U.S. v. Qualls
Decision Date | 15 April 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 95-50378,95-50378 |
Citation | 172 F.3d 1136 |
Parties | 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2742, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3573 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Lynn QUALLS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before: HUG, Chief Judge, BROWNING, FLETCHER, PREGERSON, HALL, THOMPSON, TROTT, T.G. NELSON, KLEINFELD, HAWKINS, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL; Partial concurrence and Partial dissent by Judge MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS.
In United States v. Qualls, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 398, 142 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998), the Supreme Court vacated our en banc opinion in this case, and remanded it to us for reconsideration in light of Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. 2007, 141 L.Ed.2d 303 (1998). After careful reconsideration, we affirm Qualls' conviction.
In 1975, Danny Lynn Qualls ("Qualls") pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a). The California court granted Qualls felony probation, and suspended further proceedings. In 1980, the California court ordered early termination of Qualls' probation upon payment by Qualls of $500 for probation costs. Although assault with a deadly weapon may be either a misdemeanor or a felony under California law, the circumstances of Qualls' case made it a felony.
Qualls' conviction was a felony because the offense was punishable by more than one year in prison, see United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir.1993), and because the conviction did not qualify as a misdemeanor under either California Penal Code § 17(b)(1) or (3). Qualls' $500 payment for early termination of his probation was merely a fee to cover the costs of Qualls' probation, and was not a "punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison." See Cal.Penal Code § 17(b)(1). In addition, Qualls' initial probation was not a "judgment imposing punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison." See id.; United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). Finally, the California court never declared Qualls' conviction a misdemeanor, nor did Qualls ever apply to have his offense declared a misdemeanor. See Cal.Penal Code § 17(b)(3); People v In 1994, Qualls was indicted for knowingly possessing seven firearms-two revolvers, one pistol, and four rifles-in violation of the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At this time, California law allowed Qualls to possess any of the four rifles, but did not allow him to possess either of the two revolvers or the pistol. Our interpretation of the federal felon-in-possession statute allowed Qualls to possess any weapon that he was allowed to possess under state law. See United States v. Dahms, 938 F.2d 131, 134-35 (9th Cir.1991). Therefore, at the time of Qualls' trial, Qualls could have been convicted only if the jury unanimously agreed that Qualls had possessed either of the two revolvers or the pistol, but not any one of the four rifles. See id.
Banks, 53 Cal.2d 370, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102, 116 (1959) (in banc). Under California law, Qualls was prohibited from possessing pistols, revolvers, or other concealable firearms. See Cal.Penal Code § 12021(a); People v. Loomis, 231 Cal.App.2d 594, 596, 42 Cal.Rptr. 124 (Cal.Ct.App.1965).
At trial, however, the district court instructed the jury that Qualls could be convicted if the jury unanimously agreed that the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Qualls possessed any one of the firearms described in the indictment. At that time, the district court's instruction was erroneous. Although Qualls was convicted, there was no way to determine which of the seven weapons listed in the indictment the jury had unanimously agreed that Qualls had possessed. It was therefore impossible to determine whether Qualls had been convicted on a proper basis. Consequently, we reversed Qualls' conviction under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 52, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) ( )(citation omitted). See United States v. Qualls, 108 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir.1997). We then granted en banc review in this case to reexamine our decision in Dahms. See United States v. Qualls, 140 F.3d 824, 825 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) [hereinafter Qualls II ], vacated, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 398, 142 L.Ed.2d 323.
In Qualls II, we reiterated our holding in Dahms that the federal felon-in-possession statute does not apply to a former felon who possesses a firearm that he is allowed to possess under state law. See 140 F.3d at 826. In so doing, we rejected the all-or-nothing interpretation of the federal felon-in-possession statute that had been adopted by other circuits. See United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 7-9 (1st Cir.) (prohibiting a felon from possessing all firearms under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20) and 922(g)(1) if the felon is prohibited from possessing any firearm under state law), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1110, 117 S.Ct. 2494, 138 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997); United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1480 (6th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Burns, 934 F.2d 1157, 1160 (10th Cir.1991) (same).
In Caron, the Supreme Court adopted the all-or-nothing construction of the federal felon-in-possession statute. See 524 U.S. at ---- - ----, 118 S.Ct. at 2010-12. In light of the rule announced in Caron, the Supreme Court asked us to reconsider our earlier decision in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Qualls' conviction.
AFFIRMED.
While it is unfortunate and unfair to those making a good faith effort to comply with existing law, the majority correctly concludes that United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 80 L.Ed.2d 492 (1984), controls and thus we must apply the Supreme Court's holding in Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. 2007, 141 L.Ed.2d 303 (1998), retroactively to Qualls.
Rodgers represents a departure from a time-honored principle that:
"[T]he required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred," ... must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from legislatures. If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue," it must not be given retroactive effect.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (citation omitted); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) ( ); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) ( ); United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 886 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc) ( ).
In rejecting the argument that "because the [1967 precedent] has been on the books in the Eighth Circuit for a number of years a contrary decision by this Court should not be applied retroactively to him," the Court held that "even if [Rodgers] could establish reliance upon the earlier ... decision, [his argument] would be unavailing since the existence of conflicting cases from other Courts of Appeal made review of that issue by this Court and decision against the position of the respondent reasonably foreseeable." Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 484, 104 S.Ct. 1942. Rodgers, like Caron, was a case in which the Court's dispositive interpretation of a statute expanded the scope of criminal liability in some circuits--the overruled Eighth Circuit interpretation would not have allowed Rodgers to be prosecuted.
Rodgers has the effect of requiring that a citizen look not to the established law of the circuit in which he resides, but to the law of the circuit taking the most expansive view of conduct prohibited by a statute, to determine what conduct he may undertake without risk of criminal prosecution until that point in time when the Supreme Court resolves any interpretative disagreement among the circuits. This can have the effect of restraining for years conduct that the Court may ultimately decide was always perfectly legal.
In this case, Qualls could have canvassed state law and "settled circuit law," see United States v. Walsh, 770 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir.1985), at the time he took possession of the long guns and concluded under both that his possession was not prohibited or prosecutable behavior. It seems anomalous and unfair to Qualls that had we overruled United States v....
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