U.S. v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 01 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-3036.,No. 07-3127.,No. 08-3010.,07-3127.,08-3010.,08-3036.
• Citation: 587 F.3d 1122
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Jonte ROBINSON, also known as Tay, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

587 F.3d 1122

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Jonte ROBINSON, also known as Tay, Appellant.

No. 07-3127.

No. 08-3010.

No. 08-3036.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued September 21, 2009.

Decided December 1, 2009.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 04cr00128-13).

Kristen Grim Hughes, appointed by the court, argued the cause for the appellants. Edward C. Sussman and Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, were on brief.

Amanda J. Winchester, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth Trosman, and John Philip Dominguez, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Jonte D. Robinson, Tommie Dorsey and Kenneth Dodd pleaded guilty to drug and racketeering conspiracies pursuant to "wired" plea agreements with the Government. Before sentencing, they moved to withdraw their guilty pleas. The district court denied their motions and sentenced them in accordance with their plea agreements. On appeal,¹ they contend that the district court failed to accept, and therefore left them the unfettered power to withdraw, their guilty pleas. They contend in the alternative that, if the district court accepted their pleas, it abused its discretion by denying their motions to withdraw them and by not conducting an evidentiary hearing thereon. We conclude that the district court accepted the appellants' guilty pleas and did not abuse its discretion in denying their motions to withdraw and their hearing request. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

On October 19, 2005, a grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging nineteen defendants with, inter alia, drug and racketeering conspiracies, drug offenses and homicides. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Franklin, Cr. No. 04-128 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2005) (Indict.). The defendants were separated into three groups for trial. The third group included the appellants and a co-defendant named Larry Gooch, Jr. If convicted, the appellants faced life sentences and Gooch faced death.

On January 17, 2007, after jury selection had begun, the appellants entered into plea agreements² with the Government under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (Rule) 11(c)(1)(C).³ The agreements provided that each appellant would plead guilty to a drug conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and a racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d) and 1963. They further provided that the racketeering pleas would require the appellants to admit to overt acts involving, inter alia, drugs, firearms and— for Robinson and Dorsey—murder. In return, the Government would agree to twenty-five-year prison sentences followed by five-year supervised-release terms. The plea agreements were "wired," which meant each was contingent on the others.

Later that day, the district judge held a Rule 11 plea colloquy⁴ with each appellant individually while the other two remained in the courtroom. Transcript of Plea, United States v. Dodd, Cr. No. 04-128-06, -13, -21 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2007) (Plea Tr.). Dodd went first, then Robinson, then Dorsey. Id. Each appellant pleaded guilty to the two conspiracy counts. Id.

Beginning in May 2007, the appellants filed several motions to withdraw their guilty pleas, all of which the district court denied. United States v. Robinson, 498 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.D.C.2007); Transcript of Sentence, United States v. Dodd, Cr. No. 04-128-06, -13, -21, at 24 (D.D.C. May 5, 2008) (Sent. Tr.). On May 5, 2008, the court sentenced each appellant to twenty-five years in prison followed by five years of supervised release, pursuant to their respective plea agreements. This appeal followed.

II.

The appellants want to withdraw their guilty pleas. Under Rule 11, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea under any of three circumstances. First, "before the court accepts the plea," the defendant may withdraw it "for any reason or no reason." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1). Second, if the court has accepted the plea, the defendant may withdraw it if he "show[s] a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). Third, if the court rejects a plea agreement made under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), it must permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(A).

A. Acceptance of Guilty Pleas

The appellants first argue that the district court failed to accept their guilty pleas and they are thus entitled to withdraw them "for any reason or no reason." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1). The district court rejected this argument, concluding that it had accepted each appellant's plea. Robinson, 498 F.Supp.2d at 332-33. We review the district court's decision de novo. United States v. Jones, 472 F.3d 905, 908-09 (D.C.Cir.2007).

Guilty pleas are distinct from plea agreements. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677-78, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997) (rules "explicitly envision" guilty plea before performance of plea agreement); United States v. Jones, 472 F.3d at 908 ("[G]uilty pleas exist independently from plea agreements on which they rest. . . .") (citing Hyde, 520 U.S. at 677, 117 S.Ct. 1630). Accordingly, a court may accept a defendant's guilty plea and temporarily refrain from accepting or rejecting a corresponding plea agreement. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A) ("To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may . . . defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report."); Hyde, 520 U.S. at 678, 117 S.Ct. 1630; Jones, 472 F.3d at 908. In this case, the district court refrained from accepting or rejecting the appellants' plea agreements at the Rule 11 hearing, pending presentence reports. See Plea Tr. at 8-9. The appellants contend that, in so doing, the court failed to clearly distinguish between their plea agreements and their guilty pleas, which left them with the belief that it had accepted neither.

In Jones we held that, although the district court had used language "loosely" at the defendant's plea hearing, the transcript viewed as a whole manifested that the court had accepted the defendant's guilty plea and left him "no reasonable basis" for thinking otherwise. 472 F.3d at 909. The same is true here. While the district court at times used the terms "plea" and "plea agreement" interchangeably, e.g., Plea Tr. at 18, 24-25, 29, 35, 42, the transcript of the plea hearing, read in its entirety, establishes that the court accepted the appellants' guilty pleas. The court asked each appellant how he pleaded as to the two separate counts. Plea Tr. at 25, 37-38, 46. After each appellant twice responded, "Guilty," the court told him that it "accept[ed]" his plea. Id. at 25, 38, 46. Despite the court's occasional imprecision, therefore, it plainly accepted the appellants' guilty pleas and left them "no reasonable basis" for thinking otherwise. Jones, 472 F.3d at 909.

The appellants also contend that the acceptances were ineffective because the court referred to them as "conditional." Reply Br. 3. That argument failed in Jones and it fails here. As was true in Jones, "acceptance was `conditional' only in that under Rule 11(d)(2)(A) the court had to give [the defendant] an opportunity to withdraw the plea if it ultimately rejected the plea agreement. . . . [S]uch conditions subsequent do not nullify otherwise valid acceptances." Jones, 472 F.3d at 908 (citing Hyde, 520 U.S. at 679-80, 117 S.Ct. 1630). So too, here, the court's use of the term "conditional" did not nullify its acceptance of the appellants' guilty pleas. Rather, it appropriately signified that, if the court subsequently rejected their plea agreements, the appellants would be permitted to withdraw their guilty pleas. See id.; Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(A). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court accepted the appellants' pleas.

B. Denial of Motions to Withdraw Pleas

Granting, arguendo, that the district court accepted their guilty pleas, the appellants next contend that it erred in denying their motions to withdraw them. Pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B), a district court may grant a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea if "the defendant can show a fair and just reason." We review a district court's denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Curry, 494 F.3d 1124, 1128 (D.C.Cir.2007). We focus on three factors: "(1) `whether the defendant has asserted a viable claim of innocence'; (2) `whether the delay between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has substantially prejudiced the government's ability to prosecute the case;' and (3) `whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted.'" United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 929 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C.Cir.1993)). The third factor is the "most important," Ford, 993 F.2d at 251, so we address it first. See United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1995).

1. Taint

All three appellants argue that the district court impermissibly intruded on the plea-bargaining process. Their argument relies on Rule 11(c)(1), which provides, "An attorney for the Government and the defendant's attorney . . . may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions." In support of their argument, the appellants quote statements the court made at the plea hearing regarding the bargain to which the parties had agreed. Appellants' Br. 18. Several related to the court's task of calculating the applicable Guidelines range in the context of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Plea Tr. at 8-10. As the court pointed out, however, its calculation would not alter the terms of their respective agreements. Plea...