In re Limieux

• Decision Date: 30 March 2004
• Docket Number: Adversary No. 03-4047.,Bankruptcy No. 02-47369.
• Citation: 306 B.R. 433
• Parties: In re Lenard LIMIEUX, Debtor. Scott Gomes, Plaintiff, v. Lenard Limieux, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Massachusetts

306 B.R. 433

In re Lenard LIMIEUX, Debtor Scott Gomes, Plaintiff, v. Lenard Limieux, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 02-47369.

Adversary No. 03-4047.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 30, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alfred P. Farese, Jr., Everett, MA, for debtor.

Thomas P. Smith, Caffrey & Smith, P.C., Lawrence, MA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Henry J. BOROFF, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the "Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment" (the "Motion"). Scott Gomes ("Gomes"), a state court judgment creditor, seeks a determination that his claim for damages against Lenard Limieux (the "Debtor") arising from the Debtor's assault and battery upon him is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).¹ The Debtor responds that the claim is dischargeable because: 1) his culpability, established in the state court action, does not rise to the "wilful and malicious" level required under § 523(a)(6); and 2) the exclusivity provisions of the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act² bar the recovery of such damages for intentional torts occurring in the course of employment.

I. FACTS AND TRAVEL OF THE CASE

The facts set forth below are not in material dispute.

On December 10, 2002, the Debtor filed for relief in this Court under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). On Schedule "F" of his petition, he listed Gomes as an unsecured, non-priority creditor holding a claim of $12,000.00 (the "Claim"). The Claim resulted from a Special Jury Verdict (the "Verdict"), entered in November 2002 in the Massachusetts Superior Court (the "State Court"), concluding that the Debtor had committed an assault and battery on Gomes. The special questions presented to the State Court jury and the answers thereto were as follows:

                  QUESTION:  Did Leonard Lemeiux
                             [sic] commit an assault
                             and battery on Scott
                             Gomes
                  ANSWER:    Yes
                  QUESTION:  What is the total amount
                             of damages that will fairly
                             and reasonably compensate
                             Scott Gomes for injuries
                             suffered as a result of
                             the assault and battery
                             apart from wages
                  ANSWER:    $2,352.76.
                  QUESTION:  Did Scott Gomes suffer a
                             loss of wages as a result of
                             the assault and battery?
                  ANSWER:    Yes.
                  QUESTION:  If so, what is the total
                             amount of lost wages suffered
                             by Scott Gomes as a
                             result of the assault and
                             battery?
                  ANSWER:    $6,000.00.
                

"Special Jury Verdict," Massachusetts Superior Court, Essex County, Docket No. 00-700C, November 18, 2002. Subsequently, the State Court issued its Judgment on Jury Verdict (the "Judgment") for Gomes and against the Debtor in the sum of $10,947.55, including interest and costs. "Judgment on Jury Verdict," Massachusetts Superior Court, Essex County, Docket No. 00-700C, November 26, 2002.

During the State Court trial, Gomes presented evidence that the Debtor, his co-worker, physically attacked him during work hours at their place of employment. Gomes sustained physical injuries requiring hospitalization. In his State Court complaint, Gomes alleged that "[the Debtor's] physical attack and verbal abuse of Gomes was not within the course of his employment or in furtherance of the employer's interest." "Complaint and Jury Demand," filed in Massachusetts Superior Court, Essex County, April 18, 2000, Docket No. 00-700C (the "State Complaint").³ In both a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Directed Verdict, the Debtor argued that the Massachusetts Worker's Compensation Act (the "Act") barred Gomes' recovery from him for damages because the assault was within the course of employment. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24 (2003).⁴ Both motions were denied, and the Judgment became final.

On March 6, 2003, Gomes filed a complaint in this Court seeking to determine the Claim nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Gomes then filed the instant Motion, which the Debtor opposed for the reasons set forth below. After a hearing on the Motion and the opposition thereto, the matter was taken under advisement.

