U.S. v. Mounts
| Decision Date | 27 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | 93-1861 and 94-1506,Nos. 93-1823,93-1839,93-1860,s. 93-1823 |
| Citation | 35 F.3d 1208 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph MOUNTS, Jamal Hamdan, Isabel Cristina Restrepo, a/k/a Isabel C. Scott, Thelma Zulima Buitrago, a/k/a Beatriz E. Agudelo, and Maurice Elliott, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Barry R. Elden, Asst. U.S. Atty., Christopher Cook (argued), Office of U.S. Atty., Crim. Receiving, Appellate Div., Chicago, IL, for U.S.
Elliot M. Samuels, Chicago, IL (argued), for Ralph G. Mounts.
Kevin E. Milner, Chicago, IL (argued), for Jamal Hamdan.
Elliott T. Price, Chicago, IL (argued), for Isabel C. Restrepo.
Terry G. Collins, Houston, TX (argued), for Thelma Z. Buitrago.
James D. Montgomery, Thomas C. Maeszewski (argued), Sheldon R. Sobol, Montgomery & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Maurice Elliott.
Before CUDAHY, ESCHBACH, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
This is the consolidated appeal of five criminal defendants convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1), 846. The defendants challenge both their convictions and sentences. We affirm.
Each of the defendants involved in this appeal participated in a loosely-structured narcotics organization which funneled Columbian cocaine through Houston, Texas for distribution and resale in Chicago, Illinois. The head of the organization, David Hamdan ("David"), had been supplying cocaine to distributors in the Chicago area on a regular basis since 1985. In late 1989, David's primary supplier, a man named "Javier", returned to Columbia to avoid apprehension by United States law enforcement. In his stead, Javier directed his daughter, Isabel Cristina Restrepo, to take over his business. Restrepo and David met, became romantically involved, and began living together. In the fall of 1990, Restrepo introduced David to a friend in Houston, Thelma Zulima Buitrago. After meeting Buitrago, David's ability to acquire and distribute cocaine changed dramatically.
During 1991, Buitrago worked with various Houston suppliers to arrange several multiple kilogram cocaine sales to David. To move the cocaine from Houston to Chicago, David employed his younger brother, Jamal Hamdan ("Jamal"), an old friend, Ralph Mounts, Mahmoud Ayyash ("Mahmoud"), and Rosella De La Cruz. Once in Chicago, David sold the cocaine to wholesale supplier Hamdi Ayyash ("Hamdi") who in turn distributed smaller quantities to Maurice Elliott, Joseph Horton, and Jim Clay for retail sale.
The organization began to unravel in August 1991 when Arkansas state troopers arrested Mounts for a traffic violation and seized 60 kilograms of cocaine from his rental car. Despite this setback, in August and September, David received at least two more large shipments of cocaine from Houston through his efforts and the efforts of Mahmoud, Jamal, and De La Cruz. Nonetheless, the organization's fate was soon sealed. On September 9, 1991, DEA agents arrested Hamdi and Mahmoud after Hamdi attempted to purchase 30 kilograms of cocaine from an undercover agent. Within a month, Hamdi and Mahmoud began cooperating with authorities and implicated all the defendants joined in this appeal.
On February 13, 1992, a grand jury indicted Cristina Restrepo, Jamal Hamdan, and Maurice Elliott, as well as Joseph Horton, David Hamdan, Hamdi Ayyash, Mahmoud Ayyash, Rosella De La Cruz, and Jim Clay on various narcotics offenses. Two months later, the same grand jury handed down a superseding indictment adding defendants Thelma Buitrago, Abdallah Zaatrah, and Ralph Mounts. Count One of the superseding indictment charged all twelve defendants with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute multiple kilogram quantities of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1), 846 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. Count One described a conspiracy spanning from April 10, 1991 through December 13, 1991. Count Two charged all defendants except Mounts with possession of 50 kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute on or about September 9, 1991, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. Counts Three through Eleven charged Zaatrah, Mounts, and David with travelling in interstate commerce to promote the unlawful activity of possessing and distributing cocaine, in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952(a)(3).
