U.S. v. Morgan, 95-4102
Decision Date | 08 October 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-4102,95-4102 |
Citation | 91 F.3d 1193 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Mark A. MORGAN, Defendant, Walker LaBrunerie, Defendant/Appellee, Charles J. Weber, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Bruce E. Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kansas City, MO, argued (Paul S. Becker, on the brief), for appellant.
James Ralph Hobbs, Kansas City, MO, argued (W. Brian Gaddy, on the brief), for appellee.
Before BEAM and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, * District Judge.
After determining that Walker LaBrunerie's inculpatory statement was given in the course of plea discussions, the district court suppressed the statement under Rule 11(e)(6)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The government appeals. We reverse.
This appeal involves a troublesome situation in which law enforcement agents sought a suspect's cooperation and are now attempting to use his statements against him. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) conducted an investigation into corruption in the city government of Kansas City (Missouri). During the investigation, LaBrunerie came under suspicion for, among other things, bribing city council member Michael Hernandez to obtain favorable zoning action. Unknown to LaBrunerie, Hernandez had been actively cooperating in the investigation.
At some point during the investigation, the FBI needed the cooperation of another suspect. LaBrunerie was selected for the task and approached at his Kansas City home at approximately 8:00 a.m. on September 15, 1994. The reportedly cordial meeting, between LaBrunerie and two agents, lasted for roughly thirty minutes. LaBrunerie was informed of the criminal charges he could face, 1 the strong possibility of jail time, and the importance of his cooperation. After LaBrunerie briefly explained his role in the offenses, the agents requested his further cooperation and asked him to attend another meeting later that same morning. Stating that he had no option other than cooperating with the investigators, LaBrunerie agreed to attend the meeting.
LaBrunerie drove to a hotel several miles from his home to attend the second meeting. It began around 10:00 a.m. and lasted approximately three hours. Several FBI agents were present, as was Assistant United States Attorney Paul Becker. Following introductions, Becker spent approximately the first fifteen minutes of the meeting explaining the charges LaBrunerie could face, the effect of his cooperation on his sentence, and, in general terms, the federal sentencing guidelines. At this meeting, LaBrunerie incriminated himself by giving a detailed explanation of his role in the offenses.
LaBrunerie attended both meetings without obtaining counsel. Indeed, the FBI agents admittedly discouraged LaBrunerie from obtaining counsel and did not read him his Miranda rights. The agents informed LaBrunerie that although he was a target of the investigation, he was free to leave the meetings at any time and was not under arrest. LaBrunerie was further instructed not to tell anyone about the meetings because public knowledge of his cooperation would lessen his value as an informant. 2
For various reasons, LaBrunerie's cooperation with the investigation disintegrated. After LaBrunerie informed others of his cooperation with law enforcement, the FBI effectively dropped him as a source. He was subsequently indicted on various charges involving the bribery of councilman Hernandez. LaBrunerie then moved to suppress his September 15th statements.
At a suppression hearing before the magistrate judge, both LaBrunerie and the prosecution focused on the issues of whether the FBI's questioning of LaBrunerie was custodial and whether his statements were voluntarily given. The magistrate judge found that the statement made at the 8:00 meeting was admissible as voluntarily given during non-custodial questioning. This appeal does not involve that ruling. At the end of that suppression hearing, however, the magistrate judge sua sponte raised the issue of whether the 10:00 statement was given in the course of plea discussions and was, thus, inadmissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6)(D) (Rule 11). Neither side had considered or argued this point.
The magistrate judge found the 10:00 statement was made in the course of plea discussions and recommended that it be suppressed. The district court held a hearing specifically addressing this issue and entered an order suppressing the 10:00 statement. The government alleges that this ruling was erroneous because the 10:00 statement by LaBrunerie was merely offered in the hope of obtaining leniency in sentencing and, therefore, is admissible evidence.
The district court's ultimate determination that LaBrunerie's 10:00 statement was given in the course of plea discussions is a mixed question of law and fact. See Ornelas v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ( ). On appeal, therefore, we review the determination de novo. 3 See id. To determine whether LaBrunerie's statement was given in the course of plea discussions, we look to the specific facts and examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 312 (8th Cir.1980).
The essential purpose of Rule 11, upon which the district court based its suppression order, is promoting active plea negotiations and encouraging "frank discussions" in plea bargaining. Rachlin v. United States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir.1983). The rule provides, in relevant part:
[E]vidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
....
(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6)(D). By its plain language, the rule makes it clear that a statement must be given "in the course of plea discussions" to come within the rule's exclusionary language. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1367 (5th Cir.1978) ( ). Therefore, we must determine whether LaBrunerie's 10:00 statement was given "in the course of plea discussions" within the meaning of Rule 11.
This case is indistinguishable from United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 211, 133 L.Ed.2d 143 (1995). In Hare, we agreed with the district court that statements should not be suppressed because they were not given in the course of plea discussions. Id. at 449. The facts of this case are very similar. In both cases, the defendants were...
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