U.S. v. Saint Landry Parish School Bd., 77-2237

• Decision Date: 30 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-2237,77-2237
• Citation: 601 F.2d 859
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAINT LANDRY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 859

601 F.2d 859

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAINT LANDRY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-2237.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 30, 1979.

Edward L. Shaheen, U. S. Atty., J. Ransdell Keene, Asst. U. S. Atty., Shreveport, La., Walter W. Barnett, Joel L. Selig, Attys., Civ. Rights Div., Drew S. Days, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellant.

I. Jackson Burson, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Eunice, La., for School Bd. and individual members.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before THORNBERRY, GOLDBERG and GEE, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

The government brought this action claiming that a vote-buying scheme, allegedly carried out at a school board election in district ten of St. Landry Parish, Louisiana, violated various provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The district court dismissed the government's two count complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ¹ The government now appeals that dismissal. We affirm as to count I and reverse as to count II.

Because the issue before us is the sufficiency of the government's complaint, we will outline its allegations in detail. The complaint names as defendants various members of the Saint Landry Parish School Board, including Bobby Dupre, the successful candidate in the February 21, 1976 election in district ten. The complaint also names as defendants three poll commissioners who served in that election. The complaint alleges that district ten contained 1280 registered white voters and 1883 registered black voters and that the white candidate Dupre received 1148 votes, while the two black candidates combined received only 737 votes. The complaint alleges that as a result of the election, Dupre was seated as the representative to the school board for district ten. We will quote the remaining, crucial allegations of the complaint in full. The complaint alleges that:

P 9. Defendants participated during the election of February 21, 1976, in a scheme whereby a substantial number of black voters were offered and paid money for their vote for a candidate who was not of their choice.

P 10. The black voters mentioned in paragraph 9 were driven to the polls by drivers transporting said voters at the instruction of defendant Mr. Bobby Dupre, were accompanied into the voting booth by defendant poll officials and the votes of said black voters were cast by defendant poll commissioners for the candidate that the poll commissioners desired regardless of the voters' choice and in spite of the voters' ability to vote without assistance.

P 11. The black voters mentioned above were given tokens for their votes by the defendant poll officials and those tokens were redeemed for money by persons employed by Mr. Bobby Dupre.

P 12. The votes cast in the above-described manner were accepted as valid votes by defendants and the acceptance of those votes could have affected the outcome of the election in District 10.

The complaint then sets out the two counts. Count I claims that the above-described conduct of the three defendant poll commissioners constitutes an unapproved change in the state's procedure for assisting voters which is subject to the approval requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Count II claims that above-described practices of the defendants "had the purpose and effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a) and 1973." The complaint evidently seeks the same relief under each count. Specifically, it asks the court to order a new election and to enjoin the defendant poll commissioners from participating in such practices in future elections. We will examine each of the two counts separately.

I.

Count I attempts to state a claim under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. That section requires certain covered states ² to obtain approval of certain changes in their standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting. ³ A covered state making a change in its voting procedures subject to the § 5 approval requirements must either submit the new procedure to the Attorney General for approval or bring a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The change will be approved if the Attorney General poses no objection to it within 60 days after its submission or if the district court for the District of Columbia finds that the new procedure has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race. Id.

The enforcement provisions of the Act allow the United States to bring action under § 5 seeking a declaratory judgment that a state has made an unapproved change in its voting procedure which is subject to the § 5 approval requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973j; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 826 & n. 21, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). ⁴ The Supreme Court has held that this issue must be decided by a three-judge district court. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 830, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). That court does not have the authority to approve or disapprove a covered change. The approval decision remains with the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971). If it is shown that a state has made an unapproved change in its voting procedures, which is subject to the § 5 approval requirements, the court may enjoin the state from enforcing the new procedure until the state has received the required approval. Id. 89 S.Ct. at 826.

In this case the district court concluded that the actions of the three poll commissioners were simply "isolated instances of election fraud" which did not constitute a "procedure susceptible of approval" under § 5. For this reason, the district court dismissed count I. The government claims that the district court erred in dismissing count I. It claims that the actions of the poll commissioners constitute a voting procedure covered by § 5. The government further argues, however, that whether or not the alleged voting procedure is covered by § 5, the district court had no authority to dismiss count I. The argument goes like this. Since count I is a coverage claim under § 5, it must be heard by a three-judge court. Accordingly, the district court, since it was a single-judge court, could not properly dismiss the claim. ⁵

This argument, however, does not take account of the fact that the single-judge district court to whom the request for a three-judge court is made has the authority to determine if a three-judge court is required. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b) (3). While it is true that coverage questions must be determined by a three-judge court, Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 830, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), a three-judge court is not required if the claim is wholly insubstantial or completely without merit. ⁶ In such a case the single-judge court may properly dismiss the claim. As we read the district court opinion, the judge found that the coverage claim was wholly insubstantial and completely without merit. If this finding is correct, the district court properly dismissed count I.

The participation of the three defendant poll commissioners in the vote-buying scheme allegedly consisted of the following actions: The poll commissioners accompanied certain black voters into the voting booths and cast their votes "for the candidate that the poll commissioners desired regardless of the voters' choice and despite the voters' ability to vote without assistance." The three commissioners then gave these black voters tokens which could be redeemed for cash from employees of candidate Dupre. The poll commissioners counted these votes as valid. According to count I, the poll commissioners' actions constitute a change in the state's procedure for assisting voters which is subject to the approval requirements of § 5. Louisiana has enacted procedures for assisting voters, and these procedures have received § 5 approval. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 18:564 (West.1979) (Formerly § 18:857). Although the poll commissioners were required to follow these procedures, they allegedly did not act in accordance with them.

The approval requirements of § 5 apply only when "a state or political subdivision shall enact or seek to administer" a change in its voting procedures. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Although the actions of these poll commissioners could possibly be viewed as a change in voting procedures within the meaning of § 5, ⁷ we conclude that these actions do not constitute a change that the state Has enacted or sought to administer within the meaning of that section. This conclusion is compelled by the language of § 5, the nature of the approval procedure envisioned by § 5, and the cases interpreting that section.

We do not dispute that the actions of the three poll commissioners constitute actions of the state for certain purposes. See part II Infra. But one would not normally conclude that a state "enacts or administers" a new voting procedure every time a state official deviates from the state's required procedures. The commonsense meaning of "shall enact" indicates that action of a state, As a body, is envisioned, and we think "shall seek to . . . administer" was added to cover situations when an enactment was not actually passed, but when a procedure was nonetheless widely administered with at least the implicit approval of the state governing authority.

We realize, of course, that statutory language is not always interpreted in a common-sense manner. But we can find no case which even hints that actions of a state official which are in conflict with the state's required procedures should be considered a...