U.S. v. Perez
Decision Date | 17 July 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80-1552,80-1552 |
Parties | 8 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1033 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Salvador E. PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant. . Unit A |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Abel Toscano, Jr., Harlingen, Tex., Roy Beene, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
John M. Potter, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before GEE, TATE and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
The defendant, Salvador Perez, was a deputy constable for Cameron County, Texas, in 1978. As one long connected with law enforcement, he was approached in February 1978 by Rosa Maria Hinojosa, who requested him to assist in procuring the release of her brother, Aroldo Hernandez, and her sister-in-law, Ester Hernandez, from prison.
Hinojosa testified that Perez told her that he knew the district judge who had sentenced her relatives to prison on drug charges, the judge's chief probation officer, and the prosecuting attorney in her relatives' case, and that he needed money to "wine, dine, and buy gifts" for these officials in order to secure the release of her relatives. Hinojosa gave a total of $1,600 to Perez ($1,000 on one occasion and $600 on another) for this purpose.
Hinojosa also testified that Perez informed her that an additional $5,000 would be needed later to pay off the sentencing judge, but that this sum could be paid after her brother's release.
Aroldo and Ester Hernandez, the two federal prisoners who sought to obtain an early release, testified that they called Perez (Aroldo, twice, from Leavenworth, Kansas, and Ester from Alderson, West Virginia) collect, by prearrangement, to obtain their early release. Telephone records introduced in evidence confirm that calls were made to the Perez home during the period of time indicated from these institutions.
The judge, the probation officer, and the prosecutor each testified that he was at no time aware of any efforts on the part of the defendant Perez to gain the early release of the Hernandezes. In fact, none of these individuals had any contact with Perez during the applicable time period, and his story of contacts with them was a complete fabrication, made up out of whole cloth. Eventually Mrs. Hinojosa went to the Cameron County Sheriff's office, which notified the FBI. Its investigation resulted in indictments of Perez on three counts corresponding to the three long-distance calls mentioned above.
A jury found Perez guilty on these three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which reads as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
He appeals on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, of exclusion of evidence of witness bias, and of the omission to swear an interpreter.
Appellant Perez' most troublesome contentions stem from an exchange between his counsel and the trial judge. This occurred late in the case, during the presentation of the defense witnesses, when counsel was questioning an agent of the FBI who participated in the investigation of Perez' case. Pursuing his theory that Perez' prosecution was instigated by the Cameron County Sheriff's office in retaliation for Perez' having run against the incumbent sheriff, counsel proceeded with questioning as follows:
Q. And who was the Sheriff of Cameron County back in January of 1979?
There is nothing about politics in this indictment. This man is charged with a crime of violating federal laws, and that's what this jury is going to decide. We are not going to have a Sheriff's race in this courtroom. Just don't get into that at all, because I will instruct the jury as to why Mr. Perez is here.
Mr. Perez is here because he got indicted by a federal grand jury for certain violations, and, as jurors, you are going to decide whether or not he is guilty of these violations. It has nothing to do with his being a political candidate or anything of the kind.
Don't go into that any more, because you are just making this thing more complicated than it is and has nothing to do with the case.
Q. Were you present in Harlingen, Texas, when Rosa Hinojosa, her father, Julian Hernandez, and Yolanda Hernandez were questioned?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. Do you recall who else was present, sir?
You can ask him about witnesses told him, if there is something inconsistent. But how the investigation came about or who was present is irrelevant, or what forces motivated anybody to bring this investigation on is all irrelevant.
MR. TOSCANO: Please note our exception, Your Honor.
Based on this colloquy, Perez makes three somewhat intertwined complaints: that the judge's reproving remarks to him and instructions to the jury, quoted above, were improper and prejudicial; that their effect was to prevent him from exploring bias of the Hinojosa and Hernandez witnesses; and that they prevented him as well from showing the jury that the report of his alleged misdeeds to the FBI was motivated by political malice.
The last complaint is meritless. The motives upon which informants act in reporting crimes are generally irrelevant except as they go to witness bias. Police need not disregard all such reports except as are filed by the pure in heart, 1 and the court correctly refused to permit counsel to pursue this inconsequential issue.
Nor do we find the manner of the court's mild admonitions to counsel improper, unfair, or repressive, as they are characterized by appellant. As we have often observed, federal judges are responsible for the tone and tempo of proceedings before them, not mere moderators or hosts at a symposium. E. g., Moore v. United States, 598 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 617, 622 (5th Cir. 1977). Tendencies in counsel to pursue irrelevant matter are fully subject to control by the court, as are impertinent or side-bar remarks; and while the conduct of counsel in this proceeding was scarcely boisterous, neither was it such as to merit a slack rein. 2 More than once during the proceedings the court advised the jury that its comments of this sort did not reflect upon the defendant or on the court's impartiality in the case. We find no error in the tenor of the court's dealings with counsel. 3
It remains to consider the final contention of the three, that the substance of the court's ruling unduly restrained the defense in its effort to demonstrate bias in the Hinojosa and Hernandez witnesses. It was, broadly speaking, defense counsel's theory of the case that the payments made to Perez by Mrs. Hinojosa were advances on legal fees for a lawyer whom he was to procure to assist her imprisoned relatives and, being such, were not, as the prosecution contended, mere extortions for his own benefit, exacted on the pretense of spurious projects underway to wine, dine, and bribe the authorities to release the relatives....
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