U.S. v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 07 June 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1571,77-1571
• Citation: 189 U.S.App.D.C. 155,581 F.2d 933
• Parties: , 189 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 31 UNITED STATES of America v. William D. MORGAN, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 933

581 F.2d 933

48 A.L.R.Fed. 709, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 155,

3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 31

UNITED STATES of America v. William D. MORGAN, Appellant.

No. 77-1571.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Jan. 9, 1978.

Decided June 7, 1978.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Criminal 77-00077).

Tom M. Schaumberg, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), for appellant.

Regina C. McGranery, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before BAZELON, McGOWAN and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BAZELON.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.

BAZELON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant, William Morgan, was found guilty by a jury of possessing phenmetrazine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970). We agree with his contention that the trial judge erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury.

I

On January 6, 1977, officers of the Metropolitan Police Department obtained a warrant to search for illegal drugs in a single-family dwelling in Northwest Washington, D.C. The warrant was issued upon the affidavit of Detective Mathis, stating that a reliable informant had advised him that a black male, age 22 to 24 and known as "Timmy," was selling drugs from inside the house; that "within the past 48 hours" Mathis had gone to the house with the informant and waited outside while the informant made a "controlled" buy; that upon rejoining Mathis, the informant handed him some pink pills, later identified as phenmetrazine; and that the informant said he had purchased these pills from Timmy.

When the officers arrived at the house at 10 p. m. to execute the warrant, they did not find Timmy but instead came across appellant and four other persons in the front hallway. Tr. 8, 250, 256. Appellant was holding the leash on a snarling German shepherd. According to the officers, appellant immediately reached in his pocket with his free hand, grabbed some pink pills, threw them on the floor, and started to mash them with his foot. Tr. 8. Detective Mathis managed to recover intact twelve of the pills, ¹ which subsequently were determined to be phenmetrazine. A search of the basement resulted in seizure of seventy-seven additional such pills and $30 cash, found in a shaving kit secreted in a hole in the ceiling, Tr. 17; $4,280 cash, found in a fuse box, Tr. 42; $410 cash, found in a dresser drawer, Tr. 15; the birth certificate of a Kelsey Etheridge, found in an unidentified article of clothing on a chair, Tr. 265; and Etheridge's school identification, found on top of a television, Tr. 266. No fingerprints were taken from any of these particular items, Tr. 47-48, and no fingerprints were introduced at trial. Besides appellant, at least six other persons were in the house when the police arrived, Tr. 123-124, 250, including the four who were in the hallway.

At trial, the government sought to connect appellant not merely with the twelve pills seized from the floor in the hallway but also with the seventy-seven pills and $4,280 cash found in the basement. The owner of the house, Mrs. McKnight, testified that she had known appellant for about two years and that he came to her home daily to feed and exercise her dogs, which were chained in the basement. Tr. 57-62. Appellant, she said, was the only person regularly in the house who was not afraid of the dogs. Tr. 60. She also stated, however, that with the exception of Etheridge, who used the basement bathroom, no one had lived in the basement since October 1976. ² Tr. 61-63.

Appellant testified that he resided in Southeast Washington with his sister and brother. Tr. 206. On the evening of the search, he had gone to Mrs. McKnight's house to invite one of the occupants, a William Taylor, to go with him to a party. ³ Tr. 206-207. He denied dropping any phenmetrazine, and claimed to have no knowledge of the drugs or money found in the basement. ⁴ Tr. 217-219, 240, 243. He admitted that he did take care of the dogs, however, and thus came to the house and entered the basement every other day. Tr. 213, 223.

Three times during the trial defense counsel sought to establish that Timmy, Mrs. McKnight's son, lived in the house and was selling drugs. ⁵ Counsel proffered as evidence of this fact the statements made by the informant to Detective Mathis that are contained in the affidavit supporting the search warrant. The trial judge excluded this evidence on grounds that it was irrelevant and was hearsay. ⁶

II

Morgan contends that the informant's statements were neither (a) irrelevant nor (b) hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that their exclusion was highly prejudicial.

