U.S. v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 10 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | Miscellaneous No. H-07-0699. |
| Citation | 553 F.Supp.2d 788 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. David Russell REYNOLDS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Michael W. Schultz, Office of US Attorney, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Brent Evan Newton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Pending before the court is the application of the United States to medicate involuntarily David Russell Reynolds in an effort to restore his competence to stand trial. For the reasons explained below the United States' application will be denied.
On April 2, 2007, Reynolds was charged by Criminal Complaint with making felonious threats against a federal judge.1 He was arrested, detained as a continuing threat, and ordered to have a psychiatric examination to determine his competence to stand trial. On June 1, 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Institution (F.C.I.) in Fort Worth, Texas, issued medical examination findings indicating that Reynolds was not competent to stand trial because he suffered from a delusional disorder, persecutory and grandiose types.2 On June 19, 2007, a magistrate judge ruled that Reynolds was not competent to stand trial and granted Reynolds' motion for transfer to a medical referral center.3 On July 30, 2007, the magistrate judge ordered that Reynolds be sent to a federal psychiatric facility for further examination, evaluation, and treatment to restore his competence to stand trial.4
On November 29, 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons' F.C.I, in Butner, North Carolina, issued a report that confirmed Reynolds' continuing incompetence to stand trial and recommended involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medication.5 The report acknowledged that on October 19, 2007, a hearing was held at the Butner facility to determine whether Reynolds met the criteria for forced medication to render him nondangerous as articulated by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990).6 Dr. Grant and Dr. Berger opined that "there is a substantial probability that Mr. Reynolds can be restored to competency by receiving treatment with antipsychotic medication,"7 "the proposed treatment would be substantially unlikely to have serious side effects which would interfere significantly with [Reynolds'] ability to assist his attorney in preparing and conducting his defense,"8 and that "treatment with antipsychotic medication is medically and clinically appropriate."9 Stating that Reynolds had "adamantly refused medication during this evaluation period," Dr. Grant and Dr. Berger "request[ed] another study period for treatment pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 4241(d) for the purpose of treatment with antipsychotic medications."10 They also requested that "involuntary administration of medication be allowed up until the time of [Reynolds'] adjudication and sentencing if treatment is ordered and; in [their] opinion, his competency is restored."11
On December 11, 2007, the magistrate judge ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held before a district court judge to determine if Reynolds met the criteria for forced medication intended to render him competent to stand trial articulated by the Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003) (Docket Entry No. 1).12 The Sell hearing was held on February 13, 2008, and post-hearing briefs have been submitted by both parties (Docket Entry Nos. 7 and 13). On February 28, 2008, the hearing judge signed an order of recusal (Docket Entry No. 9) and the case was reassigned to the undersigned judge (Docket Entry No. 10).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Reynolds "a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs." Harper, 110 S.Ct. at 1036. Nevertheless, in Sell, 123 S.Ct. at 2184, the Supreme Court held that in rare circumstances a defendant could be involuntarily medicated solely for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial for a serious crime, "but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests." The Supreme Court directed lower courts making such a determination to consider the following four factors: (1) whether "important governmental interests are at stake," (2) whether "involuntary medication will significantly further" those interests, (3) whether "involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests," and (4) whether "administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition." Id. at 2184-85. The Court observed that Id. at 2184.
The Sell Court did not identify the standard of proof that lower courts are to apply when deciding whether its criteria are satisfied. In United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir.2007), the Fifth Circuit adopted the standard of review applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.2004), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1128, 125 S.Ct. 1094, 160 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2005), according to which the first factor, whether the government's asserted interests are sufficiently important is a legal issue subject to de novo review, while the other Sell factors involve factual findings that are reviewed for clear error. Although the Fifth Circuit did not identify the standard of proof district courts are to use when deciding if the Sell factors have been satisfied, the Second Circuit addressed that issue in Gomes and concluded that the government bears the burden of proving all questions of fact by clear and convincing evidence. 387 F.3d at 160 (citing United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir.2002), vacated on other grounds by Gomes v. United States, 539 U.S. 939, 123 S.Ct. 2605, 156 L.Ed.2d 625 (2003)). Given the importance of the constitutional interests at issue, and the Fifth Circuit's decision to follow the Second Circuit's decision in Gomes, the court concludes that the standard of proof applied by the Second Circuit in Gomes is the appropriate standard to apply in this case and, therefore, that the government bears the burden of proving all questions of fact by clear and convincing evidence.13 Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that "place[s] in the ultimate fact finder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are `highly probable.'" Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 2437-38, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). At the Sell hearing Reynolds argued without dispute from the United States that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in this case.14
All parties, except Reynolds himself, agree that Reynolds is presently incompetent to stand trial or to assist his attorney in defending him against charges that he threatened a federal judge.15
At the Sell hearing conducted on February 13, 2008, psychiatrists for both the government (Dr. Berger) and the defense (Dr. Scarano) appeared and testified about Reynolds' continuing psychiatric disorders and their preferred treatment options. The psychologist who examined Reynolds at the Butner facility (Dr. Grant) and Reynolds' brother, Joseph, also testified.
Dr. Grant testified that Reynolds was diagnosed with delusional disorder, both grandiose and persecutory types.16 She explained that "persecutory" refers to paranoid ideas about being persecuted, that "grandiose" refers to a sense of self-importance or stature, and that based on collateral information received from Reynolds' brother she believed that Reynolds had been having delusions for at least 25 years.17
On direct examination Dr. Berger testified that a study conducted by one of the psychiatrists at the Butner facility showed that seventy-five percent of the people diagnosed with delusional disorder treated with antipsychotic medication improved to the point that they were later considered competent to proceed to trial.18 Dr. Berger testified that there are more than ten antipsychotic medications that can be prescribed to treat delusional disorder and that these medications can be subdivided into two classes: first- and second-generation medications.19 When asked "[w]ith the use of these drugs, do you believe, based on your experience, that you could get Mr. Reynolds back to a state of competence to stand trial?" Dr. Berger answered:
Statistically, it appears we probably could, given his diagnosis. We don't have past efforts with medication to see whether he has had successful treatment, or whether it would be unsuccessful. We just don't know, but given his diagnosis, it would be more likely than not that the medicine would be helpful to him to the level of regaining competency.20
Dr. Berger testified that in his opinion there were no other nonmedical treatments available that would achieve substantially the same results as the medical treatments,21 and that antipsychotic drugs are considered by the psychiatric medical community appropriate drugs for the treatment of delusional disorder.22 Dr. Berger acknowledged that these drugs can cause serious side effects, but stated that a variety of medications exist that allow these side effects to be treated effectively.23
In response to questioning by the court, Dr. Berger testified that if the medication works "very, very well," improvement will be evidenced gradually, first by improved ability...
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...to restore his competency."); United States v. Rix , 574 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (written order); United States v. Reynolds , 553 F. Supp. 2d 788 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (same); United States v. Algere , 396 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. La. 2005) (same). On remand, the district court may wish to......
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