II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

Gomes argues that the Claim is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because it is based upon injuries the Debtor intentionally inflicted upon him. In support, he points to the State Court Judgment holding that: 1) the Debtor committed the intentional tort of assault and battery against him; and 2) Gomes should recover damages against the Debtor for his injuries. Gomes argues that, under Massachusetts law, the Verdict on assault and battery necessitated a finding that the Defendant used intentional and non-justified force against him. Given such a finding, Gomes argues that the Verdict meets the "willful and malicious" standard under § 523(a)(6) precluding discharge of the Claim. Furthermore, since the Verdict required a finding that the Debtor committed a "wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse," Gomes contends that the Debtor is barred by collateral estoppel from re-litigating the dischargeability of the Claim in this Court. "Plaintiff's Memorandum In Support Of His Motion For Summary Judgment," p. 4 (quoting Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 486, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904)). Similarly, Gomes asserts that, because the issue of whether the Act bars Gomes' common law recovery of damages against the Debtor was fully litigated in State Court, collateral estoppel precludes the Debtor from re-litigating that issue before this Court. Id. at 5. Alternatively, he argues that the Act does not bar a worker's recovery against a co-worker for intentional torts.

The Debtor responds that, since the State Court jury was never asked to consider whether the Debtor's actions were "willful and malicious," the Judgment provides no basis for determining the Claim to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Instead, the Debtor asserts that the Judgment was solely based upon evidence that Gomes' injuries were the result of a "harmful or offensive contact." In fact, the Debtor maintains that courts interpreting the "willful and malicious" standard have required proof of a debtor's specific intent to harm in order for a creditor to make out a case for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6).

Moreover, the Debtor contends that since some of the Claim represented lost wages and medical bills, Gomes is barred from recovering same by the Act.⁵ In support, the Debtor cites case law holding the Act to be a bar to the recovery of common law damages by a worker injured by a co-worker's intentional torts committed within the course of employment. The Debtor argues that, if this Court holds that the entire Claim is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6), it would in effect be circumventing the Act by permitting Gomes' recovery of common law damages against him.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if all of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7056. This means that "summary judgment is inappropriate if inferences are necessary for the judgment and those inferences are not mandated by the record." Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso), 37 F.3d 760, 763 (1st Cir.1994) (citing Blanchard v. Peerless Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 483, 488 (1st Cir.1992)). The Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and make all reasonable inferences in its favor. Newport Plaza Assoc. L.P. v. Durfee Attleboro Bank, 985 F.2d 640, 643 (1st Cir.1993); Continental Grain Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 972 F.2d 426, 431 (1st Cir.1992).

B. Standards of res judicata.

It is well established that a party may invoke collateral estoppel regarding a previously litigated matter in a § 523(a) dischargeability context in order to minimize additional litigation in Bankruptcy Court. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284-85, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); In re Baylis, 217 F.3d 66 (1st Cir.2000). Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,⁶ the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal court proceeding is determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment issued. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (per curiam); U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property, 900 F.2d 470, 473 (1st Cir.1990); In re Leroux, 216 B.R. 459, 467 (Bankr.D.Mass.1997); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 27. Preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof under § 523(a). Grogan, 498 U.S. at 291, 111 S.Ct. 654. The standard of proof in a civil action in Massachusetts is likewise preponderance of the evidence. Jordan v. Clerk of Westfield Div. of Dist. Court Dept., 425 Mass. 1016, 1017, 681 N.E.2d 276 (1997).

In Massachusetts, under the rubric of "res judicata," the two separate and distinct concepts of claim preclusion (formerly, "merger" or "bar") and issue preclusion (formerly, collateral estoppel) operate to facilitate judicial economy and provide finality to judgments. Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633, 636-37, 555 N.E.2d 229, 232-33 (1990) (citing Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988)). The doctrine of claim preclusion "makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and bars further litigation on all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the action." Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23, 520 N.E.2d 151, 152 (1988). Three elements must obtain to invoke claim preclusion: "1) identity or privity of the parties to...