U.S. v. Ramos-Caraballo

• Decision Date: 26 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-2274.,03-2274.
• Citation: 375 F.3d 797
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jose RAMOS-CARABALLO, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

375 F.3d 797

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jose RAMOS-CARABALLO, Appellant.

No. 03-2274.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 9, 2004.

Filed: July 26, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Adam J. Sipple, argued, Oakland, NE, for appellant.

Joe W. Stecher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued, Omaha, NE (Michael G. Heavican, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Jose Ramos-Caraballo was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, resulting from a traffic stop along Interstate Highway 80 in Omaha, Nebraska. He argues on appeal that the stop was unreasonable and that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. He also asserts that evidentiary errors unfairly prejudiced his defense. We affirm.

I.

At approximately 12:50 a.m. on March 16, 2002, Officer Aaron Hanson of the Omaha Police Department stopped an east-bound vehicle on I-80 in Omaha after he observed "some type of a large item hanging from the rearview mirror" in violation of Nebraska law. (Trial Tr. at 27-28.) There were two occupants in the vehicle: Ramos-Caraballo, the driver, and Frank Alvarez-Gayan, the passenger. Officer Hanson said they appeared nervous as he approached the vehicle. Hanson also noticed a strong smell of air freshener. On learning that the occupants primarily spoke Spanish, Officer Hanson attempted to converse with them in Spanish as best he could, informing them of the basis for the stop.

The item hanging from the rearview mirror turned out to be a seven-and-threequarters-inch long air freshener shaped like a tree and still partially enclosed in its original packaging. Ramos-Caraballo immediately removed it on learning that it was the basis for the stop. Another air freshener was hanging on the steering column, and when Ramos-Caraballo retrieved the proof of insurance from the glove compartment, Officer Hanson noticed a can of deodorizer air spray in the compartment. Officer Hanson became suspicious because in his experience, strong perfume or deodorizers are often used to mask the transportation of illegal narcotics.

Ramos-Caraballo accompanied Officer Hanson to the police cruiser while the officer verified the registration and license. Through conversation, Hanson learned that the two men were traveling from California to Connecticut to visit Ramos-Caraballo's sick grandmother. Later, Ramos-Caraballo indicated that they were traveling to Massachusetts to visit his sick grandmother. The registration and license were valid, but Officer Hanson noticed that the car had been registered and insured in California only three days before this stop. He issued only a warning citation for the view obstruction violation, explaining as best he could in Spanish that no fine or penalty was imposed. Officer Hanson told Ramos-Caraballo to drive carefully and shook his hand.

As Ramos-Caraballo began to exit the cruiser, however, Hanson asked if they had any weapons, bombs, or narcotics in the vehicle. Ramos-Caraballo said no, but Hanson noticed that he looked away when he answered the question about the narcotics. He and the passenger both consented to Officer Hanson's request to search the vehicle after reading a Spanish language consent form. In the trunk of the car, Officer Hanson noticed that the spare tire's metal rim looked worn. He retrieved a density meter from his patrol vehicle and determined that one half of the spare tire was more dense than the other. Ultimately, Hanson uncovered 955.8 grams of cocaine hidden in the spare tire. Officer Mark Langan testified at trial that this amount of cocaine is not associated with personal use but with distribution. Officer Hanson testified that when he arrested Ramos-Caraballo, he appeared deflated and did not show much emotion.

Prior to trial, Ramos-Caraballo filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop and search, arguing that Officer Hanson stopped his vehicle without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial.

During trial, defense counsel attempted to impeach Officer Hanson with claimed inconsistent statements in his police report as well as statements in his sworn testimony before the grand jury and at the suppression hearing. Most of these statements concerned the defendant's demeanor and mannerisms, and they exposed at best slight deviations from Officer Hanson's trial testimony.

On redirect examination, the government offered as exhibits Officer Hanson's police report, a transcript of his grand jury testimony, and a transcript of his testimony from the suppression hearing, asserting that these entire documents were necessary to place all of his statements in context, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 106. The defense counsel requested a showing of what portions of these exhibits were necessary to place the impeaching statements in context, but the government asserted it was entitled to submit them in their entirety. Over defense counsel's objection, the district court admitted the exhibits in their entirety, subject to only a few agreed-upon redactions. The jury convicted Ramos-Caraballo of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and he now appeals.

II.

A. Motion to Suppress

Ramos-Caraballo challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that, contrary to the Fourth Amendment, the officer did not have a reasonable articulable basis for the stop of his vehicle. "When reviewing the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review its fact-finding for clear error and its ultimate application of the law to the facts de novo." United States v. Scroggins, 361 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir.2004). "We must affirm an order denying a motion to suppress unless the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." United States v. Rodriguez-Hernandez, 353 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir.2003).

An automobile stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment imperative that the stop must be reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A vehicle stop is reasonable if it is supported by either probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, id., or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). "It is well established that a traffic violation-however minor-creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle." United States v. Hamby, 59 F.3d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nebraska motor vehicle law provides that it is "unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle with any object placed or hung in or upon such vehicle, except required or permitted equipment of the vehicle, in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with the view of the operator through the windshield or to prevent the operator from having a clear and full view of the road and condition of traffic behind such vehicle." Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,256 (Reissue 1998). Officer Hanson testified that he observed a violation of this provision when Ramos-Caraballo's car passed him on the interstate with an air-freshener hanging from the rearview mirror. Ramos-Caraballo asserts that the statute is ambiguous and should be construed to permit objects to hang from the mirror if they do not significantly obstruct or interfere with the driver's view through the windshield so as to create a safety hazard. Under this reading of the statute, he argues that Officer Hanson did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle because the air freshener did not amount to a significant view obstruction.

We respectfully disagree with this reading of the statute. The plain language of the statute unambiguously provides that "any object" that obstructs a clear and full view through the windshield violates Nebraska law. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,256. The wording of the statute plainly indicates that the Nebraska legislature has already concluded as a matter of policy that any obstruction (not only a significant obstruction) of a clear and full view of the road is a safety hazard subject to regulation through this statute. See id. Officer Hanson testified at the suppression hearing that he observed "an item hanging from the rear view mirror" in violation of Nebraska's state traffic laws. (Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 14.) His observation provided probable cause for him to stop the vehicle, i.e., he had probable cause to believe he had observed a violation of Nebraska's traffic laws.

Ramos-Caraballo also argues that Officer Hanson's observations were not reasonably trustworthy because the vehicle was traveling sixty miles an hour, it was dark outside, and Hanson observed the alleged violation for only a short time as the car passed him and Hanson began to follow him-approximately three seconds. Hanson testified that he could continue to see the obstruction through Ramos-Caraballo's rear window as he followed them, "I guess just as far as the human eye would allow to see an object like that," and he signaled for them to pull over. The officer was not mistaken as the object proved to be a large Christmas tree air freshener still partially in its packaging hanging close to the windshield. The district court did not clearly err in crediting his testimony as trustworthy, and his articulated objective and reasonable belief that a violation of law had occurred amounted to probable cause. See United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir.1996) ("Probable cause exists where an officer objectively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law.").

We affirm the district court's denial of...