U.S. v. One 1987 BMW 325

• Decision Date: 08 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 92-1827,92-1827
• Citation: 985 F.2d 655
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ONE 1987 BMW 325, Etc., Et Al., Defendants. John Tenaglia, Claimant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 655

985 F.2d 655

24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1357

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. ONE 1987 BMW 325, Etc., Et Al., Defendants John Tenaglia, Claimant, Appellant.

No. 92-1827.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Dec. 8, 1992.

Decided Feb. 18, 1993.

Thomas Kerner, for claimant, appellant.

Michael J. Gunnison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jeffrey R. Howard, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arrives at our doorstep after meandering along the byways that link the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We conclude that, given the way in which the Admiralty Rules and the Civil Rules intersect, the district court's order striking appellant's claim for failure to answer interrogatories was premature. Consequently, we reverse the order, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Historical Prolegomenon

On March 27, 1991, police officer Sean Billert arrived at the scene of a two-car accident in North Conway, New Hampshire. One of the vehicles involved was a 1987 BMW operated by claimant-appellant John Tenaglia. In the course of a routine interview, Officer Billert caught the scent of burnt marijuana on Tenaglia's clothing. A search of the BMW revealed traces of marijuana and assorted drug paraphernalia. Authorities removed the car to a police compound and, during a further search, discovered $14,667 in used bills plus the key to a safe-deposit box. When opened, the box yielded an additional $16,000 in cash.

The State undertook to prosecute Tenaglia on a narcotics charge. Meanwhile, the federal government notified him that it planned to commandeer the cash and car. Toward that end, the government filed a forfeiture complaint in federal district court on July 3, 1991. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (a)(6) (1988). The complaint, festooned with ninety-nine interrogatories, ¹ alleged that the cash represented the avails of narcotics trafficking; that the vehicle had been purchased with drug proceeds; and, moreover, that it had been used in furtherance of a drug-related crime.

Tenaglia received the forfeiture suit papers on August 9, 1991. He promptly filed a claim and an answer to the complaint but boycotted the interrogatories. On September 18, the government moved to strike the claim because the interrogatories remained unanswered. Tenaglia responded by requesting a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of the state criminal prosecution, or in the alternative, an order sealing the record in the forfeiture action so that any admissions could not be used against him. Tenaglia subsequently answered two of the interrogatories, contending that those answers, without more, sufficed to clarify his standing.

On May 12, 1992, the district court granted the government's longstanding motion to strike. The court ruled that Tenaglia, by failing to answer the interrogatories, had not perfected the right to prosecute his claim. The BMW and the cash were declared forfeit. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Tenaglia argues that the lower court, for all intents and purposes, dismissed his claim in contravention of Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 (which, as Tenaglia reads it, does not permit dismissal as an initial sanction for failure to answer interrogatories). ² The government counterattacks on three fronts. First, it asserts that, because Tenaglia did not adequately direct the district court's attention to Civil Rule 37 during the course of the proceedings below, he is precluded from relying on the rule at this juncture. Second, the government asserts that Civil Rule 37 is inapposite in respect to interrogatories propounded pursuant to Adm.R. C(6). Third, the government asserts that, even considering Civil Rule 37, the district court's order is supportable. We limn the appropriate standard of review and thereafter address Tenaglia's appeal by tracking the government's assertions.

II. Standard of Review

It is within the trial court's fief to choose appropriate sanctions when a party does not comply with procedural rules. See Media Duplication Servs., Ltd. v. HDG Software, Inc., 928 F.2d 1228, 1238 (1st Cir.1991) ("Considerable discretion is vested in a district judge to decide whether to impose sanctions and what form they should take."); Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 524 (1st Cir.1990) (similar); Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1983) (similar). An appellate court must step softly in such precincts, taking pains not simply to substitute its judgment for that of the district court and intervening only if it is persuaded that the district court overspilled fairly wide discretionary bounds. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976); Velazquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 920 F.2d 1072, 1075 (1st Cir.1990); Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (1st Cir.1989). All in all, a party protesting an order in respect to sanctions bears a formidable burden in attempting to convince the court of appeals that the lower court erred.

Deference, however, is not to be confused with automatic acquiescence. We will not rubber stamp sanction decisions entered in the district court. Media Duplication, 928 F.2d at 1238. Rather, in examining the imposition of sanctions for possible abuses of discretion, we focus our review particularly on whether a "material factor deserving significant weight [was] ignored," whether "an improper factor [was] relied upon," or whether "when all proper and no improper factors [were] assessed ... the court [made] a serious mistake in weighing them." Independent Oil & Chem. Workers, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.1988) (collecting cases).

III. Analysis

A. Procedural Default

As a threshold matter, the government asserts that Tenaglia waived any reliance on Civil Rule 37 by failing to bring the rule to the attention of the district court. After carefully examining the record, we conclude that, on balance, Tenaglia presented the issue in a manner barely sufficient to put the theory in issue and thereby to avoid a procedural default.

To be sure, the question of waiver is borderline. Tenaglia did not confront the district court with chapter and verse anent the Rule 37 argument. Nonetheless, he did challenge the court's use of its discretion to dismiss in the first instance without prior adjudication of his generic objections to the wave of interrogatories; and on several occasions, he asked the court to consider the objections, meanwhile enlarging the time for responding to the interrogatories, before dismissing the claim. Tenaglia buttressed this point by citing cases in which orders compelling discovery preceded dismissal. See, e.g., United States v. One 1971 Corvette Stingray, Etc., No. 89-5398, 1989 WL 153951, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15079 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 14, 1989).

In fine, while Tenaglia's proffer was by no means a paradigm of lucidity, neither did it require the district court to sift an ocean of prose for a seashell's worth of reasoning. In some cases, perhaps, these meager efforts would not serve. But, in assessing the adequacy of Tenaglia's proffer, we are keenly aware that "dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction which runs counter to our strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits." Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Marx v. Kelly, Hart & Hallman, P.C., 929 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1991); Velazquez-Rivera, 920 F.2d at 1075. We are mindful, too, that forfeiture is a harsh medium and that the disposition-on-the-merits policy is, therefore, particularly potent here. See United States v. 384-390 West Broadway, 964 F.2d 1244, 1248 (1st Cir.1992) (recognizing that "forfeitures are strong medicine, disfavored in our jurisprudence"); United States v. $38,000 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1547 (11th Cir.1987) (collecting cases); cf. United States v. 1 Street A-1, 885 F.2d 994, 1001 (1st Cir.1989) (acknowledging, in a forfeiture context, that "to the greatest extent possible controversies are [to be] decided on the merits" and therefore excusing potential procedural default). And, finally, given the surge in attempted forfeitures, the importance of the issue for future cases is itself a factor cutting sharply in favor of resolving it here and now. Cf. United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir.1990) (excusing procedural default and considering purely legal issue not raised below where the issue was significant and likely to recur, such that addressing it would advance the administration of justice); United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 292 (1st Cir.1982) (similar). Considering the nature and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the argument regarding the necessity of an intervening court order before dismissal for failure to make discovery was sufficiently raised below.

B. The Interplay Between the Two Sets of Rules

In 1966, Congress abolished the former Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases and replaced them with the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The scope of the new rules belied their title because they extended beyond maritime actions to actions in rem, see Adm.R. A(2), C, and, in particular, to forfeiture actions. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). In minting the Admiralty Rules, however, Congress did not completely remove in rem proceedings from the purview of the Civil Rules. ³ Rather, Congress decreed that:

The general Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts are also applicable to [in rem] proceedings except to the extent that they are inconsistent with these Supplemental Rules.

Adm.R.A.

Pursuant to this direction, we have consistently...