U.S. v. Monroe

• Decision Date: 01 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-2945.,08-2945.
• Citation: 580 F.3d 552
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Q. MONROE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

580 F.3d 552

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Q. MONROE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-2945.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 15, 2009.

Decided September 1, 2009.

Christina E. Haselberger, Assistant U.S. Attorney (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Evansville, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

James C. Mckinley, Attorney (argued), Indiana Federal Community Defenders, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before RIPPLE, MANION and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

John Q. Monroe pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base. The district court accepted Mr. Monroe's plea. Applying a departure from the mandatory minimum sentence as permitted by U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the court sentenced Mr. Monroe to 168 months' imprisonment. Mr. Monroe later filed a motion for a reduction in the length of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, and Mr. Monroe subsequently filed an appeal from that decision. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

Mr. Monroe was charged by indictment with one count of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government later filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851, alleging that Mr. Monroe had a prior felony drug conviction.¹ Because of that prior conviction, Mr. Monroe faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months' imprisonment if convicted of the charged offense.² He subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to cooperate with the Government in exchange for its promise to recommend a departure from the applicable offense level under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1³ and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).⁴ In exchange for the Government's concessions, Mr. Monroe

expressly waive[d] his right to appeal the convictions and any sentence imposed within the statutory maximum on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Additionally, he also expressly agree[d] not to contest his sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

R.20 at ¶ 18.

The district court accepted Mr. Monroe's guilty plea. At his subsequent sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the findings in the presentence investigation report, which indicated that Mr. Monroe's base offense level was 36 and his criminal history category was IV. The court then applied a three-level reduction based on Mr. Monroe's acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 33 and a corresponding sentencing range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment. The court noted, however, that as a result of the information filed under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), Mr. Monroe faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months' imprisonment. This mandatory minimum sentence therefore became, in effect, the "guidelines sentence."⁵ The court then granted the Government's motion for a downward departure based on Mr. Monroe's substantial cooperation and sentenced Mr. Anderson to 168 months' imprisonment.

On November 1, 2007, Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines took effect.⁶ The amendment reduced the base offense levels for drug offenses involving cocaine base by two levels.⁷ Several months later, in March 2008, Mr. Monroe filed a pro se motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), seeking a reduction in the length of his sentence in light of Amendment 706.⁸ In response to that motion, Probation Officer Robert Akers filed a memorandum concluding that Mr. Monroe was ineligible for any reduction under Amendment 706 because that amendment did not affect his sentencing range, which was equivalent to the statutory minimum sentence. The Government concurred with the probation officer's position. Mr. Monroe's counsel then filed a memorandum in support of Mr. Monroe's motion. He contended that the Government's motion for a reduction in the length of Mr. Monroe's sentence rendered the mandatory minimum sentence inapplicable to Mr. Monroe, thereby permitting a reduction in Mr. Monroe's sentence under Amendment 706.

The district court denied Mr. Monroe's motion without discussing the applicability of Amendment 706; instead, the court stated only that it "[had] considered the relevant factors in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and [had] determined [that] a sentence reduction [was] not appropriate." R.47. Mr. Anderson subsequently filed this appeal.

II DISCUSSION

Mr. Monroe submits that the district court's order denying his motion for a reduction in the length of his sentence is infirm because it does not state with sufficient specificity the reason for the court's denial. Consequently, he argues, it is impossible for him to challenge the district court's ruling or for this court to conduct a meaningful review of the decision. The Government responds that, under the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Monroe waived his right to challenge his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). It further argues that, even if Mr. Monroe did not waive his right to seek a reduction in the length of his sentence, the district court properly denied his motion because Amendment 706 did not have any impact on the mandatory minimum sentence on which Mr. Monroe's sentence was based.

A.

We turn first to the question of whether, under the terms of his plea agreement, Mr. Monroe waived his right to seek a reduction in the length of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The Government notes that Mr. Monroe agreed to the following provision:

Monroe understands that he has a statutory right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed and the manner in which the sentence was determined. Acknowledging this right and in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this Plea Agreement, Monroe agrees that, in the event the Court accepts the Section 5K1.1 statement filed by the government and grants him a reduction of at least two levels pursuant to the statement, he expressly waives his right to appeal the convictions and any sentence imposed within the statutory maximum on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Additionally, he also expressly agrees not to contest his sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

R.20 at ¶ 18 (emphasis added). In the Government's view, a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is, in essence, a collateral attack. Therefore, the Government submits, Mr. Monroe clearly and unambiguously waived his right to seek a reduction in the length of his sentence when he agreed "not to contest his sentence ... in any collateral attack." The Government contends that, because Mr. Monroe knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the unambiguous terms of the plea agreement, his waiver of his right to challenge his sentence should be enforced. See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir.2001).

As a general matter, we interpret plea agreements in accordance with ordinary principles of contract law. United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir.1992); Carnine v. United States, 974 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir.1992). We shall "review the language of the plea agreement objectively," limiting "the parties' rights under the plea agreement ... to those matters upon which they actually agreed." United States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). When interpreting such agreements, however, we must bear in mind the special public-interest concerns that arise in the plea agreement context. As we consistently have recognized, plea agreements are "unique contracts" that implicate "the defendant's right to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause." Ingram, 979 F.2d at 1184 (citation and quotation marks omitted).⁹ Thus, "[w]e review the language of the plea agreement objectively and hold the government to the literal terms of the plea agreement." Williams, 102 F.3d at 927. Therefore, when a plea agreement is unambiguous on its face, this court generally interprets the agreement according to its plain meaning. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (remanding in light of the Government's clear breach of its unambiguous promise that it would not make a sentence recommendation). When the language of an agreement is ambiguous, however, "`the essence of the particular agreement and the Government's conduct relating to its obligations in that case' are determinative." Carnine, 974 F.2d at 928 (quoting United States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir.1981)).

Applying these principles, we cannot accept the Government's assertion that, under the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Monroe clearly and unambiguously waived his right to seek modification of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The plea agreement contains no language that references either that specific statute or, indeed, sentence reductions in general. Instead, the plea agreement contains only (1) Mr. Monroe's express waiver of his right to appeal his sentence, and (2) Mr. Monroe's express agreement that he would not "contest his sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack." R.20 at ¶ 18. It is not at all clear from the language of the agreement that a motion for a subsequent reduction in the length of the sentence imposed falls into either of those two categories.

Because the agreement is ambiguous with respect to whether Mr. Monroe agreed that he would not seek a sentence reduction, we must interpret the terms of the agreement "in light of the parties' reasonable expectations." United States v. Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted). From an...