U.S. v. Pressler

• Decision Date: 02 July 2001
• Docket Number: 00-2588,Nos. 00-1824,s. 00-1824
• Citation: 256 F.3d 144
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DANIEL E. PRESSLER, APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. SCOTT SHREFFLER, APPELLANT
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 144

256 F.3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2001)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DANIEL E. PRESSLER, APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. SCOTT SHREFFLER, APPELLANT

Nos. 00-1824, 00-2588

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued March 8, 2001

July 2, 2001

On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 99-CR-00133-7 and 00133-8) District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Jerry A. Philpott, Esquire (argued) P.O. Box 116, 227 No. High St. Duncannon, PA 17020 Counsel for Appellant Daniel Pressler

Andrew J. Ostrowski, Esquire (argued) 2080 Linglestown Road, Suite 201 Harrisburg, PA 17110 Counsel for Appellant Scott Shreffler

David M. Barasch, Esquire United States Attorney Theodore B. Smith, III (argued) Assistant United States Attorney 228 Walnut Street Harrisburg, PA 17108 Counsel for Appellee United States of America

Before: Becker, Chief Judge, McKEE and Stapleton, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Becker, Chief Judge.

A jury in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania convicted Daniel Pressler and Scott Shreffler of conspiracy to distribute heroin. While Pressler appeals only his sentence, Shreffler challenges both his conviction and sentence. Shreffler's appeal requires us to analyze the quality and quantity of evidence necessary to establish a conspiracy among individuals engaged in drug activity who are loosely associated.

Shreffler submits that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of conspiring to distribute heroin. To make out a conspiracy charge, the Government must show: (1) a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agreement to work together toward that goal. The final factor--an agreement between the defendant and some other person--is the essence of the offense, and there is no lesser standard for proving an agreement in drug cases. Although this and other courts have spoken of "factors" that tend to show the existence of a conspiracy, it is more accurate to say that the presence of certain facts often provides circumstantial evidence of the underlying agreement that is itself necessary to make out a conspiracy case.

The evidence here showed that Shreffler obtained and distributed a large amount of heroin. The Government demonstrated that the main person from whom Shreffler obtained his heroin, Pedro "Pete" Caban, also distributed the drug to many others, and that some of the people to whom Caban sold heroin had been referred to him by Shreffler. The evidence also established that many of the people to whom Shreffler and Caban provided heroin sold the drug themselves, including a man with whom Shreffler lived for several months. And the Government proved that Shreffler was aware of all of the above facts. But there was simply no evidence that Shreffler ever agreed to work with either his seller or his buyers to achieve a common goal or advance a common interest.

The Government contends that the evidence here was sufficient to establish a conspiracy under this Court's holding in United States v. Gibbs, 190 F .3d 188 (3d Cir. 1999). What this contention misses is that in Gibbs there was no dispute that a drug conspiracy existed--the only issue was whether the defendant had joined it. Here, in contrast, the question is whether a conspiracy existed at all. As a result, much of the discussion in Gibbs is simply inapposite. Because the Government never established the existence of an agreement between Shreffler and someone else, we will vacate his conviction on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support it. We will, however, affirm the judgment of sentence as to Pressler.

I.

Situated in rural Mifflin County in central Pennsylvania, Lewistown is home to less than 30,000 inhabitants. In the latter half of the 1990s, public officials noticed a disturbing rise in heroin use among students enrolled in the Lewistown school system. Local police deemed the problem so severe that they requested federal assistance. Federal investigators determined that the heroin was coming from Philadelphia, and that it was being imported by Lewistown residents who would drive to Philadelphia to purchase heroin and then return to Lewistown to use and sell it.

On May 26, 1999, a grand jury indicted Pressler, Shreffler, and seven others for conspiring to violate the federal drug laws in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. Section (b) of Count One of the indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to "[i]llegally possess with intent to distribute and illegally distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1), HEROIN, a Schedule I controlled substance while over the age of 18 years to individuals under the age of 21 years, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 859(a)."

Although their co-defendants pled guilty, Pressler and Shreffler exercised their rights to a jury trial. The jury heard testimony from four of Pressler's and Shreffler's former co-defendants, as well as eight other witnesses. We provide the details of this testimony, infra at Part II(B), in the context of discussing Shreffler's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The court instructed the jury that they were to decide whether the defendants had "engaged in a conspiracy to distribute heroin," but, consistent with prevailing law at the time, did not ask the jury to determine the quantity of heroin that the defendants had conspired to distribute. The jury found Pressler and Shreffler guilty, and, via a special verdict form, also found that "the Government ha[d] proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [Pressler and Shreffler], being 18 years or older, conspired to distribute heroin to persons under 21 years old."

The Probation Officer prepared Presentence Investigation Reports (PSIs) for both Pressler and Shreffler. Pressler lodged two objections, one of which is relevant here. In P 14 of Pressler's PSI, the Probation Officer relayed the contents of a statement in which Craig Bedleyon told investigators that he had been hospitalized after overdosing on heroin obtained from Pressler. The Probation Officer relied on Bedleyon's statement in determining that Pressler was eligible for an enhanced Offense Level of 38 pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(a)(2), which applies "if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C) . . . and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance." Pressler objected, claiming that his sentence could not be enhanced based on Bedleyon's overdose because it had not been charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The District Court held sentencing hearings for Pressler on May 16 and June 2, 2000. At the close of the hearings, the court found that the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Pressler provided the heroin upon which Bedleyon had overdosed, and opined that such findings were the province of the court rather than the jury. The court therefore determined that Pressler was eligible for the death or serious bodily injury enhancement, which set his base Offense Level at 38. Other enhancements raised Pressler's Offense Level to 43, and his Criminal History Category was determined to be IV. This combination ordinarily would have resulted in a mandatory life sentence, see U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A, but the District Court decided to depart downward, noting that it found Pressler to be "less culpable" than Shreffler. Stating that it had "a duty to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities" and characterizing Pressler's case as "present[ing] a circumstance outside of the heartland," the District Court sentenced Pressler to serve 336 months in prison.

The District Court held sentencing hearings concerning Shreffler on June 16 and July 14, 2000, and made extensive factual findings on August 9, 2000. Employing a preponderance of the evidence standard the court found that Shreffler had provided heroin to both Joseph Stoner and Scott Knouse, that Stoner and Knouse had overdosed on heroin provided by Shreffler, and that each had suffered serious bodily injury as a result. The court also determined that Shreffler had distributed between 69 and 113 grams of heroin. In response to these findings, the Probation Officer revised Shreffler's PSI and concluded that he was eligible for an enhanced Offense Level of 38 pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(a)(2). Two other enhancements gave Shreffler an Offense Level of 42, and this, in conjunction with a Criminal History Category of V, left Shreffler with a sentencing range of 360 months to life. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A. On August 23, 2000, the District Court sentenced Shreffler to 360 months imprisonment. Both Shreffler and Pressler filed timely appeals.¹

II.

Shreffler's primary claim is that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of conspiring to distribute heroin. In so arguing, he takes up "a very heavy burden." United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). The Government needed to show only that Shreffler conspired with "someone--anyone." United States v. Obialo, 23 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, because Shreffler is appealing from a jury verdict against him, "[w]e must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and must sustain [the] jury's verdict if `a reasonable jury believing the government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the offense.' " United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991)). The elements of a charge of conspiracy are: (1) "a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators;" (2) "an intent to achieve a common goal;" and (3) "an agreement to work together toward that goal." United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

A.

A perpetual...