U.S. v. Maxwell
| Decision Date | 07 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-6349,92-6349 |
| Citation | 34 F.3d 1006 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne MAXWELL; Keith Woods; Brenda Faye Johnson, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Neil Hanley, Mobile, AL, for Wayne Maxwell.
Margaret A. Stone, Mobile, AL, for Brenda Faye Johnson.
Wesley Blacksher, Mobile, AL, for Keith Woods.
J.B. Sessions, III, U.S. Atty., Richard H. Loftin, Mobile, AL, for U.S.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOEVELER *, Senior District Judge.
Defendants-appellants Wayne Maxwell, Keith Woods, and Brenda Faye Johnson challenge their convictions and sentences on charges of conspiring to distribute and distributing controlled substances. We affirm the convictions of all three defendants and the sentences of Woods and Johnson. Because we find that the district court erred in calculating Maxwell's guidelines range, we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
Defendants Maxwell, Woods, and Johnson were indicted along with Edward Hall Yates and Elijah Smith, Johnson's common law husband, for conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute hydromorphone hydrochloride, a narcotic also known as dilaudid, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846. The indictment alleged that the conspiracy began in the middle of 1986 and continued through June of 1991. In addition to the conspiracy count, Maxwell and Woods were also charged with several substantive counts of distributing dilaudid during the period of the conspiracy. Maxwell was also charged with one count of distributing less than one ounce of cocaine in April or May of 1987. Yates and Smith entered pleas of guilty, and their convictions and sentences are not at issue in this appeal. Maxwell, Woods, and Johnson were tried together before a jury.
The government's principal witness was Richard Lundy. Lundy had been convicted Lundy testified that he had purchased cocaine from Maxwell in April or May of 1987. Lundy had collected money from a number of people so that he could purchase dilaudid for them. When he was unable to obtain dilaudid, Lundy had obtained, instead, less than an ounce of cocaine from Maxwell. This is the only occasion on which Lundy purchased cocaine from Maxwell. 6 Maxwell did not ever ask Lundy to become involved in cocaine distribution. 7
of conspiring to distribute dilaudid and had agreed to cooperate with the government in exchange for a lesser sentence. Lundy testified as follows. From 1986 until June of 1991, he had been in the business of distributing dilaudid. He had two sources of supply for dilaudid pills: Maxwell and Yates. 1 Lundy would purchase dilaudid pills from Maxwell and then sell them to Woods, Smith, and Johnson, who would then sell them to others. 2 Lundy had supplied Woods with dilaudid pills from 1986 until 1991; Woods usually sold these pills at a convenience store near Lundy's house. 3 In June of 1988, Lundy had begun selling dilaudid to Johnson, who would purchase dilaudid pills for a few other people so that she could make a sufficient profit to purchase a pill for herself. 4 Because Lundy had preferred dealing with Johnson's common law husband, Smith, rather than with Johnson, Lundy eventually began selling dilaudid to Smith rather than Johnson. Even after Lundy began dealing with Smith, Johnson had continued to participate in the sale of dilaudid with her husband. When Smith was busy, Johnson would obtain the dilaudid pills from Lundy or deliver money from dilaudid sales to Lundy. 5
The government offered the testimony of several other witnesses to bolster Lundy's account of the involvement of Maxwell, Woods, and Johnson in the dilaudid distribution scheme. Lundy's wife testified that she occasionally had obtained dilaudid from Maxwell on her husband's instructions and that Maxwell had come by their house to collect money from her husband. 8 She also testified that she had delivered dilaudid pills to Smith and to Woods on her husband's instructions. 9 Four other witnesses testified that they had purchased dilaudid from Woods, 10 and one witness testified that she had purchased dilaudid from Johnson. 11 The officer who took statements from Woods and Johnson shortly after their arrest testified that Woods had admitted to delivering dilaudid pills and collecting money for Lundy and that Johnson had admitted that she and her husband distributed the dilaudid they obtained from Lundy to support their own drug habits. 12 Finally, two witnesses corroborated Lundy's testimony regarding the substitution of cocaine for dilaudid in April or May of 1987. 13
In addition to testimony regarding the charges of the indictment, the government, over Maxwell's objections, also introduced extrinsic offense evidence regarding other drug dealings in which Maxwell had allegedly been involved. First, Lundy testified that he and Maxwell had made two trips to Kansas in the fall of 1990 to obtain marijuana. 14 A city police officer, with whom Lundy had been cooperating at the time, corroborated this testimony. 15 Second, Shirley Goneke The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to distribute dilaudid. Maxwell was also convicted of distributing less than an ounce of cocaine in April or May of 1987, and Woods was convicted on several substantive charges of distribution of dilaudid. Maxwell was sentenced to 136 months in prison, Woods was sentenced to 30 months in prison, and Johnson was sentenced to 21 months in prison. All three defendants appealed.
