U.S. v. Ruiz-Marty

• Decision Date: 25 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 06-0111 (DRD).,06-0111 (DRD).
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. Awilda RUIZ-MARTY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

463 F.Supp.2d 137

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. Awilda RUIZ-MARTY, Defendant.

No. 06-0111 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 25, 2006.

Ernesto G. Lopez-Soltero, Jose A. Ruiz-Santiago, United States Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Alexander Zeno, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is defendant, Awilda Ruiz-Marty's Motion for Dismissal on Speedy Trial Grounds and/or for the Prompt Scheduling of a Trial (Docket No. 76) filed on September 21, 2006, as well as plaintiff, United States of America's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial Grounds and/or for the Prompt Scheduling of a Trial (Docket No. 78), filed on September 22, 2006.

Defendant avers that there is speedy trial violation merely because upon Defendant's knowledge that the trial for the instant case was set for September 15, 2006, she purchased a plane ticket to travel from Washington, D.C. to San Juan, made plans to stay in Puerto Rico for the duration of the trial and started preparations for said trial. Defendant avers that around that the same time, the trial date was cancelled, without Defendant's consent. Defendant alleges that said action constitutes a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and/or the Constitution of United States. Consequently, Defendant objects to the cancellation of the trial and requests the dismissal of the instant case on said grounds.

Furthermore, Defendant states that, notwithstanding the aforementioned allegations, Defendant, in good faith, continued to hold verbal plea negotiations with A.U.S.A. Juan Milanés which culminated in an agreement that, the Court adds, later went sour. Due to the fact that Defendant trusted that the verbal agreement would be honored, Defendant did not file a motion for dismissal on speedy trial grounds¹

Notwithstanding said trust, Defendant alleges that Juan Milanés failed to honor his end of the plea agreement. Defendant alleges that instead of honoring his end, AUSA Milanés e-mailed Defendant a plea agreement that incorporated a forfeiture clause that was never discussed in the initial verbal agreement. Defendant avers that Mr. Milanés as an excuse, averred that the forfeiture clause was added because it was not convenient for the Department of Justice to have a separate criminal and civil trial and that co-defendant Ferdinand Padilla's counsel Mr. Luis Rivera believed it was the best course of action since the forfeiture matter could be subject to plea agreements, thereby potentially disposing of both concerns.

For the reasons stated above, Defendant states and prays that the charges in the instant case be dismissed based on the Speedy Trial Act and/or violation to the Constitution of the United States and/or that a trial be promptly scheduled taking into consideration the fact that Defendant wasted time and money in her reliance on the initial scheduling date of the trial and on the word of the Department of Justice. The request is not supplemented by any legal arguments or citations warranting Defendant's position.

Notwithstanding, the United States of America, in its Motion in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 78), avers that Plaintiff has always been ready for trial in the present case and that at no time has the Speedy Trial Act ("STA") clock totally lapsed. Plaintiff avers that the Defense Counsel has no legal grounds nor offers any legal bases for filing a motion claiming a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.

The United States further avers that the STA did not start until the Court's Scheduling Order was issued on March 29, 2006. Plaintiff alleges that although the Indictment in this case was returned on March 22, 2006, a motion was pending before the Court at the time the Indictment was returned. Plaintiff states that the aforementioned automatically tolled the STA until a decision on Defendant's motion was timely issued on March 29, 2006.

Furthermore, the United States of America avers that on April 7, 2006, within nine (9) days of the commencement of the STA clock, the Defendant filed the first motion, tolling the STA ("Motion to Modify Condition of Release, Request for De Novo Hearing on behalf of Awilda Ruiz-Marty Docket No. 23"). Plaintiff avers that the STA remained tolled until May 17, 2006, when other consecutive outstanding motions that were subsequently filed were resolved. Within two (2) days of the STA clock recommencing, the United States filed a motion under Rule 12 (Docket No. 42), designating evidence in the instant case. Plaintiff avers that since there was no response or opposition from Defendants regarding said motion, the Court restarted the STA clock on June 5, 2306 when it issued an Endorsed Order regarding Plaintiff's motion. Notwithstanding, on June 16, 2006, eleven (11) days after the STA clock had been restarted, defendant, Awilda Ruiz-Marty, the mover in the instant Motion, filed a Motion to Continue Trial (Docket No.44). Plaintiff avers that since the aforementioned motions, there have been fourteen (14) consecutive motions, petitions, responses and replies filed in the instant case that have continuously tolled the STA clock.

