U.S. v. Paden, 89-4589
| Decision Date | 03 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-4589,89-4589 |
| Citation | 908 F.2d 1229 |
| Parties | 30 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1057 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis Ray PADEN, William M. Headrick II, and Robert Boyd, Defendants-Appellants. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Dennis Ray Paden, Bastrop, Tex., pro se.
M.E. McLeod, Jackson, Miss. (Court-appointed), for Robert Boyd.
Gary D. Thrash, Jackson, Miss., for William M. Headrick, II.
Julie Epps, Rienzi, Miss. (Court-appointed), for Dennis Ray Paden.
Joe M. Hollomon, Asst. U.S. Atty., George Phillips, U.S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for U.S.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before JOHNSON, HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Dennis Ray Paden (Paden), William M. Headrick, II (Headrick), and Robert Boyd (Boyd) entered guilty pleas on several federal criminal charges arising from the arson of Lakeland Stationers in Rankin County, Mississippi. All of the Appellants have appealed their sentences. Unable to find that the district court committed reversible error, this Court affirms the sentences imposed on the Appellants.
In 1988, William M. Headrick, II, owned and operated a printing and retail business known as Lakeland Stationers, located in Rankin County, Mississippi. The business was not a successful venture, and Headrick became increasingly unable to satisfy the business's creditors. Headrick, desperate to stimulate cash flow, concocted a scheme to destroy a piece of duplicating equipment in order to collect the insurance proceeds. In a telephone conversation with his cousin, Dennis Ray Paden, Headrick confided his plan to defraud Lakeland Stationers' insurance company. 1
Paden, a licensed electrician, apparently agreed to assist Headrick in completing this plan, informing Headrick that he could destroy the equipment in a controlled electrical fire that would appear accidental. On April 1, 1988, Paden traveled from his home in Pinehurst, Texas, to Mississippi, accompanied by two young associates, one of whom was the Appellant Robert Boyd. That evening, Headrick and his wife and Paden and the two associates discussed the relative merits of Headrick's scheme to defraud the insurance company. At some point, either Headrick or Paden concluded that the conspirators would burn the entire building which housed Lakeland Stationers, to claim the maximum insurance proceeds. 2
The next afternoon, Headrick, Paden, Boyd and the other associate toured the inside of the Lakeland Stationers' building and formulated a plan for completing the arson. Satisfied with their planning, the parties removed some completed printing work from the building and retired to a nearby restaurant for dinner. That evening, April 2, 1988, Paden, Boyd and the other associate returned to the building to set it ablaze.
Entering the building with a key obtained from Headrick, Paden instructed his associates to remove a Tandy computer and printer from the building and place them in his automobile. Paden then poured a flammable printing chemical over rags inside the building. After the two associates distributed trash around the building, Paden ignited the rags. The three then left the burning building and returned to the Headricks' residence. In the meantime, the fire became an inferno, and spread to another building. The local fire department was called to the scene; in the course of fighting the blaze, fireman Tony Tadlock was trapped by falling debris and killed.
Subsequently, Paden and his associates returned to Texas, along with the computer and printer taken from Lakeland Stationers. The police later recovered these items after a search warrant was executed on Paden's residence in August, 1988. Based in part on this and other evidence accumulated after the fire, Headrick, Paden and Boyd were indicted on September 8, 1988, for their involvement in the arson. All three eventually entered pleas of guilty.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that the base offense level for each of the Appellants was Level 43, pursuant to Sentencing Guideline 2A1.1 [First Degree Murder]. The court adjusted this base offense level downward to Level 33 for second degree murder, because the death of the firefighter was not caused "intentionally or knowingly." The court then assessed a two level increase on the sentences of Paden and Headrick for their roles as leaders in the criminal activity. The court imposed an additional two level increase on Paden based on the court's conclusion that Paden had willfully obstructed the administration of justice. Because of the obstruction of justice, the court denied Paden a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. While Headrick received no sentence enhancement other than the increase for his leadership role, the court denied Headrick a sentence reduction for cooperation with the Government.
The district court sentenced Headrick to 140 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and to a term of five years on supervised release. Headrick was also ordered to make restitution in the sum of $14,750.00 to several individuals and entities injured by the Lakeland Stationers blaze. The court sentenced Paden to 210 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and to a term of five years on supervised release. Paden likewise was ordered to make restitution in the sum of $14,750.00. Boyd, pursuant to a motion of the Government, received a sentence of only 15 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and a term of three years on supervised release. Boyd was ordered to make $3,500.00 in restitution.
