U.S. v. Rodriguez-Torres

• Decision Date: 19 June 2008
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 07-302 (JAG).
• Citation: 570 F.Supp.2d 237
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. RODRIGUEZ-TORRES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

570 F.Supp.2d 237

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. RODRIGUEZ-TORRES, et al., Defendants.

Criminal No. 07-302 (JAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 19, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jose A. Ruiz-Santiago, Julia Diaz-Rex, United States Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to inspect grand jury minutes. (Docket No. 1920). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In this case, a total of one hundred and ten (110) doctors, were charged in a eighty six count Superseding Indictment for having participated in a scheme to improperly obtain a license to practice medicine in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1104). On May 29, 2008, Defendant Elba I. Torres Benitez ("Torres") filed a motion requesting that this Court disclose all grand jury transcripts. Torres alleges that during the grand jury proceedings, Assistant United States Attorney Jose A. Ruiz Santiago ("Ruiz") engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when he interrupted the investigative function of the grand jury. Specifically, Torres relies entirely on four (4) alleged interruptions made by Ruiz in the grand jury testimony of Luis Navedo Ortiz ("Navedo"). Torres focuses on Ruiz's fourth alleged intervention. According to Torres, during this intervention Ruiz did not allow Navedo to answer a question by a grand jury member that alluded to the fact that there may have been people inside the Board of Medical Examiners, who were purposely flunking students. Torres points to the Government's interviews of Pablo Valentin Torres, (Docket No. 1920, Exh. 4) and Gregorio Diaz, (Docket No. 1920, Exh. 3). Torres states that Gregorio Diaz admitted to erasing answers from various student because he believed they had failed. Furthermore, Torres brings to this Court's attention that Pablo Valentin admitted during his interview that he passed two candidates because he believed that Gregorio Diaz was failing them on purpose.

Torres avers that it has a right to know whether this evidence was ever given to the grand jury. Moreover, Torres contends that it has a right to know whether other people inside the Board of Medical Examiners altered exams as did Gregorio Diaz. According to Torres, all of the grand jury transcripts should be disclosed in order to ascertain whether there was a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct throughout the grand jury proceedings; and to determine whether there is any exculpatory or impeachment evidence in said transcripts. In the alternative, Torres requests that this Court hold an in camera inspection of said transcripts to determine whether there was a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct. (Docket No. 1920). On June 2, 2008, Ruiz opposed Torres' motion. (Docket No. 1947). On June 17, 2008, Defendants Nancy Barbosa, Mayra Mora, Marjorie Santiago, Onnis Acosta, Vidalina Torres, Manuel Malave Hernandez, Maria Vargas, Obet Jimenez, Enery Cordero, Gerardo Gonzalez, Pilar Bulted (together with Torres hereinafter referred to as Defendants) moved to join Torres' motion. (Docket No. 1977). Said request was granted by this Court. (Docket No. 1978). Additionally, an extension of time was requested for the June 20, 2008 dispositive motions filing deadline. (Docket No. 1978).

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of secrecy in grand jury proceedings, even after, as in this case, the grand jury has concluded its function. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979); United States v. McMahon, 938 F.2d 1501, 1504 (1st Cir.1991). Grand jury secrecy facilitates the investigation of criminal charges by assuring potential witnesses that their testimony will not become public knowledge, thus encouraging them to testify freely and limiting the potential that they will be improperly influenced by those under investigation. United States v. Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 591 (1st Cir.2004)(internal citations omitted). At the same time, it ensures "that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule." Id. The Supreme Court has stated that there are several reasons for grand jury secrecy:

(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979) (internal citations omitted).

Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e), grand jury material may be disclosed before trial.¹ United States v. Liuzzo, 739 F.2d 541 544 (11th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Horton, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS 28406 (4th Cir.1993). Since 1946, the disclosure of grand jury minutes has been governed by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ill. v. Abbott & Assocs., 460 U.S. 557, 566, 103 S.Ct. 1356, 75 L.Ed.2d 281 (1983). "This provision is not an invitation to engage in a fishing expedition to search for grand jury wrongdoing and abuse when there are no grounds to believe that any wrongdoing or abuse has occurred." United States v. Loc Tien Nguyen, 314 F.Supp.2d 612, 616 (E.D.Va. 2004). Under the rule, a court may release grand jury material to a defendant "who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury." Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). To justify this release, the defendant must show what has been described as a "particularized need."

The Supreme Court has consistently held that Rule 6(e) requires a strong showing of "particularized need" for grand jury material before any disclosure will be permitted. Abbott, 460 U.S. at 567, 103 S.Ct. 1356; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. 1667; Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966). In determining whether to break that traditional secrecy,² parties seeking disclosure must show "that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed." Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. 1667. The Supreme Court has stated that "such a showing must be made even when the grand jury whose transcripts are sought has concluded its operations."³ Id.

A Court called upon to determine whether grand jury transcripts should be released has substantial discretion. See id.; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 396-97, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959); United States v. Abusaid, 256 Fed.Appx. 289 (11th Cir. 2007); McAninch v. Wintermute, 491 F.3d 759, 767 (8th Cir.2007). That discretion, however, is not unlimited. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966); McMahon, 938 F.2d at 1504.

Here, Defendants request that all grand jury testimonies be disclosed so they can determine whether the Ruiz's interruptions during Navedo's testimony before the grand jury substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict. Furthermore, Defendants claim that said jury transcripts are essential to determine whether there was grand jury abuse on the part of the Government. Specifically, Defendants question whether the Government offered any evidence to the grand jury that persons inside the Board of Medical Examiners were purposely flunking people and whether this may have influence the grand jury's decisions to indict. Moreover, Defendants argue that the disclosure of all grand jury transcripts could lead to exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence. Alternatively, Defendants request that this Court perform an in camera inspection of all the grand jury transcripts to determine whether there was a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct throughout the grand jury proceedings.

Rule 6(e) "is not an invitation to engage in a fishing expedition to search for grand jury wrongdoing and abuse when there are no grounds to believe that any wrongdoing or abuse has occurred." United States v. Loc Tien Nguyen, 314 F.Supp.2d 612, 616 (E.D.Va.2004). A defendant's particularized need must be based on more than mere speculation. United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir.1998). Because grand jury proceedings are entitled to a strong presumption of regularity, a defendant seeking disclosure of grand jury information under Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii) bears a heavy burden of establishing that particularized and factually based grounds exist to support the proposition that irregularities in grand jury proceedings may create a basis for the dismissal of an indictment. Loc Tien Nguyen, 314 F.Supp.2d at 616. This burden cannot be satisfied with conclusory or speculative allegations of misconduct. Id. "It is not sufficient for [Defendants] to assert that [they have] no way of knowing whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred." United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1291 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that a "showing" under Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e) must be based on a particularized need for disclosure of the transcript and that mere speculation that prosecutorial abuse may have occurred is insufficient.)

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