U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property

• Decision Date: 06 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1571,89-1571
• Citation: 900 F.2d 470
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ONE PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY, etc., Defendant, Appellant, Appeal of Carmela SCLAFANI and Rosario Sclafani, Claimants. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 470

900 F.2d 470

UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ONE PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY, etc., Defendant, Appellant, Appeal of Carmela SCLAFANI and Rosario Sclafani, Claimants.

No. 89-1571.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 6, 1990.

Decided April 11, 1990.

John C. McBride, with whom Thomas Kerner and McBride, Wheeler and Widegren, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellants.

Jeffrey S. Robbins, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellee.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States resulting in an order forfeiting property of claimants Rosario and Carmela Sclafani, husband and wife, to the United States. The property is the home of the Sclafanis; it consists of land and buildings located at 141 Bell Rock Street, Everett, Massachusetts.

I. THE FACTS

The United States instituted a forfeiture proceeding against the Sclafanis' property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(7) (1988). ¹ The complaint in rem for forfeiture alleged:

That as indicated by the Affidavit of Joseph W. Coons, attached and incorporated as Exhibit B, the defendant real property with the building, appurtenances, and improvements, was used or intended to be used to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, violations of Title 21 of the United States Code, the Controlled Substance Act; namely 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846, in that the defendant real property was used by Rosario Sclafani and Carmela Sclafani, in at least 1987, to unlawfully store, conceal, possess, prepare and distribute quantities of cocaine, a controlled substance.

The affidavit of Joseph W. Coons states that he is a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); that he has had extensive experience relative to cocaine trafficking; and that on September 8, 1987, police officers of the Everett, Massachusetts Police Department executed a search warrant at the Sclafanis' property. We quote the most important parts of the affidavit.

I am informed by Detective Cook that, on September 8, 1987, at 9:00 p.m., Carmela M. Sclafani admitted Detective Cook and the others to 141 Bell Rock Street after Detective Cook identified himself as a [sic] Everett police detective.

Rosario Sclafani, husband of Carmela Sclafani, was present in the residence at the time of the search. When Rosario learned that the detectives had a search warrant, and as Lt. Chambers started up the stairs to the second floor of the house, Rosario quickly went to a bedroom on the second floor.

Rosario Sclafani soon after rushed past Lt. Chambers at the top of the stairs and into the bathroom where Rosario threw several plastic bags, each containing a white powdery substance, into the toilet and then flushed it. Lt. Chambers was able to salvage five small bags from the toilet bowl before the bags were lost.

At the same time, Carmela Sclafani went to the second floor bedroom and removed a large white plastic bag from the top of a dresser. Detective Bontempo was able to seize the plastic bag before Carmela could conceal it under her dress. The bag contained three large cellophane bags, each containing a white powdery substance. The total weight of the cellophane bags was approximately one pound. Detective Bontempo also seized a smaller cellophane bag from the top of a dresser in the bedroom. The bag contained 14 packets of white substance wrapped in white paper.

The Everett police also seized U.S. currency from various parts of the residence: $11,990 from the top drawer of the dresser in the second floor bedroom, $1,144 from the top drawer of a night stand next to the bed in the same bedroom and $710 from a hutch in the dining room. The total amount of U.S. currency seized from the residence was $13,884.

From 141 Bell Rock Street, the Everett police also seized an Ohaus triple beam balance scale which, I know from my experience as a special agent, is commonly used in association with cocaine trafficking; a four-ounce bottle of Inositol powder commonly used to dilute cocaine powder; five handguns, one .22 cal. rifle, one Mossberg 12 gauge pump shotgun, and one Ruger single six .22 cal. revolver, the serial number of which was obliterated. In addition, the detectives seized various documents, papers, records and books.

On September 9, 1987, Carmela and Rosario Sclafani were arrested and charged with cocaine trafficking. Rosario was also charged with possession of an illegal firearm.

The bags of white powder seized were analyzed by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health; each bag tested positive for cocaine.

On the same day that the warrant was executed, September 8, 1987, the Sclafanis were arrested and charged under state law with cocaine trafficking. On August 19, 1988, the United States filed the forfeiture complaint against the Sclafanis' property. On September 26, 1988, Rosario Sclafani pled guilty in state court to possession of more than 100 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute; Carmela pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The next day, September 27, service of the forfeiture complaint was made on the Sclafanis.

II. THE ISSUES

In granting summary judgment for the government the district court ruled that the affidavits of DEA Agent Coons and Everett police officer David Cook "as well as the record of claimants' convictions" established probable cause to believe that there was a substantial connection between the claimants' property and drug trafficking, and hence that the property was subject to forfeiture. See United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 897 (1st Cir.1987) (In forfeiture actions under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881, "the government must initially show probable cause to believe that the property was connected with illegal drug transactions. Once probable cause is shown, the private claimant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not involved in illegal drug transactions."). The court ruled that the Sclafanis' pleas of guilty in state court collaterally estopped them "from relitigating the issues litigated and disposed of in their criminal case, the possession with intent to distribute cocaine." We note that the district court evidently treated the guilty pleas as the equivalent of litigating the issues. The district court further held that the affidavits of the two law enforcement officers were sufficient to establish probable cause, even without reference to the convictions of claimants.

The government posits three grounds on which the district court can be affirmed. One, that the state court guilty pleas collaterally estop the Sclafanis from denying in the federal forfeiture case that they used their property for the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it. Two, that even without the benefit of collateral estoppel there was no genuine issue of material fact and the United States was entitled to summary judgment. Three, that the failure of the Sclafanis to comply with Rule 18 of the District Court of Massachusetts warrants summary judgment for the government.

Appellants argue that the government did not prove, as required in a forfeiture action, that there was a substantial connection between their property and drug trafficking. They contend that the guilty pleas do not establish such a connection. Appellants also urge that the undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to them, does not support the government's claim that their home was used to store and distribute cocaine and that this is a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved by a trial.

A. Collateral Estoppel

We start our analysis with a statement by the Supreme Court in Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 2373, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983): "Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738 generally requires 'federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.' Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S., at 96, 101 S.Ct. at 415. ⁶" Note 6 reads: "If the state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior judgment, 'the courts of the United States can accord it no greater efficacy' under Sec. 1738. Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 [23 S.Ct. 604, 606, 47 L.Ed. 712] (1903)." Our next stop is Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980):

Indeed, though the federal courts may look to the common law or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal courts, Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so:

"[J]udicial proceedings [of any court of any State] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State...." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738.

Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 [61 S.Ct. 513, 517, 85 L.Ed. 725]; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 [59 S.Ct. 3, 6, 83 L.Ed. 26].

Pursuant to this clear and unmistakable command, we turn to the law of Massachusetts to determine what effect is to be given the claimants' guilty pleas. This question was fully discussed in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 395 Mass. 737, 481 N.E.2d 1356 (1985). The Supreme Judicial Court held that "a plea of guilty is admissible in evidence as an admission in subsequent civil litigation." Id. 481 N.E.2d at 1363 (footnote omitted). The court then focused on the collateral estoppel effect of a guilty plea in subsequent civil litigation:

When a conviction is entered after a plea of guilty, "no issue...