The five defendants in this case pleaded not guilty. Prior to trial, the district court severed Elliott's trial from the others'. After a month-long trial, a jury convicted Restrepo, Jamal, Mounts, and Buitrago on all counts. A different jury convicted Elliott on all counts as well. After conducting individual sentencing hearings, the district court sentenced the defendants as follows: Restrepo, 121 months' imprisonment; Jamal, 188 months' imprisonment; Mounts, 188 months' imprisonment; Buitrago, 292 months' imprisonment; and Elliott, 240 months' imprisonment. Additionally, the district court ordered five years of supervised release for each defendant. After sentencing, all five defendants filed timely appeals. We have jurisdiction to review their challenges under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(a).
The defendants raise a variety of issues. We first address their evidentiary challenges and then discuss their sentencing arguments. Finally, we address Elliott's challenge to the jury instructions given at his trial.
Prior to trial, Mounts moved to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest in Arkansas. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied his motion, concluding that the stops of Mounts by Arkansas state troopers had been legal. Mounts now challenges this ruling.
This court reviews the district court's denial of a motion to suppress for clear error. United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir.1993). Clear error exists only if after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with "the firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. In conducting our review, we give particular deference to the district court which had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Id. (quoting United States v. Withers, 972 F.2d 837, 841 (7th Cir.1992)).
When a defendant challenges the lawfulness of an allegedly pretextual traffic stop, the district court must conduct an objective, two-prong analysis, determining first whether law enforcement authorities had reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and second, whether state or municipal law authorized the officers to effect the stop in question. United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989)).
On August 7, 1991, Arkansas State Trooper Ronald Ball 1 was patrolling Interstate 30 south of Little Rock, Arkansas when he approached a rental car bearing a 1991 Georgia license plate. He noticed that the license plate did not display a sticker indicating the month it expired, so he radioed an inquiry on the license plate. When the dispatcher informed him that the Georgia computers had no records on the license plate, Officer Ball decided to pull the car over to check its registration.
After pulling the car over, Officer Ball asked the driver, Ralph Mounts, for his driver's license and registration papers. Mounts produced a Texas license and the car's rental agreement. After Officer Ball satisfied himself that Mounts was in lawful possession of the car, he issued Mounts a citation for not displaying a monthly sticker on his license plate. He then asked Mounts for permission to search the car. Mounts consented. When the troopers removed a heavy suitcase from the trunk, Mounts asked that the search stop. Although the troopers suspected the suitcase contained contraband, the troopers complied and permitted Mounts to leave.
Approximately 40 minutes later, another trooper, Officer Karl Byrd, stopped Mounts again. During the time between the two stops, the troopers had received additional information indicating that Mounts had a revoked driver's license from Illinois. After confirming that Texas law did not allow an individual to obtain a driver's license after another state revokes his license, Officer Byrd arrested Mounts for driving in Arkansas on an invalid license. The troopers impounded Mounts' car and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. They found 60 kilograms of cocaine in a suitcase located in the trunk. 2
After hearing Officer Ball's testimony and reviewing the state suppression hearing transcript, the district court denied Mounts' motion to suppress. With regard to the first stop, the district court rejected Officer Ball's reliance on the absence of a monthly sticker on Mounts' license plate as grounds for reasonable suspicion, finding that a trooper with his level of experience should reasonably know that Georgia law does not require its license plates to bear a monthly sticker. However, the district court found that Officer Ball also relied on the absence of any car registration information in the Georgia computer system in deciding to pull Mounts over. The court concluded that the absence of any registration information created a reasonable suspicion sufficient to permit Officer Ball to stop Mounts. The court also held that the second stop of Mounts and the subsequent inventory search were constitutionally valid.
On appeal, Mounts challenges only the validity of the first stop by the Arkansas State Troopers. 3 He first argues that the district court clearly erred when it concluded that Officer Ball relied on the absence of registration information in deciding to stop him. According to Mounts, Officer Ball offered the "absence of registration information" rationale only after the district court made...
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