U.S. v. M.R.M.

• Decision Date: 25 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-3832.,06-3832.
• Citation: 513 F.3d 866
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. M.R.M., Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

513 F.3d 866

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. M.R.M., Appellant.

No. 06-3832.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 12, 2007.

Filed: January 25, 2008.

Gary G. Colbath, Jr., AFPD argued, Rapid City, SD, for appellant.

Mark E. Salter, AUSA, argued, Gregg S. Peterman, AUSA, on the brief, Rapid City, SD, for appellee.

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

M.R.M. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent after she admitted committing an assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6), 1153, and 5032. The district court¹ ordered her committed to official detention until the age of twenty-one. M.R.M. appeals the disposition, and we affirm.

On September 17, 2004, M.R.M, then sixteen years old, was with three female acquaintances when an unknown man assaulted her. Rather than come to M.R.M.'s aid during the assault, her acquaintances left the scene. Three days later, M.R.M. was at a house on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation when she learned that one of the girls present during the assault was planning to visit. Still angry that the girl had abandoned her when she was attacked, M.R.M. met the girl at the door of the house with a baseball bat in hand. M.R.M. then attacked the girl with the bat, first hitting her in the forehead, and then chasing her out of the house while continuing to hit her until she took refuge in a vehicle. The victim suffered a four-and-a-half inch laceration on her forehead, a fractured hand that required surgery, and numerous bumps and welts on her body.

A two-count information charged M.R.M. under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA") with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and assault with a dangerous weapon. She admitted the latter charge, and at the dispositional hearing, the government recommended that M.R.M. be placed on probation for three years. The district court instead ordered M.R.M. committed to official detention until her twenty-first birthday, which resulted in a term of detention of thirty-four months and twenty days.

We have jurisdiction to review a sentence pronounced under the FJDA to determine whether it was "imposed in violation of law" or is "plainly unreasonable." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (4); United States v. K.R.A., 337 F.3d 970, 978 (8th Cir.2003). The district court enjoys "broad discretion" when sentencing juvenile offenders under the FJDA, K.R.A., 337 F.3d at 978—indeed, broader discretion than when sentencing an adult. The advisory sentencing guidelines place an upper limit on the term of official detention that may be imposed, 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1), (c)(2); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 306-07, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992), but the sentencing guidelines, even in their advisory capacity, do not apply to juveniles. Id. at 307 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 1329; USSG § 1B1.12; see 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(19) (providing that the Sentencing Commission shall have power to "study the feasibility of developing guidelines for the disposition of juvenile delinquents"). Nor does the statute governing, juvenile dispositions, 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c), incorporate the adult sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Cf. United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 798-99 (11th Cir.2006) (explaining that a different section of the FJDA governing juvenile probation orders, 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b), applies 18 U.S.C. § 3565, which in turn directs the court to consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a)); United States v. A.J., 190 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir.1999) (same). Although we have found reference to some of the § 3553(a) factors useful in determining whether a district court permissibly considered certain evidence as relevant in a juvenile proceeding, United States v. D.A.L.D., 469 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir.2006), we have not declared that a district court must balance all of the § 3553(a) factors in making a juvenile disposition. See id. (affirming juvenile disposition where "the district court cited only the section 3553(a) factors that it deemed relevant"). To require, for example, that the district court consider the sentencing ranges set forth in the applicable sentencing guidelines would conflict with the decision of Congress to refrain from applying the guidelines to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Cf. United States v. Hernandez-Martinez, 485 F.3d 270, 273-74 (5th Cir.) (concluding that "plainly unreasonable" standard of review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) for sentences after revocation of supervised release is not identical to "unreasonableness" standard under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), for original sentences, in part because Congress provided that only some of the factors set forth in § 3553(a) also apply in revocation proceedings), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 325, 169 L.Ed.2d 229 (2007).

M.R.M. relies on the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), in arguing that the term of official detention ordered by the district court was plainly unreasonable. She contends that this disposition varies from how similarly-situated juveniles have been treated in other reported cases. The court's obligation and capacity to avoid excessive sentence disparities, however, depends on the existence of a benchmark like the advisory guideline range from which to measure potential disparities. United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir.2006). Because there is no such benchmark in juvenile proceedings, and because § 5037(c) does not direct the court to consider § 3553(a)(6) in' arriving at a juvenile disposition, we reject M.R.M.'s contention that a particular term of official detention would be "plainly unreasonable" if it caused sentence disparity with other similarly-situated juveniles. Sentence disparities are part and parcel of a dispositional process in which neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission has elected to provide direction beyond setting an upper limit for a period of official detention. Congress simply has not seen fit to direct that a district court must take into account the decisions of other courts—either through the aggregating work of the Sentencing Commission or by some sort of independent survey—in fashioning a juvenile disposition.²

M.R.M. also contends that the district court unreasonably failed to consider whether official detention was the least-restrictive disposition available. She derives this proposed mandate from the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2003), which held that "implicit in the structure and purposes of the. FJDA" is the requirement that "[y]outh who are adjudged to be delinquent under the FJDA must ... be confined in the least-restrictive environment that will support their continued rehabilitation." Id. at 785-86. We have never adopted the Ninth Circuit's standard, and we decline to do so here. The plain language of the FJDA imposes no least-restrictive disposition requirement, and the structure of the statute is ambiguous at best. Rehabilitation is one purpose of the FJDA, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 5035, 5039, but it is not the only purpose served by adjudications of juvenile delinquency. While the Supreme Court in R.L.C. did not accept the proposition that Congress entirely abandoned the rehabilitative model for juveniles in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Court appeared to recognize that Congress moved away from an exclusive focus on rehabilitation, allowing only that the statute does not "completely reject rehabilitative objectives." R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 298-99, 112 S.Ct. 1329 (emphasis added). Nothing in the statute precludes the district courts from giving due consideration, for example, to protection of the public or deterrence.

In any event, the district court adequately considered rehabilitation in this case. The court noted that "[t]he purpose of a hearing on a sentencing for a juvenile defendant is to attempt, if possible, to provide some leadership" so that the young person might "straighten around her life." (S. Tr. 12). The court emphasized to M.R.M. that "I don't find any joy in sending an 18-year-old intelligent young lady into federal custody, but what I want is a solution in your life." (Id.). After considering the nature of the offense and M.R.M's personal history, the court concluded that detention was necessary so that M.R.M. might "learn to live by the rules." (Id. at 14). The court encouraged her to attend counseling while incarcerated so that she could improve her life, and eventually "be a credit ... to [her] community." (Id. at 15). The court adequately considered the statutory purpose of rehabilitation and reasonably explained why the chosen disposition would further that purpose.³

M.R.M. also argues that the sentence was contrary to law or plainly unreasonable because the district court relied on impermissible factors. M.R.M. did not object at sentencing to any of the statements that she now disputes. As a consequence, the district court had no opportunity to clarify its comments or to correct any potential error in the first instance. Nor was the district court prompted to explain whether the comments had any effect on the ultimate disposition of the case. Accordingly, we review M.R.M.'s complaints about the district court's remarks under a plain error standard. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 479-80 (8th Cir.2007) (Gruender, J., concurring). To obtain relief, she must show that the district court made an obvious error, that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome, and that failure to correct the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Oland, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

One belated...