U.S. v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 19 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. CRIM AMD 04-0029.,CRIM AMD 04-0029.
• Citation: 405 F.Supp.2d 602
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Willie MITCHELL, Shelton Harris, Shelly Wayne Martin, and Shawn Gardner.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

405 F.Supp.2d 602

UNITED STATES of America v. Willie MITCHELL, Shelton Harris, Shelly Wayne Martin, and Shawn Gardner.

No. CRIM AMD 04-0029.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

December 19, 2005.

Robert Harding, Thomas M. Dibiagio, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for United States of America.

Laura Kelsey Rhodes, Albright and Rhodes LLC, Rockville, MD, Timothy Joseph Sullivan, Law Offices of Timothy Sullivan, College Park, MD, Gerard P. Martin, Rosenberg Martin Funk Greenberg LLP, William Walter Kanwisher, Law Offices of William Kanwisher, Baltimore, MD, Adam Harris Kurland, Howard University School of Law, Barry Coburn, Trout Cacheris PLLC, Peggy Bennett, Coburn and Schertler LLP, Washington, DC, for Willie Mitchell, Shelton Harris, Shelly Wayne Martin, and Shawn Gardner.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

DAVIS, District Judge.

The four defendants in this case, Willie Mitchell, Shelton Harris, Shelly Wayne Martin, and Shawn Gardner, have moved to dismiss all charges against them based on a lack of jurisdiction. Their individual but identical written pro se motions, the substance of which have been reiterated orally numerous times during in-court proceedings, are hereby DENIED for the reasons stated herein.¹

I.

The defendants have been indicated by a properly constituted grand jury, and they are, indisputably, subject to the jurisdiction of this court. In particular, the grand jury has accused Mitchell, Harris, Martin, and Gardner of having participated in a criminal racketeering enterprise that began in the mid-1990s and continued up to their arrests in 2004. The group is alleged to have sustained itself through armed robberies, drug trafficking, and the establishment of a music production company called Shake Down Entertainment, Ltd. Each of the defendants is alleged to have willfully participated in one or more of five murders in and around Baltimore. If convicted on the capital counts, Mitchell, Harris and Gardner will face the possibility of the death penalty.

II.

The defendants' challenge to jurisdiction is unusual — if not bizarre. The defendants claim that the court does not have jurisdiction "for lack of verified complaint."² They also state that the court "lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Res and lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Rem."³ The motions, dated November 8, 2005, are supported by sources of law that are not ordinarily associated with challenges to criminal jurisdiction, including the Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A.

The exact theory relied on by the defendants is difficult to ascertain, but it seems to be related to their common statements insisting that, "I do not consent. I did not sign anything. And I do not understand the attached documents [the front page of the Second Superceding Indictment]." The defendants also persistently claim that they are not properly identified in the caption of the indictments because their names are printed in all capital letters, thereby failing to properly represent them as "flesh and blood" men.⁴

These arguments are patently without merit. Perhaps they would even be humorous — were the stakes not so high. To begin with, the U.C.C. has no bearing on criminal subject matter jurisdiction. In crossing out the front page of their indictments, the defendants cite "U.C.C. 3.501." The court takes this to mean U.C.C. § 3-501. This section of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, pertains to presentment of negotiable instruments. It is unfathomable how such a provision has any relevance in a criminal proceeding.

The defendants also cite Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Again, this has nothing to do with the instant case. Although the rule does pertain to courts dismissing actions for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, the rule applies only to civil actions. This is a criminal action.

Furthermore, the defendants, who, prior to November 8, 2005, acted with appropriate dignity at all times while in court and cooperated fully with their counsel, apparently recognizing the authority of this court, are mistaken if they think they cannot be prosecuted without their consent or signatures.⁵ If this were the case, it is hard to imagine that any indicated defendant would "consent" to any proceedings against him, and the entire federal criminal code would be pointless. The court can only speculate as to the motivations behind the defendants' recent actions, but it seems that the defendants are confusing criminal procedure with the requirement in civil cases that the defendant be properly served with process.

Finally, the use of capital letters in the caption of an indictment is irrelevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The government attorneys and the court have addressed the defendants, both in court and on paper, in a proper manner that clearly identifies them. "It makes no sense to rest a jurisdictional distinction upon the use of all upper case letters or a mixture of upper and lower case letters. The federal courts abandoned this level of formalism long ago." United States v. Singleton, 2004 WL 1102322, *3 (N.D.Ill. May 7, 2004) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on argument, in part, that defendant was "a flesh and blood man").

B.

Although unique by conventional legal standards, the defendants arguments are not new. Increasingly, they have been asserted in criminal cases pending in this district, and have been summarily rejected. Similar challenges have been advanced in other districts as well, but the results have been the same. In Singleton, for example, the defendant argued first that the capitalization of his name referred not to a flesh and blood man, but to a treasury account the government had set up for each citizen in the 1930s. Id. at *2. Second, the defendant argued that Congress had illegally adjourned without a quorum in 1861, thereby invalidating every law passed since then. Id. The court rejected these assertions. See also United States v. Secretary of Kansas, 2003 WL 22472226 (D.Kan. Oct. 30, 2003) (criminal defendant who filed a lien against property owned by a federal judge sought dismissal of injunctive action filed by the United States on the ground, in part, that he was a "flesh and blood man with a soul").

These assertions are equally unimpressive as invoked in the instant case. This court clearly has jurisdiction over the defendants and over the criminal charges contained in the indictment. By statute, federal district courts "have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The defendants are all charged with crimes that were established by acts of Congress, including racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841. They were indicted by a properly assembled federal grand jury. Now they must stand trial in federal court.

III.

It is not likely that the defendants in this case, charged with, but presumed innocent of, involvement in the urban violence that all too commonly attends the modern drug trade, know of the origins of their in-court tirades and irrational written objections based on "jurisdiction." But courts have encountered these claims before, namely, in the antics and writings of extremists who wish to dissociate themselves from the social compact undergirding this nation's democratic institutions, including the independent judicial branch of government. See THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT GUIDEBOOK, National Center for State Courts (1999), downloadable at http://www.ticket slayer.com/beta _ts_ 2/anti-gov_ handbook.pdf and by purchase from the National Center for State Courts at http://library.ncsc. dni.us/uhtbin/cgisir si.exe. There, the authors have described activities and arguments made by others not unlike those employed by the defendants in this case:

Though the precise contours of their philosophy differ among the various groups, almost all antigovernment movements adhere to a theory of a "sovereign" citizen. Essentially, they believe that our nation is made up of two types of people: those who are sovereign citizens by virtue of Article IV of the Constitution, and those who are "corporate" or "14th Amendment" citizens by virtue of the ratification of the 14th Amendment. The arguments put forth by these groups are generally incoherent, legally, and vary greatly among different groups and different speakers within those groups. They all rely on snippets of 19th Century court opinions taken out of context, definitions from obsolete legal dictionaries and treatises, and misplaced interpretations of original intent. One of the more cogentin the sense that it is readily followed-arguments is that there were no United States citizens prior to the ratification of the 14th...