U.S. v. Miller
| Decision Date | 11 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:05-CR-14(GLS).,1:05-CR-14(GLS). |
| Citation | 382 F.Supp.2d 350 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Maurice D. MILLER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney, Albany, New York, for the United States.
Hon. Alex T. Bunin, Federal Public Defender, Albany, New York, for the Defendant.
Carlos A. Moreno, Assistant U.S. Attorney, of counsel.
Paul J. Evangelista, Assistant Federal Defender, of counsel.
Decision and Order
Maurice D. Miller has been indicted for possession of a handgun and ammunition, and possession with intent to distribute crack and powder cocaine. He moves to suppress the warrantless seizure of evidence from his person and vehicle, and statements he made to local police officers. See Dkt. No. 10; FED. R.CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C). The motion to suppress physical evidence is denied in its entirety, and the motion to suppress statements is granted as to one of six, and otherwise denied.
Preliminarily, this decision is, in part, the logical extension of several observations made by this court in United States v. Elliott, 363 F.Supp.2d 439 (N.D.N.Y.2005). Suppression analysis is difficult absent a clear understanding of the precise issues, and parties should take care in their stipulations or motions to identify those issues. To achieve that goal, there must be sufficient factual disclosure during discovery, and, depending on the circumstances, the government may have to file a notice of intention to offer evidence. See FED. R.CRIM. P. 12(b)(4). However, just as the court cautioned in Elliott, the attorneys have adhered to past practice. See Elliott, 363 F.Supp.2d at 446. They may well have made tactical judgments regarding the issues they elected to raise. Regardless, they could not reasonably have anticipated all of the issues the court now considers, especially since Elliott was not published when this motion was filed.
The parties have raised many Fifth and Fourth Amendment claims, but there are preliminary and substantive issues they have not addressed. Since all issues are pertinent to this motion and equally important to future motions by similar litigants, the court considers each.
The preliminary issues are: (1) the standard of proof; (2) the burden of proof; (3) the admissibility and weight of particular suppression hearing evidence; (4) whether federal or state law governs the substantive analysis ("choice of law"); and (5) the extent to which parties waive issues not raised.
The Fifth Amendment issues are: (1) the application of Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) to various custodial and non-custodial statements; (2) the public safety exception to Miranda (see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984)); (3) the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, and, under due process standards, of the statements themselves; and (4) whether statements are tainted by impermissible searches or other inadmissible statements.
The Fourth Amendment issues are: (1) an arrest in terms of probable cause, custody and good faith reliance on a warrant; (2) exceptions to the search warrant requirement, including an inventory search, a search of a person and vehicle as incidental to an arrest, and the automobile and plain view exceptions; (3) inevitable discovery; and (4) the defendant's expectation of privacy ("abandonment").
The facts surrounding these issues are critical to Miller's motion, and Rule 12 requires the court to state its essential findings. See FED. R.CRIM. P. 12(d). Accordingly, the court first recites the facts, followed by a discussion of the motion's procedural history and the parties' submissions, and concludes with a consideration of the preliminary and substantive issues.
Having considered the testimony of Watervliet police officers Morrow, Ellis and Murray, thirteen exhibits, a Miller affidavit, and the parties' submissions, and having resolved issues of credibility, the court finds the following essential facts. See FED. R.CRIM. P. 12(d); see also infra Part V.A-C. (Standard and Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Considerations).
Running a red light is a traffic offense in violation of Watervliet City Ordinance § 260(4) and New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1) and (2)(a). Patrolman Morrow was a Watervliet police officer authorized to enforce the Watervliet and New York traffic laws.
At 10:45 P.M. on December 21, 2004, Patrolman Morrow saw Miller's car run a red light in Watervliet.1 Miller was the sole occupant and registered owner of the car. Morrow radioed Miller's plate number to headquarters, and followed Miller for a short distance. Within three minutes, Morrow activated his marked patrol car's emergency lights, and signaled Miller to pull over. Miller complied by double-parking in front of 216 23rd Street. Thus, the encounter between Morrow and Miller began as a routine traffic stop.
