U.S. v. Reynolds, 75-1794
| Decision Date | 05 April 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1794,75-1794 |
| Citation | 532 F.2d 1150 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Calvin J. REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
George R. Ripplinger, Jr., Belleville, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Henry A. Schwarz, U. S. Atty., Robert L. Simpkins, Asst. U. S. Atty., E. St. Louis, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PELL and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges, and PERRY, Senior District Judge. *
Defendant-appellant Calvin J. Reynolds (hereinafter "Reynolds") appeals from a five-year sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. 1 Reynolds was indicted on April 15, 1975 upon the following charge:
That on or about the 22nd day of March, 1975, at Lancaster, Illinois, in the Eastern District of Illinois, CALVIN J. REYNOLDS knowingly and with intent to extort from Mrs. Kenneth E. Kavanaugh a sum of money, did deposit in an authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent and delivered by the Postal Service, a written communication, dated March 21, 1975, addressed to Mrs. Kenneth E. Kavanaugh at Lincoln Drive in Lawrenceville, Illinois, and containing a threat to injure the person of Kenneth E. Kavanaugh, that is, that four individuals had hired someone to kill Kenneth E. Kavanaugh; all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 876.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
(1) On the morning of March 22, 1975, Shirley K. Kavanaugh received in the mail a letter reproduced as follows:
After receiving the letter, Shirley Kavanaugh telephoned her husband, Kenneth E. Kavanaugh. He came home, read the letter, took it back to his plant and called the local chief of police, Donald Foster.
(2) Chief Foster and the county sheriff, Elbert Bailey, drove to Mr. Kavanaugh's plant, were given the letter by Mr. Kavanaugh, and thereupon called in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter "FBI"). The letter was turned over to FBI Special Agent Robert L. King on his arrival on March 24, 1975, whereupon Sheriff Bailey and Special Agent King went to the residence mentioned in the letter.
(3) Upon their arrival at the residence, they determined that Reynolds lived there but that he was at a neighbor's house. They encountered Reynolds at the neighbor's house. Special Agent King advised Reynolds of his rights and questioned him regarding the letter. Reynolds at that time denied any knowledge of the letter. Reynolds gave Special Agent King a handwriting exemplar reproduced as follows:
(4) Reynolds was interrogated again on March 26, 1975 by Special Agent King, who first read an Interrogation and Advice of Rights form to Reynolds. Reynolds then signed the form. 2
(5) Reynolds made a confession which was incorporated in a nine-page statement prepared by Special Agent King and signed by Reynolds. The statement was witnessed by Special Agent King, Sheriff Bailey, and Rosemary Kirby, Reynolds' common-law wife.
(6) At arraignment on May 1, 1975, Reynolds pleaded not guilty. Subsequently a jury trial was set for June 9, 1975. When his case was called for trial, Reynolds executed a Waiver of Jury and was given a one-day trial.
(7) At the close of the testimony regarding Reynolds' signed statement, counsel for the defense moved to suppress the statement upon the grounds that
. . . the statement was made only as a result of promises made by Agent King to the defendant in this case that if he cooperated that the possible penalty would be lighter and that the possibility of a recognizance bond would be greatly enhanced, and Mr. Reynolds' own testimony that he would not have confessed had those promises not been made.
The court denied the motion to suppress, stating:
. . . The Court specifically finds that Government Exhibit 6, being the confession by this defendant, was voluntarily and understandingly made after Mr. Reynolds had been advised of his Constitutional rights, and had voluntarily and understandingly signed the Advice of Rights as had been previously printed.
The court then received Reynolds' confession into evidence.
(8) After resting his case, Reynolds' counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. After hearing arguments on the motion and after reading the cases cited by opposing counsel, the court denied the motion and found Reynolds guilty as charged.
(9) On August 21, 1975 the court imposed sentence on Reynolds. On August 25, 1975, Reynolds filed a notice of appeal in which he appealed "from the five year sentence imposed in this action on the 21st day of August, 1975."
