U.S. v. Macpherson
| Decision Date | 13 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 04-4825 CR. |
| Citation | 424 F.3d 183 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. William MacPHERSON, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. James, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Roslynn R. Mauskopf, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellant.
Robert M. Simels (Alexandra Vandoros, on the brief), New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RAGGI, WESLEY, and CUDAHY,1 Circuit Judges.
After trial, a jury found William MacPherson guilty of structuring a quarter-million dollars into thirty-two separate cash transactions, each less than $10,000, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge) set aside the verdict and entered a judgment of acquittal, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), ruling that the trial evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea elements of the charged offense, specifically, MacPherson's knowledge of and intent to avoid federal currency reporting requirements for cash transactions exceeding $10,000. The United States appeals, arguing that the totality of the circumstantial evidence permitted the jury to infer MacPherson's guilty knowledge and intent. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of acquittal and remand the case to the district court with directions that it reinstate the jury verdict, proceed to sentencing, and enter a judgment of conviction.
At times relevant to this case, William MacPherson was a New York City police officer who supplemented his salary with rental income from various real estate holdings. In a four-month period between September 26, 2000, and January 16, 2001, MacPherson deposited a total of $258,100 in cash into three Staten Island bank accounts by means of thirty-two transactions, structured so that no single transaction exceeded $10,000. We here detail the chronology of these deposits, grouping those occurring on the same day.
1. 9/26/00 Citibank $9,000
2. 9/27/00 Citibank $8,000
3. 9/28/00 Citibank $3,000
4. 10/2/00 Independence $9,000
5. 10/2/00 Chase $9,000
6. 10/2/00 Citibank $9,000
7. 10/11/00 Independence $9,000
8. 10/11/00 Chase $9,000
9. 10/11/00 Citibank $9,000
10. 10/18/00 Independence $9,000
11. 10/18/00 Chase $9,000
12. 10/18/00 Citibank $9,000
13. 11/1/00 Independence $9,000
14. 11/1/00 Chase $9,000
15. 11/1/00 Citibank $9,000
16. 11/7/00 Independence $9,000
17. 11/7/00 Chase $9,000
18. 11/7/00 Citibank $9,000
19. 11/13/00 Independence $9,000
20. 11/13/00 Chase $9,000
21. 11/13/00 Citibank $9,000
22. 12/28/00 Independence $4,000
23. 12/28/00 Chase $5,500
24. 12/28/00 Citibank $8,000
25. 1/5/01 Independence $4,400
26. 1/5/01 Chase $9,200
27. 1/5/01 Citibank $9,200
28. 1/8/01 Citibank $9,100
29. 1/10/01 Chase $9,000
30. 1/16/01 Independence $2,000
31. 1/16/01 Chase $8,700
32. 1/16/01 Citibank $7,000
At trial, the government did not contend that the deposited funds derived from any criminal activity. Rather, it suggested that the deposits were made with monies that MacPherson had previously shielded against a possible civil judgment. To support this theory, the government adduced the following evidence.
In December 1997, MacPherson was sued for $2.5 million by an individual who was injured at one of his rental properties. MacPherson was uninsured against a possible damages award. Starting in January 1998 and continuing for some years thereafter while the tort suit was pending against him, MacPherson liquidated or transferred significant assets in an apparent effort to shield them from judgment. For example, between January 1998 and September 2000, MacPherson sold five real properties for just under $1 million, realizing a net profit of approximately $343,000. He also made four large cash withdrawals totaling $220,000 from a Citibank account held jointly with his wife. The first withdrawal, for $80,000, was on January 21, 1998, from a branch located at 577 Bay Street on Staten Island. The other three cash withdrawals were all made on August 31, 1999: $50,000 from the aforementioned Bay Street branch; another $50,000 from a branch at 1492 Hylan Boulevard on Staten Island; and $40,000 from a branch at 1910 Victory Boulevard, also on Staten Island.
In September 2000, MacPherson settled the pending tort suit for $27,000. That same month, he made the first three of the charged structured deposits.2
Because MacPherson's large cash withdrawals in 1998 and 1999 each exceeded $10,000, Citibank was required by law to document them to the Internal Revenue Service, see 31 U.S.C. § 5313; 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1); infra Part II.B.1, which it did by filing a Form 4789 Currency Transaction Report ("CTR"). The January 21, 1998 CTR reported the persons involved in the cash transaction as William J. MacPherson and his wife, Tracy A. MacPherson.3 The bank verified Mr. MacPherson's identity by reference to his New York State driver's license. Mrs. MacPherson's identity was verified by reference to her Citicard number. Edith Steuerman, a Citibank Manager, testified that she filled out most of the MacPhersons' January 21, 1998 CTR, with a teller filling out other parts. Although Steuerman had no specific recollection of the MacPherson transaction — for example, she could not recall if Mrs. MacPherson was actually present on the occasion — she testified that her uniform practice in preparing CTRs was to have the customer sit down across from her at a desk while she took down identifying data.
Steuerman did not prepare any of the August 31, 1999 CTRs, and no persons involved in their preparation were called to testify. Nevertheless, the CTR filed in connection with the $50,000 cash withdrawal from the Bay Street branch itself indicates that Mr. MacPherson was the sole person involved in that transaction and that his identity was verified on this occasion by reference to his Citicard number. The Hylan Boulevard CTR of the same date indicates that both MacPhersons were involved in that $50,000 cash withdrawal, with their identities verified by reference to their driver's licenses. The Victory Boulevard CTR similarly indicates the involvement of both MacPhersons in that $40,000 withdrawal, with their identities again verified by their driver's licenses.
At the close of the prosecution case, MacPherson moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government had failed to prove that, at the time of the charged cash deposits, he knew that banks were required to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000.4 The court denied the motion, observing that Steuerman's testimony about her practice of filling out CTRs in the presence of the customer involved in the cash transaction could support a jury inference that MacPherson acquired the necessary knowledge when he made the 1998 cash withdrawal of $80,000, for which Steuerman filed a CTR.
After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, MacPherson renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), challenging the sufficiency of the government's evidence of his knowledge of and intent to evade currency reporting requirements. This time, the court granted the motion, offering the following explanation:
I have thought long and hard about this particular case even while the trial was going on and I was ready to grant a Rule 29 at the conclusion of the government's case but I said no, I'll let it go to the jury; if the jury comes back with a verdict of not guilty, that settles it, but they came back with a verdict of guilty
....
I'm persuaded by the argument of the defendant that I don't think the government's evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant a conviction so therefore I'm going to grant the Rule 29 and the government can appeal my decision.
I do not mean to substitute my judgment for the judgment of the jurors, however, as a matter of law, I think it's insufficient.
The government appealed.
We review the district court's grant of a judgment of acquittal de novo, see United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir.2004), applying the standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, which asks "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under this stern standard, a court, whether at the trial or appellate level, may not "usurp[] the role of the jury," United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.2003), by "substitut[ing] its own determination of ... the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury," United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court may grant a judgment of acquittal only if it is convinced that "the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."...
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