U.S. v. Medina
| Citation | 775 F.2d 1398 |
| Decision Date | 18 October 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-3787,85-3787 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Jesus MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Raymond Takiff, Coconut Grove, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Michael Rubenstein, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, HILL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
This case is before the Court on Defendant-Appellant Medina's emergency motion for bail pending trial. As presented to us, the facts appear to be as follows:
Following his arrest on charges of possession with intent to distribute approximately eight tons of marijuana, Medina was first brought before the Honorable George T. Swartz, a United States Magistrate sitting in Lee County for the Middle District of Florida, on August 29, 1985. The defendant was not represented by counsel at that appearance and had refused to provide any information to a United States Probation Office Pretrial Services Officer for the purpose of preparing a pre-bail report for the court. Counsel for the government also was not present at the defendant's initial appearance before the federal magistrate. Magistrate Swartz set bond in the amount of $500,000, which could be satisfied by payment of a $50,000 cash deposit into the court's Registry.
Medina was subsequently transferred from Ft. Myers, Florida, where he had been held following his arrest, to Tampa, where he appeared with counsel before the Honorable Thomas P. Wilson, United States Magistrate for the Middle District of Florida, on September 5, 1985. At that appearance the magistrate held a preliminary hearing and found probable cause to believe that Medina and his codefendants had committed the major drug offenses with which they were charged. At that hearing, counsel for the government objected to the bond set by Magistrate Swartz and indicated that the government would seek an order detaining Medina without bond. Defense counsel represented that he was prepared to go ahead immediately with a hearing on the government's motion for a pretrial detention order and requested that the matter be considered at that time.
Following the hearing that was then held, Magistrate Wilson concluded that Medina posed a risk of flight if released on bond and ordered him detained pending trial. Under the applicable statutes, once the magistrate had found probable cause to believe Medina committed the offense with which he was charged, a rebuttable presumption arose to the effect that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). The magistrate's conclusion that Medina had not overcome the statutory presumption in favor of pretrial detention was based on his findings that Medina had not demonstrated strong ties to the community and that he was apparently involved in the alleged drug smuggling operation in a supervisory capacity (i.e. as captain of the drug smuggling vessel). In sum, the magistrate concluded that "[t]he totality of the evidence in this case provides a strong indication that defendant Medina would be a risk to flee, if released on bail."
Medina challenged Magistrate Wilson's pretrial detention order before the district court, arguing that (1) the detention order is void because the detention hearing was not held at Medina's first appearance; (2) Medina does not in fact pose a risk of flight; (3) the Bail Reform Act of 1984, pursuant to which the pretrial detention order was issued, is unconstitutional; and (4) Magistrate Wilson was prejudiced against Medina because he was accused of smuggling drugs. The district court rejected each of Medina's contentions, finding that Magistrate Wilson did not err in concluding that Medina posed a risk of flight and should be held without bond pending trial.
In his emergency motion to this court, Medina raises essentially the same claims he raised in the district court, restating them to assert that (1) the order of detention is void because it was not issued as a consequence of the proceedings transpiring upon Medina's first appearance before a judicial officer, (2) the magistrate erroneously applied the law to impose pretrial detention where it is not warranted by the facts, and (3) the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is unconstitutional. We address each of these claims in the order in which they are presented above.
Appellant argues first that the pretrial detention order issued by Magistrate Wilson and subsequently approved by the district court is void because it was not the product of a detention hearing held immediately upon Medina's first appearance before a judicial officer. In support of this contention, Medina places heavy reliance upon the recent decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Payden, 759 F.2d 202 (2nd Cir.1985). In that case the court held that where the defendant was not afforded any hearing under the newly enacted Bail Reform Act of 1984 until two weeks after his arraignment, he could not thereafter be detained pending trial pursuant to the terms of the Act. In that case, however, the court reversed the district court's pretrial detention order because the Bail Reform Act by its terms required that the defendant be granted a detention/release hearing at his first appearance before a judicial officer, unless a continuance was granted in accordance with the terms of the Act. The district court's failure to afford the defendant any hearing at all until two weeks after his first appearance thus constituted a clear violation of the language and spirit of the Act. Under such circumstances, it may indeed be inappropriate to permit the pretrial detention of a defendant otherwise detainable under the Act. As we indicate below, however, we find no such violation of the Act in the case at bar. Thus, we need not approve or disapprove of the holding and rationale of Payden at this time.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides generally that:
Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial, the person be--
(1) released on his personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b);
(2) released on a condition or combination of conditions pursuant to the provisions of subsection (c);
(3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclusion pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d); or
(4) detained pursuant to the provisions of subsection (e).
18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(a). Subsection (e) provides for the imposition of pretrial detention under certain circumstances, following a hearing that "shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(f). At any such detention hearing,
the person has the right to be represented by counsel, and, if he is financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed for him. The person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.
Id. These procedural safeguards, the statute makes clear, must only be insured if detention is contemplated or imposed at the initial appearance pursuant to subsection (e).
We construe these provisions to impose upon the judicial officer before whom the defendant makes his first appearance a duty to (1) conduct a detention hearing, if one is appropriate under the circumstances and can be conducted in accordance with the statutorily mandated safeguards, perhaps resulting in detention pursuant to subsection (e), (2) order the defendant detained temporarily pursuant to subsection (d) to permit deportation, exclusion or the revocation of certain forms of conditional release, or (3) order the defendant released...
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