tr. at 169–71. Officer Poupart then removed Douglas's jacket and searched the backpack, recovering a Sig Sauer, model P320, .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun with an obliterated serial number, loaded with a single round in the chamber and twelve rounds in a thirteen-round capacity magazine. Shortly after Douglas was stopped, officers stopped Williams and, after receiving word that Douglas's bag contained a firearm, arrested him. See BWC of Ofc. Gabster , ECF 35-3.

After being alerted that the suspects had been arrested, Officer Jackson drove to the parking lot where Williams and Douglas were detained. Id. at 52–53. From approximately twenty yards away, while remaining in his vehicle, Officer Jackson confirmed that Douglas and Williams were the individuals who had been engaged in the backpack exchange. Gov.’s Ex. 3 at 10:28.

In July 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment that charged both Defendants with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Person Convicted of a Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding One Year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Parties filed various motions to admit or suppress evidence, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing on these Motions.

II. Government's Motion to Admit Other Crimes Evidence and Impeach Defendants with Prior Convictions

A. Rule 404(b) Evidence

In its Motion to Admit Other Crimes Evidence and Impeach Defendants with Prior Convictions, ECF 28, the government first asks the Court to admit certain Rule 404(b) evidence against both Douglas and Williams. See generally Gov.’s Mot. to Admit Evid., ECF 28. Specifically, with regard to Douglas, the government seeks to introduce two prior gun possession convictions; images and videos taken from Douglas's cellphone of him holding and shooting firearms; and two text message conversations, again taken from Douglas's cellphone, in which Douglas inquires about the price of certain firearms. See id. The government argues that this evidence is probative of the fact that Douglas knowingly and intentionally possessed the firearm recovered from the backpack he was wearing on the day of his arrest, and that his possession of the firearm was not the result of inadvertence, mistake, or accident. See id. at 22. The government also seeks to introduce a screenshot sent from Williams to Douglas, and recovered from Douglas's phone, of a masked man holding a gun while on a video call with Williams. See id. at 19. The government argues the screenshot demonstrates that Williams and Douglas had previously discussed and shared images of firearms, which tends to make it more likely that they engaged together in a firearm exchange. See id. at 28–29.

"Convictions are supposed to rest on evidence relevant to the crime charged, not on evidence of other, unrelated bad acts suggesting nothing more than a tendency or propensity to engage in criminality." United States v. McGill , 815 F.3d 846, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Thus, under Rule 404(b), evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is not admissible to prove a defendant's character. However, that evidence is admissible for any non-propensity purpose, including to establish motive, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake. See United States v. Bowie , 232 F.3d 923, 926, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ). The rule against introducing character evidence is not based on the idea that a defendant's character is irrelevant. Rather, it is based "on a fear that juries will tend to give it excessive weight, and on a fundamental sense that no one should be convicted of a crime based on his or her previous misdeeds." United States v. Daniels , 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Despite Rule 404(b) ’s "restrictive[ ]" framing, the D.C. Circuit has noted that it is actually "quite permissive." United States v. Crowder , 141 F.3d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc ). It only prohibits the admission of other crimes evidence in "one circumstance"—when the evidence is being introduced to demonstrate that the defendant's acts conformed with his character. Id. ; see also United States v. Cassell , 292 F.3d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[A]ny purpose for which bad-acts evidence is introduced is a proper purpose so long as the evidence is not offered solely to prove character.").

A two-prong test determines whether evidence of prior crimes is admissible under Rule 404(b). First, the evidence must be "probative of a material issue other than character." United States v. Miller , 895 F.2d 1431, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Second, the evidence is subject to the Rule 403 balancing test, in which the evidence's probative value must not be "substantially outweigh[ed]" by its prejudicial effect. Id. The government is allowed to admit 404(b) evidence in the government's case-in-chief in anticipation that a defendant will deny intent or knowledge. See United States v. Inserra , 34 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that Rule 404(b) other crime evidence "is admissible during the government's case-in-chief if it is apparent that the defendant will dispute the issue").

1. Evidence Pertaining to Douglas

Before turning to the specific evidence that the government seeks to introduce against Douglas, the Court addresses Douglas's threshold argument that all of the government's 404(b) evidence against him should be excluded. See Douglas's Opp'n to Gov.’s Mot. to Admit Evid., ECF 39, at 4. Douglas insists that the evidence is "irrelevant" because he is willing to stipulate to the fact that he was previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See id. Douglas relies on Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), in which the Supreme Court held that a district court abused its discretion when it rejected a defendant's offer to stipulate to the element of a prior felony conviction and...