Each of the Appellants raise substantially different issues in their appeals. These issues will all be examined in turn.
Headrick argues that the district court improperly assessed a two level increase in his sentence for a leadership role in the criminal offense. Under section 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, an offender plays an aggravating role in an offense if the offender "was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor." According to Headrick, the Government failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of a leadership role that would support sentence enhancement under section 3B1.1.
The standard of review of the Sentencing Guidelines is well-established. This Court "will affirm sentences imposed by district judges who make factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, and who apply the guidelines to those findings." United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3257, 106 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989).
In the present case, the district court's determination that Headrick occupied a leadership role is not clearly erroneous. Application Note 3 to section 3B1.1 outlines several factors a court may consider in determining whether a criminal defendant occupies a leadership role: the exercise of decision making authority, the recruitment of accomplices, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the degree of control and authority exercised over others, etc. Here, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Headrick set in motion the chain of events that culminated in the deadly Lakeland Stationers fire. Headrick recruited the individuals who actually started the blaze. Headrick led these individuals to the Lakeland Stationers building for a preliminary inspection and provided them a key to the building for their entrance on the evening of the fire.
Headrick apparently contends that because Paden's sentence was enhanced by Paden's leadership role in the offense, the court should not have enhanced Headrick's sentence for the same reason. However, Application Note 3 to section 3B1.1 provides that more than one person can qualify as a leader or organizer of a criminal offense. In this case, the court found that both Headrick and Paden occupied such a leadership role. This Court can find no error in the district court's determination.
Headrick also argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant a downward departure from his offense level based upon his alleged substantial assistance to the Government. Whether or not a criminal defendant has provided substantial assistance to the Government is a factual question. The district court's determination of this factual question, like its findings with respect to the leadership role of the defendant, Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 221, are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. This Court will uphold a district judge's refusal to depart from the guidelines unless the refusal is in violation of law or is clearly erroneous. United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1989).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court properly may reduce a criminal defendant's sentence on the basis of substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person. See United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 828-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3172, 104 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1989). In order to evaluate the propriety of such a reduction, the district court must be able to evaluate the extent of the defendant's assistance. Ordinarily, the government will file a motion that recites the assistance provided. The absence of a government motion, though, "does not preclude a district court from entertaining a defendant's showing that the government is refusing to recognize such substantial assistance." Id. at 829.
In this case, however, the district court had absolutely no evidence on which it could evaluate the extent of Headrick's assistance to the Government. The Government did not file a motion that recited any assistance provided by Headrick. Headrick filed a Motion to Depart from the Sentencing...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Laury
...v. Bethley, 973 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1323, 122 L.Ed.2d 709 (1993); United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1236 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039, 111 S.Ct. 710, 112 L.Ed.2d 699 (1991). The district court found that Laury obstructed j......
-
Grunsfeld v. State
...in federal courts, it is arguable that Texas Rule 405(b) was not intended to apply at the punishment phase. See U.S. v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1235 n. 3 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039, 111 S.Ct. 710, 112 L.Ed.2d 699 (1991) (rules of evidence, except for privileges, do not apply ......
-
U.S. v. Tolliver
...(Most analogous federal offense to second degree murder conviction under New York law was first degree murder); United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1238 (5th Cir.1990) (Most analogous offense to state law arson offense was second degree murder).47 915 F.2d 811, 814-15 (2nd Cir.1990).48 S......
-
U.S. v. Martin
...modified, 41 F.3d 361 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); United States v. El-Zoubi, 993 F.2d 442, 449-50 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039, 111 S.Ct. 710, 112 L.Ed.2d 699 (1991). 8 In Prevatte, we also concluded that Sec. 2A1.1 wa......
-
Miranda v. Arizona Revisited and Expanded: No Custodial Interrogation Without the Presence of Counsel
...4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993). 106 United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039 (1991). 107 Bannister v. Armontrout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993). 108 United States v.......
-
Lying at Plea Bargaining
...negotiations that result in a final plea of guilty are also admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 410; Fed. R. Evid. 609; United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1990). Although as Brandon Garrett notes, one of the reasons pleas are not confessions is because they are not administered und......