A. RELEVANCY

The district court has wide discretion to admit or exclude evidence where the question is one of relevancy or materiality. See, e. g., United States v. Hallman, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 93, 94, 439 F.2d 603, 604 (1971); Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1965). We find an abuse of such discretion here, however, since it plainly appears that the excluded evidence bears on a matter that could be determinative of guilt or innocence.

When illicit drugs are found in an area accessible to two or more people, any one, or all of them might be criminally culpable. Whether the government charges all of them, or only one, the threshold question for the jury is the same: Who had possession? To convict a particular defendant of possessing illegal drugs, the jury must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that that defendant knew about their presence and intended to exercise dominion and control over them. 33 D.C.Code § 402(a); United States v. Weaver, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 458 F.2d 825 (1972). To convict a particular defendant of the more serious crime of possession with intent to distribute, the jury must be willing (where there is no evidence of actual distribution) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that that defendant would not have possessed so substantial a quantity of drugs if he merely intended to use them himself. United States v. Herron, 185 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406, 567 F.2d 510, 513 (1977); United States v. James, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 112, 494 F.2d 1007, 1031, Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020, 95 S.Ct. 495, 42 L.Ed.2d 294 (1974).

In this case it is not clear whether the jury found that appellant intended to distribute the twelve pills which he assertedly threw on the floor or the seventy-seven pills found in the basement. ⁷ In either event, however, evidence that another person was selling phenmetrazine from the house was decidedly relevant. If the jury had believed that "Timmy" was a dealer in residence, it might have concluded that appellant had merely purchased the twelve pills found in his possession from Timmy, and that Timmy, not appellant, exercised dominion and control over the seventy-seven pills in the basement with intent to distribute them. Since there was no evidence of actual sales by appellant, the jury was asked to rely solely on speculative inferences about intent to distribute. ⁸ It might not have drawn such inferences if the evidence suggested that a third person was the distributor. Under these circumstances, we see no basis to exclude evidence of actual sales by a third person on grounds of relevancy.

B. HEARSAY

The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically provide that certain categories of out-of-court statements offered to show the truth of the matter asserted shall not be regarded as "hearsay." ⁹ Under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) such a statement is not barred as hearsay if a party-opponent "has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth . . .." This Rule plainly applies to the informant's statements to Detective Mathis. The government manifested its belief in the truth of the informant's statements about Timmy by characterizing them as "reliable" in a sworn affidavit to a United States Magistrate. ¹⁰

Notwithstanding the plain language of the Rule, the government urges us to hold it inapplicable to the prosecution in criminal cases. The government's position is based on public policy grounds, and has been accepted, it says, by the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. ¹¹ All of the cases on which it relies, however save one, were decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence were made effective by Congress. ¹² And that one, United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1146, 47 L.Ed.2d 340 (1976), decided several months after the effective date of the Rules, ¹³ does not discuss their possible applicability. Moreover, there is nothing in the history of the Rules generally or in Rule 801(d)(2)(B) particularly to suggest that it does not apply to the prosecution in criminal cases. ¹⁴

Most basically, we think the government reads too much into the position taken by our sister Circuits. None of the cases on which it relies deals with the problem of out-of-court statements in which the government itself has manifested its "adoption or belief." Rather, to the extent these cases survive publication of the Federal Rules, a question we need not decide here, they establish only that the prosecution is excepted from the general rule that admissions made by an agent during the course of the agency and concerning matters within the scope of the agency are binding on his principal. ¹⁵ Clearly, statements in which the government has manifested its "adoption or belief" stand on more solid ground than mere out-of-court assertions by a government agent. We do not decide that just Any statement the informant might have made is admissible against the government. We decide only that where, as here, the government has indicated in a sworn affidavit to a judicial officer that it believes particular statements are trustworthy, it may not sustain an objection to the subsequent...