U.S. v. Peltier

• Decision Date: 26 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-20032-BC.,03-20032-BC.
• Citation: 344 F.Supp.2d 539
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs, v. Lewis Alexander PELTIER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

344 F.Supp.2d 539

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs, v. Lewis Alexander PELTIER, Defendant.

No. 03-20032-BC.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

October 26, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael J. Hluchaniuk, U.S. Attorney's Office, Bay City, MI, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

LAWSON, District Judge.

The defendant, Lewis Alexander Peltier, is charged in a five-count indictment with various controlled substance and firearms offenses. The violations were discovered when Michigan State and local police officials executed a search warrant at the defendant's residence, which is located within the boundaries of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian reservation. The defendant is a member of the Little Traverse Bay Ottawa Indian Tribe, and he has filed motions to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence on the grounds that the State warrant to search premises within Indian Country was invalid and the warrant was based on information illegally obtained by the police. He also claims that the federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain this prosecution because the crimes charged in the indictment are not enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Finally, the defendant has moved to suppress a confession on the ground that he was suffering from drug withdrawal when he made his statements. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on August 26, 2004, allowed the parties time to submit supplemental briefs, and the matter is now ready for decision. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the matter, the confession was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause, the police did not act improperly in obtaining the search warrant, and the state court did not have authority to issue the search warrant to search premises within Indian Country. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion to suppress the evidence and deny the motion to suppress the statement.

I.

Based on the testimony presented, it appears that there is little dispute as to the facts. Harry Norman, a Michigan State police detective assigned to the Bay Area Narcotics Enforcement Team, known as "BAYANET," testified that in December 2002 his unit was engaged in a large-scale investigation involving drug trafficking in Isabella County. He said that the defendant's name was connected with this investigation. Coincidently, that same month Richard Walter, the owner of an Isabella County trailer park, contacted the State police expressing concern over suspicious activity that had occurred during November and December 2002 at his complex. The activity included heavy vehicle traffic, and Walter recorded license plate numbers. The trailer complex is located within the Saginaw Chippewa Indian reservation.

Walter and Norman met with Michigan State police detective lieutenant Daniel King, also assigned to BAYANET, and formulated a plan that targeted the defendant's residence. Walter explained that every quarter he took water samples from the residences for testing. King proposed that he would pose as Walter's assistant and enter the premises after obtaining consent of the tenants to conduct the water sampling. At approximately 2:30 p.m. on December 9, 2002, Walter and King went to the defendant's residence. The door was answered by Ajaina Keshick who was a female the park owner knew to be Mr. Peltier's girlfriend and to be residing with him in that unit. Keshick's name appeared on the documents relating to the mobile home unit as someone occupying the premises. The park owner asked to speak with Mr. Peltier, who was not there at the time, and then asked to examine the water. Ms. Keshick then gave permission for the owner and the owner's assistant to enter for that purpose.

While inside the residence, King observed what he believed to be a small quantity of marijuana in one location, a marijuana stem in another location, some rolling papers on the floor, and a firearm in the livingroom area on the floor. King testified that he saw two other individuals inside, and based on his observations he suspected a certain level of criminal activity was taking place on the premises. King and Walter were inside the premises for fifteen to twenty minutes and did not seize any property while there. King did not move any items to gain a better vantage point or seize any property at that time.

King used this information to obtain a search warrant from a State court judge. The warrant was executed at approximately 6:00 p.m. that day by several officers, but the participants did not include any federal agents. The defendant was present when the search warrant was served. The search yielded three firearms, including a .22 caliber Rueger rifle with an obliterated serial number. In addition, ten to fifteen grams of crack cocaine were found on defendant's person, as well as $928 in cash. The police also discovered a police scanner, a surveillance camera set to view the outside of that residence, and a monitor.

The defendant was arrested some time after midnight on December 10, 2000 and made statements to Trooper Norman. Norman testified that after the defendant was given his Miranda warnings, he said that he was "stupid" and knew he would get caught. Thereafter, Norman removed the handcuffs from the defendant, let him smoke a cigarette, and engaged him in conversation. Norman insisted that the defendant did not exhibit signs of drug or alcohol withdrawal and maintained good eye contact. The defendant asked Norman how he could help himself and agreed to make telephone calls to set up a drug deal. However, nothing ever materialized from the defendant's offer. Although Norman testified that he interviewed the defendant only on December 10, 2000, the government's exhibits indicate that there was a tape-recorded interview on December 9 and another interview that continued on December 10.

Norman also testified that the Isabella County prosecutor refused to authorize an arrest warrant for the defendant because the premises on which the arrest occurred was located on tribal land per the Treaty of 1855, so Norman called the tribal court and a warrant for possession of cocaine base was issued and bond was set. Apparently, that case did not proceed in tribal court. On June 18, 2003, a federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging the defendant with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (count one); possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base (count two); possession of marijuana (count three); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count four); and possession of a firearm with the manufacturer's serial number removed or obliterated (count five). The indictment was unsealed on July 16, 2003, and the defendant was arrested on March 19, 2004. On April 13, 2004, the government's request for detention of the defendant was granted. Thereafter, the defendant filed the several motions noted earlier.

II.

Turning first to the defendant's argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this prosecution, the Court notes that the government concedes that the defendant is an Indian and the arrest and search took place within Indian country, as that term is defined by federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining "Indian country" to include "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government"). "Criminal jurisdiction over [such] offenses `is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.'" Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993) (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680, n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990)).

The defendant argues that the Court must turn to the Indian Major Crimes Act to determine whether jurisdiction over the offenses lies in federal court. That statute states:

(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.

18 U.S.C. § 1153. Since the drug and weapons offenses charged in the indictment are not enumerated in Section 1153, the defendant reasons, the Court has no jurisdiction because the offenses took place in Indian country.

The defendant's argument overlooks the Indian Country Crimes Act, however, which states:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.

This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty...