U.S. v. Maturin

• Decision Date: 01 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-30756.,05-30756.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roland MATURIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

488 F.3d 657

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roland MATURIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-30756.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 1, 2007.

Camille Ann Domingue (argued), Stephanie A. Finley, Asst. U.S. Attys., Lafayette, LA, for U.S.

Rebecca L. Hudsmith, Fed. Pub. Def. (argued), Lafayette, LA, for Maturin.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Roland Maturin pleaded guilty to one count of concealing assets in a bankruptcy proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(1). Maturin now challenges the district court's restitution order as excessive. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the district court's order of restitution and REMAND.

I.

Appellant Roland Maturin was the president of RAM Industries, Inc., a marine construction company. On August 4, 1998, Maturin caused RAM to file a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On that same day, Maturin opened a bank account in the name of RAM Industries with Farmers Merchants Bank and Trust Company. Maturin failed to disclose the existence of that account to RAM's creditors and to the United States Trustee. Between August 5, 1998 and April 29, 1999, Maturin made a number of deposits into the account in order to fraudulently conceal from creditors and the United States Trustee funds that were, in reality, property of the bankruptcy estate. According to the pre-sentence investigation report, the sum total of these deposits was $164,988.98.

A creditor of RAM Industries eventually became aware of the concealed account, and Maturin was indicted on August 14, 2003. The indictment charged Maturin with 28 counts of unlawful concealment of assets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) (one count for each allegedly fraudulent deposit to, or disbursement from, the concealed account between August 5, 1998 and April 29, 1999), and one count of making a false statement under oath, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(2). On March 16, 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, Maturin pleaded guilty to count 1 of the indictment, which charged Maturin with making a fraudulent deposit of $54,384.43 into the concealed account on August 6, 1998. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss counts 2-29 of the indictment against Maturin.

In the factual basis for his guilty plea, Maturin admitted that he concealed assets from the creditors of RAM Industries and the United States Trustee from August 5, 1998 through April 29, 1999, and that the August 6, 1998 deposit was "[o]ne of the deposits which should have been included and/or reported to the bankruptcy estate, creditors and trustee." In addition, in response to a question from the district court during his plea colloquy, Maturin stated that he believed that he had deposited a total of roughly $130,000 in the concealed account, but that he was not sure of the exact amount. Maturin's plea agreement with the government did not mention restitution, and the district court did not discuss the possibility of restitution with Maturin during his plea colloquy.

Before Maturin was sentenced, the probation officer issued a pre-sentence investigation report, which recommended that the court order Maturin to pay restitution in the amount of $164,988.98. That figure represented the total amount of funds that Maturin allegedly deposited into the concealed account between August 5, 1998 and April 1, 1999. Maturin did not file any objections to the pre-sentence investigation report. On July 13, 2005, the district court sentenced Maturin to 21 months in prison, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. The district court also ordered Maturin to pay $164,988.98 in restitution to the bankruptcy court.

Maturin did not object to the district court's restitution order at the time of sentencing. On this appeal, however, Maturin asserts that the restitution order exceeded the district court's authority because it imposed restitution based on charges and conduct for which Maturin was not convicted.

II.

This court ordinarily reviews the legality of a restitution order de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 363 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir.2004). Because Maturin failed to object to either the amount of restitution recommended in the pre-sentence investigation report or the district court's restitution order, however, we review Maturin's claim only for plain error. See United States v. Howard, 220 F.3d 645, 647 (5th Cir.2000) ("There being no objection to the order of restitution at sentencing, we review for plain error.").

Under the plain error standard, this court can correct an error in the district court proceedings only if the error was clear or obvious and affected the substantial rights of the defendant. See United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) ("To establish plain error, [the defendant] must show that (1) there is an error, (2) the error is clear or obvious, and (3) the error affects his substantial rights."); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) ("A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention."). If those conditions are met, this court may, in its discretion, grant the defendant relief if "the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596, 606 (5th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.2005)).

III.

The trial court ordered Maturin to pay restitution in the amount of $164,988.98, representing the total amount of funds that Maturin deposited into the concealed account between August 5, 1998 and April 1, 1999. In essence, the district court's restitution order covered all of the assets of the bankruptcy estate that Maturin was alleged to have fraudulently concealed. Maturin asserts that the restitution order was unlawful because it imposed restitution in excess of the amount of loss caused by the offense for which Maturin was convicted, count 1 of the indictment.

The district court's award of restitution in this case is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3556, which provides that "[t]he court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense shall order restitution in accordance with [18 U.S.C. §] 3663A, and may order restitution in accordance with [18 U.S.C. §] 3663." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 ("MVRA"), provides that, when a defendant has been convicted of any of a list of specified offenses, including "any offense committed by fraud or deceit," the sentencing court "shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense." The MVRA's discretionary counterpart, the Victim and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, provides that, in cases where the MVRA does not apply, the court "may order" a defendant convicted of an offense to "make restitution to any victim of such offense." The parties in this case agree that the MVRA's mandatory restitution provisions apply to Maturin's conviction.¹

The general rule is that a district court can award restitution to victims of the offense, but the restitution award can encompass only those losses that resulted directly from the offense for which the defendant was convicted. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) ("Hughey I") ("[T]he language and structure of the [VWPA] make plain Congress' intent to authorize an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.").²

The MVRA defines a "victim" of the offense as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). The MVRA also, however, broadens the definition of the term "victim" for any "offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity" to include "any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." Id. Thus, this court has held "that where a fraudulent scheme is an element of the conviction, the court may award restitution for actions pursuant to that scheme." United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hughey II, 147 F.3d at 437 ("The statute now provides that when the subject offense involves a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, restitution may be awarded to any person who is directly harmed by the defendant's course of criminal conduct."). When the count of conviction does not require proof of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern, however, as noted above, the defendant "is only responsible to pay restitution for the conduct underlying the offense for which he has been convicted." Adams, 363 F.3d at 366; Mancillas, 172 F.3d at 343.

The VWPA provides an exception to these general rules for cases in which the defendant has agreed to a particular award of restitution, as it provides that "[t]he court may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3); see also id. § 3663A(a)(3) ("The court shall also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.").

In this case, it is undisputed that the district court's award of restitution in the amount of $164,988.98 goes well beyond the losses that were caused directly by the conduct for which Maturin was actually convicted. Count 1, the count to which Maturin pleaded guilty, simply charged that he deposited $58,384.43 belonging to the bankruptcy estate into the concealed account. Accordingly, to determine the propriety of the district court's restitution...