U.S. v. Riedl
| Decision Date | 13 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CR NO 98-624 ACK.,CR NO 98-624 ACK. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Brigitte RIEDL, Defendant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
On November 24, 1999, Brigitte Riedl ("Defendant") was convicted by a jury of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, two counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine, one count of distributing cocaine, and five counts of money laundering. The jury additionally found by special verdict that nine properties owned by Defendant were involved in the money laundering offenses and were subject to forfeiture to the United States.
On December 20, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture, claiming that the forfeiture of her property would be an excessive fine within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of Defendant's offenses.
After hearing oral argument, this Court denied Defendant's motion on January 7, 2000, finding that the forfeiture was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of Defendant's offense. After considering the value of Defendant's property sought to be forfeited, the fines authorized by the Guidelines for the offense committed, and other factors, such as the relation of the violation to other illegal activities, and the extent of harm caused, the Court concluded that the amount of forfeiture had a direct proportionality to the gravity of Defendant's offenses. The Court noted, however, that it would reconsider the issue at the time of Defendant's sentencing, and ordered that the subject properties not be sold prior to sentencing.
Defendant was scheduled to be sentenced on August 29, 2000. On August 21, 2000, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Forfeitures. Defendant argued inter alia that the forfeiture of Defendant's property would be an excessive fine within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of Defendant's offenses. The Government filed a Memorandum in Opposition on August 25, 2000. The Government argued that the forfeiture is not excessive, but rather is appropriate and consistent with current forfeiture law in light of the gravity of her criminal conduct, her personal culpability, and the harm to the community.
The Court first heard oral argument and testimony by Defendant's expert witness regarding Defendant's alleged diminished capacity due to mental disorder on August 29, 2000. The Court granted the Government leave to have Defendant examined by its own expert and continued the sentencing until such time as Defendant had been examined by the Government's experts. On February 7, 2001 the Government filed a Forensic Psychological Evaluation of Defendant prepared by Dr. Harold Hall. On March 28, 2001 the Court ordered Defendant to undergo further neuropsychological testing by the Bureau of Prisons. On May 21, 2001 Drs. Maureen Burris and Ralph Ihle of the Bureau of Prisons submitted their report on Defendant.
On June 12, 2001 Defendant filed a Final Supplemental Sentencing Memorandum addressing the forfeiture and other sentencing arguments as well as presenting evidence regarding Defendant's mental condition. On July 12, 2001 the Government filed a Final Supplemental Sentencing Memorandum on the same issues. Sentencing was rescheduled for July 26, 2001.
The Court heard oral argument and expert testimony on July 26, 2001.
Defendant argues that the forfeiture of all nine of Defendant's properties involved in the money laundering offenses is excessive and violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of Defendant's offenses. The Government disagrees, as does this Court.1
A forfeiture is excessive if it is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). Translating the gravity of a crime into monetary terms — such that it can be proportioned to the value of forfeited property — is not a simple task. In doing so, the court must look at the specific facts of each case, and the culpability of the offender must be examined specifically, rather than examining the gravity of the crime in the abstract. See id.; see also United States v. 3814 NW Thurman St., Portland, Oreg., a Tract of Real Property, 164 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir.1999). Factors to be considered in determining an individual defendant's culpability include the nature and extent of the criminal activity, its relation to other crimes, its penalties, and the harm it caused. See Id.; see also, United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 817 (4th Cir.2000) ().
In considering the above factors, the Bajakajian Court first noted that the crime at issue was "solely a reporting offense," explaining that transporting currency out of the country is lawful as long as the currency is reported. See id. at 337, 118 S.Ct. 2028. The Court also emphasized that this "single" reporting offense "was unrelated to any other illegal activities" — that is, the currency was produced by and used for legal activities. Id. at 338, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Finally, the Court determined that the harm caused by the offense was also minimal:
Failure to report his currency affected only one party, the Government, and in a relatively minor way. There was no fraud on the United States, and respondent caused no loss to the public fisc. Had his crime gone undetected, the Government would have been deprived only of the information that $357,144 had left the country.
Id. at 339, 118 S.Ct. 2028. The Court stressed that the harm was minimal because the offense resulted only in a loss of information to the government. For these reasons, the Court held that the forfeiture of $357,144 for a single reporting violation, unrelated to any other illegal activity, and harming only the United States "in a relatively minor way," constituted an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Thus the Court determined that a forfeiture that was almost 72 times greater than the applicable guidelines fine was grossly disproportionate.
In applying these same factors to the instant case, the Court finds that the forfeiture at issue is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
In considering an offense's gravity, the other penalties that the legislature has authorized are relevant evidence, as are the maximum penalties that could have been imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines. See Thurman St., 164 F.3d at 1197. If the value of forfeited property is within the range of fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is constitutional. See United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.1999) (). Furthermore, if the value of the property forfeited is within or near the permissible range of fines under the sentencing guidelines, the forfeiture almost certainly is not excessive. See id. at 1310; see also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339 & n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028, ( that forfeiture of $357,144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was $250,000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was $5,000); United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1996) ().
In this case, Defendant was convicted of five counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B). The Government seeks to forfeit property with a net value ranging from approximately $1,374,300 to $1,193,521.2 The maximum statutory fine for each of the offenses is $250,000.3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3). As Defendant was found guilty of five counts of money laundering in violation of U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B), the total maximum statutory fine applicable to Defendant can be calculated by aggregating the maximum statutory fine for each count, which totals $1,250,000, a sum approximately equal to the net value of Defendant's properties. See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3rd Cir.1972) () citing Robles v. United States, 279 F.2d 401, 407 (9th Cir.1960) (); see also United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 929-930 (9th Cir.1998) (); United States v. Young, 66 F.3d 830, 839 n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) ().
Although the statutory fine is a consideration, the Supreme Court has indicated that when considering the gravity of the offense, the fines authorized by the Guidelines should weigh heavier than statutory fines, as the Guidelines are more particularized. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also id. at 2044 ...
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...range of fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is constitutional."); United States v. Riedl, 164 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1199 (D.Hawai'i 2001) (same) (citing 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d at Other courts focus solely or principally on the applicable Guideline......
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