U.S. v. Rimka, 74-1370
| Decision Date | 21 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-1370,74-1370 |
| Citation | 512 F.2d 425 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Carl RIMKA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Theodore B. Walter, Lexington, Ky. (Court appointed), for defendant-appellant.
Eugene E. Siler, Jr., U. S. Atty., Robert M. Murphy, Lexington, Ky., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before EDWARDS and ENGEL, Circuit Judges, and RUBIN, * District Judge.
Appellant Rimka was convicted after jury trial on a charge of armed robbery of a bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970). His principal complaint on appeal is that the District Court, after hearing a motion to suppress evidence, admitted into evidence a confession which he made on the second day after his arrest.
It was appellant's contention that this confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary in that it was the product of duress represented by a promise of treatment for withdrawal symptoms which he was suffering on the day of his confession. He also contends that his Miranda rights were violated the previous day when FBI Agents continued to interrogate him, although he had indicated an unwillingness to talk.
We find no merit to the first of these issues. There was ample evidence from which the judge, and the jury subsequently, could have determined voluntariness of the confession on the day when it was given.
It appears that in fact, however, he was questioned on the preceding day even though he had indicated an unwillingness to talk. This represents a specific violation of the rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). It is clear also, however, that the questioning on the first day of appellant's arrest did not result in any statement from appellant which was introduced in evidence.
On the second day after his arrest, appellant was the subject of line-up procedures which resulted in his being told that he had been identified. Miranda warnings were given to appellant and on this occasion there was testimony that he talked freely about his participation in a number of bank robberies after reading and signing a statement that he had been informed of his constitutional right.
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...A promise of treatment for withdrawl symptoms does not necessarily render a subsequent confession involuntary. See United States v. Rimka, 512 F.2d 425 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046, 95 S.Ct. 2663, 45 L.Ed.2d 698 (1975); cf. United States v. Ritter, 456 F.2d 178 (10th Cir.1972). T......
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