U.S. v. Morales-Rivera, CR. 99-185(DBH).
| Decision Date | 03 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CR. 99-185(DBH).,CR. 99-185(DBH). |
| Citation | 203 F.Supp.2d 92 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. MORALES-RIVERA, et al. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Ana Berta Vazquez-Martinez, San Juan, PR, John F. Cicilline, Providence, RI, for Norberto Morales-Rivera.
Maria T. Arsuaga, Federal Public Defender's Office, San Juan, PR, for Francisco Irizarry-Mendoza.
Frank D. Inserni-Milam, San Juan, PR, for Pedro L. Bonilla-Marengo.
Daniel J. Vaccaro, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for U.S. Attorneys.
DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
On June 25, 1999 the defendants1 were indicted for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.2 On June 29, 1999, the defendants were arrested and made their initial appearance before the Magistrate Judge. On January 30, 2002, defendant Norberto Morales-Rivera filed a motion seeking dismissal of the Indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994). Defendants Pedro Bonilla-Marengo and Francisco Irizarry-Mendoza have since joined this motion. Generally, the Speedy Trial Act provides that a criminal defendant must be tried within 70 days of either his initial appearance before a judicial officer or the indictment, whichever occurs later. The Act allows this 70-day clock to be tolled, however, for certain specified periods. After reviewing the record in this case, I conclude that although 945 days elapsed between the defendants' initial appearance before a judicial officer and the filing of the speedy trial motion, at least 933 of those days are excludable from the speedy trial calculation. Because no more than 12 countable days have accumulated, the Speedy Trial Act has not been violated and the motion is DENIED.
"The Speedy Trial Act ... commands that a defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either the filing [and making public] of an indictment or information, or the first appearance before a judge or magistrate." Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986); 18 U.S.C § 3161(c)(1). However, the Speedy Trial Act specifically provides that this 70-day clock is tolled for certain designated "periods of delay." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Determining whether a Speedy Trial Act violation has occurred is a two-step process. First I must "do the basic mathematics and determine the aggregate time elapsed awaiting trial." United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.1998). Then I must "ascertain how many days should be excluded from the total time." Id.
On June 25, 1999, the Grand Jury returned a sealed Indictment charging defendants Norberto Morales-Rivera, Jerry Martinez-Marti, Francisco Irizarry-Mendoza, Carlos Parrilla-Elicier, Victor Medero-Ruiz, Pedro Bonilla-Marengo and Alexis Maldonado-Marquez with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On June 29, 1999, all seven defendants were arrested and made their initial appearance before a Magistrate Judge. On June 29, 1999, the Court also ordered the Indictments unsealed. Because both triggering events (the initial appearances and the unsealing of the indictments) occurred on June 29, 1999, the Speedy Trial Act clock started to run the next day, June 30, 1999. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.1998) (); United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1162 (1st Cir.1995) (). The clock stopped running on January 30, 2002, the day defendant Morales-Rivera filed his Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Violations of the Speedy Trial Act. See United States v. Connor, 926 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir.1991) ( ). Because the day the speedy trial motion is filed is excludable, January 29, 2002 is actually the last countable day. United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 600 (1st Cir.1996) (). Therefore, the speedy trial clock ran for 945 days from (and including) June 30, 1999 to January 29, 2002.
In the second step of the analysis, I must determine how many of these 945 days are excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). In order to make this determination, I have reviewed the entire docket and case file, including all of the motions, hearings, orders and other events that could potentially produce excludable time. However, I will only discuss a selection of those events that, by themselves, account for a sufficient amount of excludable time. Furthermore, I will discuss excludable time, generally, rather than with respect to individual defendants because "[i]t is well-settled that an exclusion of time attributable to one defendant is applicable for all codefendants." United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir.1997)).
(1) The 204 days from June 30, 1999 to January 19, 2000 are excludable.
On June 29, 1999, the Government filed a motion seeking the detention without bail of all seven defendants named in the original indictment. On July 1, 1999, the Court held a hearing and ordered defendants Martinez-Marti, Irizarry-Mendoza, Parrilla-Elicier, Bonilla-Marengo, Medero-Ruiz and Maldonado-Marquez held without bail. On July 2, 1999, the Court held a hearing and ordered defendant Morales-Rivera held without bail. Therefore, the time from June 30, 1999 to July 2, 1999 is excludable as "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F); see also United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 11 (1st Cir.1998) (); United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1997) ().
The defendants were arraigned on the same day as their bail hearing. At the arraignments, the Court allowed the parties 15 days to file pre-trial motions. Thus, the time from July 3, 1999 to July 17, 1999 (15 days starting the day after defendant Morales-Rivera's arraignment) is excludable as "time set aside by the district court as motion preparation time." Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 1165 (); see also Sarah Jane Cole, Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Speedy Trial, 89 Geo. L.J. 1377, 1391 n. 1208 (2001) (collecting cases).
On July 13, 1999, the Government filed a motion asking for additional time to comply with the discovery requirements of Local Rule 409. On August 25, 1999, the Court ruled this motion moot. For a motion that does not require a hearing, the Speedy Trial Act "allow[s] for the exclusion of all of the time from the filing of the motion to the time that the court receives all reasonably expected papers, plus no more than an additional 30 days of advisement time." Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 1163. Therefore, the time from July 13, 1999 to August 12, 1999 is excludable.
On July 27, 1999, defendant Bonilla-Marengo filed a motion asking the Court to stay the proceedings and order the Government to comply with the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1994). On August 5, 1999, the Court referred the motion to the Magistrate Judge. On August 12, 1999, the Government filed a response. On August 16, 1999, the Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the motion. On August 19, 1999, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion. The time from July 27, 1999 to August 19, 1999 is excludable as delay resulting from a pretrial motion.
On August 11, 1999, the defendants3 filed an omnibus discovery motion. On August 24, 1999, the Government filed a response and requested additional time to comply with those portions of the defendants' request that it did not contest. On October 8, 1999, the Court referred both motions (the original discovery motion and the Government's request for more time) to the Magistrate Judge. On November 1, 1999, the Magistrate Judge granted the Government's request for additional time. At the same time the Magistrate Judge granted part of the defendant's motion and denied the remainder. Only a portion of this period is excludable however. Once the Government filed its response, the Speedy Trial Act allowed the Court 30 days to decide the motion. Therefore, the period from August 11, 1999 to September 23, 1999 is excludable. The clock stopped again when the Court referred the motions to the Magistrate Judge. Thus the time from October 8, 1999 to November 1, 1999 is also excludable.
On August 31, 1999, defendant Bonilla-Marengo filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider its denial of his Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act motion. The Government's response was due September 13, 1999. However the Government did not file a response. On October 8, 1999, the Court referred the motion to the Magistrate Judge. On November 1, 1999, the Magistrate Judge...
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