testified that she had purchased two dilaudid pills from Maxwell in 1984 or 1985, prior to the period of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. 16 Third, Jerry Dycus testified that, beginning in April of 1986, he had sold cocaine for Maxwell for a period of a month and a half to two months. 17 According to Dycus, he never discussed dilaudid with Maxwell 18 and never had any dealings with those involved in the dilaudid distribution; the 1986 cocaine deals were solely between him and Maxwell. 19 Finally, after Maxwell took the stand and denied ever supplying anyone with cocaine or crack cocaine, 20 the government on rebuttal called Rolin Manders, who testified that he had purchased crack cocaine from Maxwell on several occasions. 21 During the charge to the jury, the district court instructed that this extrinsic offense evidence could not be used to establish that Maxwell committed the acts charged in the indictment, but could only be used to establish his state of mind. 22
Maxwell contends that the district court erred in permitting the government to introduce the extrinsic offense evidence. Specifically, he challenges the introduction of evidence regarding his trips to Kansas to obtain marijuana, his sale of dilaudid to Goneke in 1984 or 1985, his sale of cocaine to Dycus in 1986, and his sale of crack cocaine to Manders. The district court held that this evidence of uncharged drug offenses was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as relevant to Maxwell's intent to distribute controlled substances.
Extrinsic evidence of uncharged bad acts is admissible if the evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character, the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its undue prejudice, and the government offers sufficient proof that the jury could find that the defendant committed the acts. 23 Here, the government introduced the extrinsic offense evidence to prove intent, which Maxwell placed at issue by pleading not guilty to the charges against him. 24 This court has said that " '[e]vidance of prior drug dealings is highly probative of intent to distribute a controlled substance, as well as involvement in a conspiracy.' " 25 This court also has observed that "the precedents in this circuit allowing evidence of prior drug-dealing offenses in drug conspiracy prosecutions are ample." 26 The district court's rulings in this case are consistent with these precedents. Accordingly, after careful consideration of the record and the binding caselaw, we conclude that the district court's admission of the extrinsic offense evidence does not constitute reversible error.
Woods and Johnson contend that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions.
We must decide whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, establishes Woods' and Johnson's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 27 As to Woods, Lundy testified that he sold dilaudid to Woods and that Woods sold it to others at a convenience store near Lundy's house, Lundy's wife testified that she delivered dilaudid to Woods, and four witnesses testified that they purchased dilaudid from Woods. As to Johnson, Lundy testified that Johnson purchased dilaudid for others to support her own drug habit and that, after he began dealing with Johnson's husband, Johnson would sometimes obtain dilaudid from Lundy or deliver money to Lundy for her husband. One witness testified that she purchased dilaudid from Johnson. Both Woods and Johnson made inculpatory statements to police following their arrests. Having carefully reviewed the record, we are convinced that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions of both Woods and Johnson
Maxwell raises two challenges to the district court's calculation of his sentencing guidelines range. First, Maxwell argues that the district court erred in determining the amount of drugs attributable to him for purposes of calculating his base offense level. Had the district court held Maxwell accountable only for the distribution of dilaudid and of less than one ounce of cocaine, as charged in the indictment, Maxwell's base offense level would have been 18. 28 Relying on extrinsic offense evidence, specifically, Dycus' trial testimony that he...
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