The District Court made the following findings:
The Court finds I should first say that the confession, which was received in evidence, the Court finds was voluntarily and understandingly made without any duress, fraud, threats or similar acts and, therefore is validly and conclusively a part of this record.
The Court finds that the letter was written to the Kavanaughs, that the Kavanaughs received the letter, that it was placed in the United States mail for delivery to the addressee, that it was delivered to the addressee, that it was an extortion letter, that the defendant was advised on two different occasions as to his rights under the law and under the Constitution, that he signed the two written Waiver of Rights, and in the confession he stated that he understood them when he signed them, and that he voluntarily and understandingly signed the letter and again that the confession was voluntary and understandingly signed, that the letter was knowingly written and that it was written for the purpose of injury and that it contained a threat.
We don't need to use the word "threat." The contents of any written piece, whether it be a letter, a missile, or whatever it is, it is the contents that determine the meaning and when you read this letter, which is Government's Exhibit 2, the import of that letter and the context and content of that letter has to determine the meaning and there is only one meaning. It is a violation of that provision of the statute.
Therefore, the Court finds the defendant, Calvin J. Reynolds, guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment and it is the judgment of this Court that the defendant, Calvin J. Reynolds, is guilty of the crime charged in the indictment in manner and in form as charged therein.
Both parties have formulated the issues thuswise:
1. Do the facts of this case as elicited at defendant's trial constitute a violation of Title 18, U.S.Code, § 876?
2. Did the trial judge err in refusing to suppress and in admitting into evidence the confession of the defendant?
Reynolds first contends that the facts of this case do not show a violation of the statute in that the letter he mailed to Mrs. Kavanaugh does not contain any threat to injure the person of the addressee (Mrs. Kavanaugh) or of another. Thus, argues Reynolds, an essential element of the offense charged is lacking. Reynolds relies upon Petschl v. United States, 369 F.2d 769, 770 (8th Cir. 1966), for the proposition that there are two essential elements to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876, viz., (1) that the defendant wrote a letter addressed to a certain person containing a threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, and (2) that the defendant knowingly caused the letter to be forwarded by United States mail. We agree that Petschl correctly sets out the essential elements of the offense with which Reynolds was charged, but we cannot go so far as to agree that Reynolds' letter contains no threat of injury. To the contrary, we think that the letter is an extortion demand by mail which is coupled with language carrying the reasonable connotation of a threat to injure Mr. Kavanaugh, and that the letter lies therefore within the scope of the proscription of the statute, as this court held in United States v. Prochaska, 222 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836, 76 S.Ct. 73, 100 L.Ed. 746 (1955).
Reynolds' counsel on appeal is the same counsel who defended Reynolds during his trial. There, in support of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, he advanced the same contention that he advances here, i. e., that Reynolds' letter contained no threat by the writer thereof to injure anyone; in addition, he contended that the letter was merely a request for money, that the letter "merely set a price on information." We think that the letter did more than "set a price on information." In his letter, Reynolds stated in effect that four persons had hired someone to kill Mrs. Kavanaugh's husband and that if Mrs. Kavanaugh did not deliver $10,000, Reynolds would not tell her the names of the four persons. Therefore the inference is unmistakable that Mr. Kavanaugh would be killed if the money was not delivered.
The clear intent of the writer of the letter was to induce fear of the worst kind of injury, death. That the letter induced fear is obvious. After Mr. Kavanaugh returned home and read the letter, he immediately notified the local chief of police, who in turn notified the county sheriff. The sheriff testified that he and the chief of police thereupon went to Mr. Kavanaugh's place of business and that Mr. Kavanaugh was "extremely nervous". What the court said in United States v. Barcley 452 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1971), is pertinent here. In Barcley the defendant was charged with communicating threats by mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876; however, neither the addressee of the letter nor another lawyer criticized therein testified that he experienced fear upon reading the letter. Said the court:
In prosecutions for extortion, proof of the effect of an allegedly threatening communication upon the victim may be crucial. (citations omitted) Similarly, in a case of this kind, it seems that proof of the effect of an allegedly threatening letter upon the addressee would...
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