Calabro v. State
| Citation | 995 So.2d 307 |
| Decision Date | 18 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. SC07-1105.,SC07-1105. |
| Parties | Rodney CALABRO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charles G. White, Miami, for Petitioner.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Rolando Soler, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Respondent.
This case is before the Court based upon express and direct conflict. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Petitioner, Rodney Calabro, contends that the holding of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Calabro, 957 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), that his statements made during arraignment indicating his desire to engage in plea negotiations were admissible against him at his criminal trial, is in error and conflicts with the Florida Evidence Code and other district court decisions. We agree and quash Calabro.
In Calabro the Third District outlined the circumstances culminating in Calabro's appeal:
The State filed an information charging Calabro with one count of second degree murder. On November 26, 2002, during the arraignment in open court, with Calabro and the prosecutor present, the trial judge reviewed Calabro's financial affidavit and subsequently, appointed Calabro a public defender to represent him. Immediately after the appointment of the public defender, the following discussion took place:
MR. WILLIAMS [the public defender]: Stand mute, demand discovery, trial by jury. Is it murder second degree?
MS. SEITCHIK [the prosecutor]: Is that in a—right now, it is. I have discovery and I also amended discovery will [sic] all the reports that I have at this time.
You should have talked to me three weeks ago, I haven't had no representation since I've been in jail, for three weeks. Where have you been? I will like to avoid the trial and have some kind of plea agreement set earlier than March or whatever that was.
But if an attorney came to see me within its past three weeks, maybe they'll have an idea of where my mind is at but right now I'm guilty. I'm not proud of it, but.
....
(Emphasis added). Calabro thereafter filed a motion to exclude the statements relating to his admissions of guilt, alleging that the statements were offers to plead guilty or made in connection with plea negotiations and thus, inadmissible under section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(h). In responding to Calabro's motion to exclude the statements, the State conceded that the first statement uttered by Calabro, "I will like to avoid the trial and have some kind of plea agreement," is inadmissible under section 90.410, Florida Statutes, and rule 3.172(h) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the second statement, "I know this is unusual but unfortunately I'm guilty of this .... right now I'm guilty," the State argued that it was a separate and distinct, unsolicited and unilateral utterance, which did not satisfy the two-prong test required by the Florida Supreme Court in characterizing a statement or discussion as an inadmissible plea negotiation. The trial court entered an order excluding both statements, concluding that the statements made by Calabro "were offers for a plea agreement and are inadmissible pursuant to § 90.410, Fla. Stat. (2005) and Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(h)."
On appeal, similarly to its argument below, the State only challenges the exclusion of Calabro's second statement and argues that the trial court erred in excluding the statement as an offer for a plea agreement.
Calabro, 957 So.2d at 1211-12.1 The Third District reversed the trial court's order excluding the second statement. "Without reaching a conclusion as to the propriety of the State's concession of Calabro's first statement as an inadmissible offer for a plea agreement," the Third District held that "Calabro's second statement relating to his admission of guilt was an unsolicited, unilateral utterance not made in connection with any plea negotiation and is therefore, admissible." Id. at 1212. The Third District cites Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(h) in its opinion, but this rule is now rule 3.172(i).
When reviewing orders on motions to suppress, appellate courts "accept the trial court's factual findings if there is evidence to support them, while reviewing the court's legal conclusions de novo." Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 522 (Fla. 2003) (). In this instance we agree with the State that our review is essentially de novo since the trial court relied exclusively on a transcript from arraignment as the factual predicate for applying section 90.410, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(i) (formerly rule 3.172(h)).
Calabro argues that the Third District erred in concluding that his unsolicited statements admitting guilt during arraignment did not fall within the ambit of evidence excluded by section 90.410, Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(i). He asserts that the Third District's ruling is contrary to an application of the plain language of section 90.410 and rule 3.172(i) as well as numerous decisions from this Court and the other district courts of appeal involving similar circumstances.
Initially, for example, Calabro asserts that the Third District's decision in Calabro conflicts with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Davis v. State, 842 So.2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The statements at issue in Davis took place during a pretrial "rocket docket" arraignment hearing in open court. Id. at 990. The First District held that the defendant's statement to the prosecutor "Oh, I already told you I was guilty of that, but the grand theft, no, no, no" was made in connection with the defendant's attempts at plea negotiations and was, therefore, inadmissible under the express provisions of section 90.410. Id. at 991-92. The First District cited this Court's opinion in Richardson v. State, 706 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 1998), and concluded by explaining that its holding was mandated by Richardson and the express terms of the statute and rule:
In so finding, we note the fairly broad scope of the applicable criminal rule and statute, section 90.410. See § 90.410, Fla. Stat. (2000) ( ; Richardson, 706 So.2d at 1355-56 ().
842 So.2d at 991-92. Similarly, Calabro asserts his initial request for a plea agreement constituted "an offer to plead guilty" and his second statement conceding guilt was "made in connection with" that offer and his attempt to resolve his case by a plea agreement. However, notwithstanding the similarities between the circumstances in Davis and Calabro, we agree with the State that the cases can also be distinguished on the basis that Davis involved ongoing plea discussions while Calabro involves the initiation of plea discussions by the defendant.
Calabro also asserts the Third District's decision conflicts with the holdings in Debiasio v. State, 789 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); McCray v. State, 760 So.2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); and Russell v State, 614 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). He notes that, as in his case, all three of these cases involved initial and unsolicited communications by defendants to the State offering to plead, and, in the process, admitting guilt. In all these cases the district courts held that section 9.410 and rule 3.172(i) barred admission of the statements.
In Russell, the First District found that a defendant's unsolicited letter to the state attorney was an offer to plead and was, therefore, inadmissible pursuant to section 90.410 and rule 3.172(i). The letter at issue, which was received the day before trial, stated:
Dear Mr. Grimm,
If I could be sentenced under the regular offense and you agree to give me three years and all my county time I will take it and won't go to trial. If you agree to do this. I look forward to hearing from you soon.
Russell, 614 So.2d at 606. The State argued that the letter was an unsolicited and unilateral communication not protected by the statute. Id. The First District...
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