U.S. v. McMahan, 76-1613
| Decision Date | 25 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-1613,76-1613 |
| Citation | 548 F.2d 712 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Anton McMAHAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Edward T. Stein, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Samuel K. Skinner, U. S. Atty., Thomas A. Mauet, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOOD, Circuit Judge.
Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of having transported in interstate commerce certain stolen rare books, including a copy of Shelley's "Adonais," the books having a value of $5,000 or more and the defendant knowing that they had been stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The sole issue raised by defendant on appeal is whether the district court erred in finding that the books in question had a "value" of $5,000 or more within the meaning of section 2314. We affirm.
The parties stipulated before trial that the fair market value of all the books except the "Adonais" volume, at the time they were transported in interstate commerce, was $800. At trial, the Government, presented four expert witnesses, each of whom testified to the market value of the "Adonais" volume at the time of trial in May, 1976, and at the time the books were transported in interstate commerce in June, 1975. Their valuations ranged from $6,000 to $8,000. The defendant presented two expert witnesses. One testified to the book's value at the time and place of trial. Both also testified to its value at the time and place to which it was transported (Chicago, Illinois, in June, 1975) and to its value at the time and place the book was stolen (Claremont, California in August, 1972). Their estimates of the book's value at all these times and places were from $2,000 to $2,500.
Defendant contends that the only proper measure for determining the value of the "Adonais" copy under section 2314 was its market value at the time and place the book was stolen. He asserts that the Government did not present sufficient evidence to prove the requisite value because it did not offer any direct evidence of the book's value in August, 1972, at Claremont, California, and because the defendant's evidence of its value then and there was uncontradicted. We reject the defendant's limited view of the standard to be applied in determining value under section 2314.
We start by noting that neither section 2314 nor the applicable statutory definition of value limits the standard to market price at the time and place of theft. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2311. Moreover, although the cases cited by the defendant do support the proposition that market value at time and place of theft is an appropriate, and even customary, standard of "value" under section 2314, they do not hold that "value" must be measured by that standard alone. See Cave v. United States, 390 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1968); Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961); Stern v. United States, 204 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1953); Husten v. United States, 95 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1938). In none of these cases was the standard with respect to time and place disputed by the parties.
We have recognized that the standard for determining value under 18 U.S.C. § 2315, a sister provision of section 2314 outlawing the receipt or concealment of stolen property carried interstate and having a value of $5,000 or more, is not exclusively the market value at the time and place the property is stolen. United States v. Riso, 405 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1968). Instead, the value of the property may be determined by reference to its market value "at any time during its receipt or concealment." Id. at 137. The Congressional purpose under section 2315 of discouraging both the initial taking and the later receipt of stolen property carried interstate is served by permitting its value to be measured either at the time of theft or at the time of receipt. United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861, 96 S.Ct. 118, 46 L.Ed.2d 89 (1975). Congress plainly intended under section 2314 to discourage both...
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U.S. v. Berkwitt
...405 F.2d 134, 137 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959, 89 S.Ct. 1306, 22 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969), and see United States v. McMahan, 548 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 1685, 52 L.Ed.2d 381. In other words, appellants could have sold directly to the pub......