United States v. Ingram

• Decision Date: 02 December 2019
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:19-cr-113/MCR
• Citation: 415 F.Supp.3d 1072
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Kadeem INGRAM a.k.a. "Cody"
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

415 F.Supp.3d 1072

UNITED STATES of America

v.Kadeem INGRAM a.k.a. "Cody"

Case No.: 3:19-cr-113/MCR

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division.

Signed December 2, 2019

Michelle Kathleen Daffin, Northern District Of Florida, Panama City, FL, for United States of America.

DECISION AND ORDER

Michael J. Frank, United States Magistrate Judge

On November 26, 2019, this court conducted a detention hearing pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq. Based upon the information contained in the Pretrial Services Report, the evidence presented at the hearing, and the arguments of counsel, this court finds that Defendant should be detained pending trial because there is no condition or combination of conditions that reasonably would assure his appearance at trial and the safety of the community.

I —Eligibility for Detention

The " ‘Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for trials.’ " Maryland v. King , 569 U.S. 435, 452-53, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972-73, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 534, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1871, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ). To safeguard victims, witnesses, and the community, and to ensure that defendants are present at their trials, defendants "legitimately may be incarcerated by the Government prior to a determination of their guilt or innocence ...." Bell , 441 U.S. at 523, 99 S. Ct. at 1865. To detain a defendant prior to trial, however, "the Government must comply with constitutional requirements ... and any applicable statutory provisions." Bell , 441 U.S. at 534 n.15, 99 S. Ct. at 1871 n.15.

In this case, under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as amended, the Defendant is eligible for detention because he has been charged via an indictment with an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act ( 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. ). Specifically, a grand jury charged Defendant with four qualifying offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 28 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 ; (2) two counts of distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) ; and (3) possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii).

II —Standard

"The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court with two choices when dealing with a criminal defendant who has been ‘charged with an offense’ and is awaiting trial ...." Reno v. Koray , 515 U.S. 50, 57, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2025, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995). A court may either release a defendant on appropriate conditions or detain the defendant. Id. In determining whether detention is appropriate, courts must keep in mind that "liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). The policy of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 "is to permit release under the least restrictive condition compatible with assuring the future appearance of the defendant" and the safety of the community. United States v. Price , 773 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

"A criminal defendant must be released before trial on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured bond, unless the court determines that release will not reasonably ensure his appearance or will endanger the safety of others." Taylor v. Pekerol , 760 F. App'x 647, 653 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) ). On the other hand, a defendant must be detained pending trial if he presents a serious risk of flight or poses a danger to another person or members of the community. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S. Ct. at 2102 ; see United States v. Montalvo-Murillo , 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S. Ct. 2072, 2077, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (noting that the Bail Reform Act "directs a judicial officer to detain a person charged, pending trial, if the Government has made the necessary showing of dangerousness or risk of flight"). Before detaining a defendant pending trial, however, the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant poses a serious risk of flight, or show by clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to another person or the community. See Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 ; United States v. Quartermaine , 913 F.2d 910, 917 (11th Cir. 1990) ; United States v. King , 849 F.2d 485, 488-89 (11th Cir. 1988) ; United States v. Medina , 775 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 1985).

It is important to note that "danger to the community" "was not meant to refer only to the risk of physical violence." United States v. Tortora , 922 F.2d 880, 884 (1st Cir. 1990). "The concept of safety of the community under § 3142(e) is not limited to the danger of physical violence, but rather ‘refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community.’ " United States v. Boy , 322 F. App'x 598, 600 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cook , 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989) ); United States v. Abdullahu , 488 F. Supp. 2d 433, 438-39 (D. N.J. 2007) (noting that "danger to the community does not only include physical harm or violent behavior"); United States v. Gotti , 219 F. Supp. 2d 296, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Danger to the community is not limited to violent crimes; it includes crimes that would harm the community."). For example, "the harm to society caused by narcotic trafficking is encompassed within Congress' definition of ‘danger.’ " United States v. Leon , 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1985) ; see United States v. Hare , 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that the "risk of continued narcotics trafficking on bail constitutes a risk to the community"); United States v. Stone , 608 F.3d 939, 947 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that "drug trafficking is a serious offense that, in itself, poses a danger to the community"). The probability that a released defendant will continue to engage in narcotics trafficking constitutes a risk to the community. United States v. Rueben , 974 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992) ; United States v. Majors , 932 F. Supp. 853, 857 (E.D. Tex. 1996) ("The very nature of drug offenses themselves constitutes a non-physical danger to the community.").

Clear and convincing evidence exists when the evidence induces "an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’ " Colorado v. New Mexico , 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2437-38, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). Accordingly, to show by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant poses a danger to the community, the United States need not prove that there is a 100% chance that a defendant will commit harmful acts. Rather, the concept of danger entails probability of harm and, thus, demonstrating a substantial risk of harm is sufficient. United States v. Shea , 749 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The term ‘danger’ invokes a concept of probability (commonly referred to as risk of harm) rather than certainty of harm.").

As noted above, if the government satisfies its burden of demonstrating dangerousness or risk of flight, the Bail Reform Act requires the detention of a defendant. Montalvo-Murillo , 495 U.S. at 717, 110 S. Ct. at 2077 ("The Act ... requires pretrial detention of certain persons charged with federal crimes and directs a judicial officer to detain a person charged, pending trial, if the Government has made the necessary showing of dangerousness or risk of flight."); United States v. Smith , 79 F.3d 1208, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The Bail Reform Act requires that a defendant be detained prior to trial if there is clear and convincing evidence that no conditions placed upon his release would reasonably assure the safety of the community."). A defendant may be detained based either on the risk of nonappearance or his dangerousness; the government is not required to establish both. King , 849 F.2d at 488-89 ; see United States v. Apker , 964 F.2d 742, 743 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); United States v. Dillon , 938 F.2d 1412, 1417 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Because we conclude that detention is required on risk of flight grounds, we need not address the issue whether appellant also presents a danger to the community."); Rueben , 974 F.2d at 586 ("For pretrial detention to be imposed on a defendant, the lack of reasonable assurance of either the defendant's appearance, or the safety of others or the community, is sufficient; both are not required.").

III —The Presumption of Risk of Flight and Danger to the Community

Because Defendant is charged in an indictment with four offenses "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act," there is a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant's appearance at trial and the safety of the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). In "order to trigger section 3142(e)'s rebuttable presumption, the government need not make a showing of probable cause independent of the grand jury's indictment." King , 849 F.2d at 487-88 ; United States v. Vargas , 804 F.2d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 1986) ; United States v. Hurtado , 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985). That is, "an indictment returned by a duly constituted grand jury conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause for the purpose of triggering the rebuttable presumptions set forth in § 3142(e)." United States v. Contreras , 776 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1985) ; see Quartermaine , 913 F.2d at 916 ("A grand jury indictment provides the probable cause required by the statute to trigger the presumption.").

In light of the statutory presumption, the Defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption.

See United States v. Stricklin , 932 F.2d 1353, 1354 (10th Cir. 1991) (per...