Consequently, Plaintiff alleges that, as of this date, only twenty-two (22) of the seventy (70) days of the Speedy Trial Act have elapsed and that the Defense itself has contiguously delayed the trial in this case with its motions. For said reasons, Plaintiff avers that since defendant Awilda Ruiz-Marty cannot seek to benefit from her own dilatory tactics, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial Grounds (Docket No. 76) must be denied.

Since Court is not persuaded by Defendant's allegations, for the reasons stated below, defendant, Awilda Ruiz-Marty's Motion for Dismissal on Speedy Trail Grounds and/or for the Prompt Scheduling of a Trial (Docket No. 76) is hereby DENIED.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

a. 6th Amendment Speedy Trial Dispositions and Speedy Trial Act (STA)

Pursuant to the United States Constitution "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...." See U.S. Const. Amends. VI. Nevertheless, "[t]his right is not so absolute or unqualified that it admits of no delay. `The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.'" See Reece v. U.S., 337 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir.1964)(quoting Beavers v. Hubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)).

The instant case is not yet covered under the umbrella of the 6th Amendment's speedy trial since that flag is not raised thereunder until one year has elapsed since the indictment or arrest, whichever occurs first. "[T]he lower courts have generally found post accusation delay `presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year." See Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652, n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520(1992) "It would be, however, `an unusual case in which the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have been met but the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to speedy trial has been violated.'" See U.S. v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1049 (1st Cir., 1983)(quoting U.S. v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 360 (9th Cir., 1982))(emphasis ours); see also U.S. v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir.1997). The STA has not elapsed in the instant case as explained infra.

As well as the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, the Speedy Trial Act (STA), 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), "protects defendants from undue post-accusation delay." See 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev.Crim. Proc. (2006). The STA states that a federal criminal trial must begin within seventy (70) days of the filing of an Information or Indictment or Defendant's initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). "The remedy for [a] violation of the 70-day requirement is dismissal of the indictment either with or without prejudice, depending on consideration of several statutory factors." See U.S. v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1162 (1st Cir., 1995). (emphasis ours); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Consonant with the Sixth Amendment case law, said requirement may not be taken literally due to the fact that the STA states that certain periods of delay shall be excluded when computing the time within which the trial must commence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h); see also U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 600 (1st Cir., 1996). When an STA violation is alleged by a Defendant, the Court must follow a two-step process. See Staula, 80 F.3d at 600 (1st Cir., 1996). "First, the court must do the basic mathematics and determine the aggregate time elapsed awaiting trial. Second, it must determine how many days should be excluded from that ultimate sum." Id.; see also U.S. v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1193 (1st Cir.,1993). "Certain types of pretrial delays are automatically excluded from the Act's time limits." 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. (2006). Several examples of tolling considered excludable under the STA "clock" are the following: "Delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the date of the filing of the motion through the date of the prompt disposition of the motion. ..." See U.S. v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 347 (3rd Cir., 1993); "[D]elay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court;" See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). Furthermore, "[a] pretrial motion resulting in excludable time for one defendant also stops the Speedy Trial clock for all codefendants." See U.S. v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 626 (1st Cir., 1988)(emphasis ours); see also, Arbelaez, 7 F.3d at 347 (3rd Cir., 1993) ("pursuant to section 3161(h)(7), after defendants are joined for trial, an exclusion applicable to one defendant applies to...