Consistent with standard and reasonable police procedures, Morrow approached Miller's driver's side window, spoke with Miller about the reason for the stop, and requested his license, registration and insurance information. Miller produced the information, and told Morrow that he believed he had been stopped for making a U-Turn, that he was headed to his cousin's house, and that his cousin was Donald Lewis. ("First Statement"). Miller's statement was prompted by a non-custodial Morrow question.
While Morrow was at Miller's driver's side door, Miller's cousin, Lewis, a pedestrian on the contiguous sidewalk, approached the car several times. Morrow recognized Lewis as a member of the Bloods, a violent street gang associated with drugs and guns. Each time Lewis approached, Morrow ordered him away. After obtaining Miller's license, registration and insurance information, Morrow returned to his car to run a license check. Lewis again approached Miller's car, and Morrow exited his vehicle and ordered him away.
Morrow reentered his car and radioed for back-up because he was nervous about Lewis' intervention. Contemporaneously, he used the patrol vehicle's computer to run a license check on the New York State Police Information Network ("NYSPIN"), and learned that there was an outstanding Troy, New York warrant authorizing Miller's arrest. Morrow then contacted his dispatcher to verify that the Troy warrant was active. "Verification" is a Watervliet Police Department policy, and its purpose is to confirm that the "warrant issuing jurisdiction" still wants the subject.
Within seconds of Morrow's conversation with the dispatcher, the back-up, Ellis, and the shift commander, Lieutenant Murray, arrived almost simultaneously. As they did so, Morrow exited his patrol car, approached Miller's driver's side window, and ordered Miller to exit the vehicle. Approximately five minutes elapsed from the time Miller was stopped until Morrow issued his order. When Morrow issued the order, Miller was no longer free to terminate the encounter, and it escalated from routine traffic stop to custodial arrest.
Miller's arrest was based on the outstanding Troy warrant. Morrow believed that he was without authority to arrest Miller absent warrant confirmation. Suppression Hearing Transcript ("T."), p. 93, Dkt. No. 10. While Watervliet policy supported Morrow's subjective belief, New York law authorized Morrow to arrest Miller. See infra Part VI.A.
After Miller exited his car, Morrow led him to the rear of the vehicle, where Ellis was then standing. Again, Lewis attempted to approach the car, and was instructed to move away. After he complied, Ellis walked over, told him not to interfere, and warned him that he would be arrested if he continued to do so.
From the beginning of the five-minute interval between the traffic stop and custodial arrest, and until Ellis' subsequent conversation with Lewis, Miller engaged in repeated conversations with Lewis. In essence, Miller loudly requested that Lewis, or through Lewis' intercession, Miller's wife, take possession of the vehicle. (Collectively, "Second Statement"). Miller's pre-and post-custodial second statement to Lewis was spontaneous and not prompted by police interrogation.
While at the rear of Miller's car and after Miller's arrest, Morrow searched Miller's person and clothing.2 Morrow seized Miller's wallet, car keys, a separate set of odd-shaped keys, and cash. Morrow then handcuffed Miller, and left him in Ellis' custody at the rear of the vehicle. Contemporaneously, the dispatcher radioed that the Troy warrant was active.
Consistent with a written Watervliet police policy and standard operating procedure, Morrow and Murray ordered Miller's car impounded, requested a tow truck and began an inventory search. The inventory did not begin until after Miller's arrest. The Watervliet Police Department routinely employs inventory procedures when an unattended vehicle accompanies a custodial arrest. Although Miller disputes the clarity of the written policy, the court finds that it specifically supports the testimony of Morrow and Murray. See Watervliet Police Department, General Order, Inventory Policy, Gov't Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 11. While a literal reading of selected portions may support an argument that a vehicle should be inventoried after it is towed, the credible testimony and the document in its entirety support the contrary conclusion that vehicles are generally inventoried prior to towing. Furthermore, and regardless of whether a vehicle is inventoried before or after it is towed, the written policy authorizes an inventory. Both the written policy and standard operating procedure require that officers inventory all closed containers within the vehicle. Id. at § II.1.B.8. It was inevitable that had the inventory occurred at the station instead of roadside, the same...
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