U.S.A. v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 19 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-1951,99-1951 |
| Citation | 196 F.3d 910 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 1999) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. MICHAEL D. SANDERS, APPELLANT. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.
Before Bowman, Lay, and Beam, Circuit Judges.
A South Dakota federal jury convicted Michael D. Sanders of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). On direct appeal, Sanders argues that the District Court1 committed three errors: (1) refusing to suppress evidence, including the firearm seized from a vehicle during a traffic stop; (2) instructing the jury that the police officers' stop and search of the car were legal; and (3) refusing to allow Sanders's wife to testify regarding the measures she took to keep firearms away from him. We affirm.
On August 6, 1987, Sanders was a passenger in a pickup truck that was towing a trailer. Officer Keith Jorgenson of the South Dakota Highway Patrol stopped the vehicle because one of the two taillights on the trailer was missing a red lens and was emitting white light from the exposed bulb. Approximately ten minutes later, Special Agents John Buszko and Robert Beyer of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation arrived to provide backup. As Officer Jorgenson discussed the traffic offense with the driver, Ricky Standon, Agent Buszko approached Sanders, who remained sitting in the passenger side of the truck. Agent Buszko asked Sanders if he possessed any guns or knives, and Sanders denied any such possession. Having observed a small, folded knife on the dashboard in front of Sanders, Agent Buszko asked Sanders to step out of the vehicle for a pat-down search.
As Sanders exited the vehicle, Agent Buszko observed that Sanders had several unhealed sores and cuts, which are consistent with methamphetamine use. In addition, Agent Buszko noticed a ball of electrical tape where Sanders had been sitting. According to Agent Buszko's testimony at the suppression hearing, electrical tape frequently is used to conceal narcotics because it is thought to conceal their scent. Agent Buszko seized the ball of tape and asked Sanders about it. Despite having just been seated on this nearly baseball-sized ball of tape, Sanders denied any knowledge of it. When the Agents later opened the ball of tape, it was found to contain methamphetamine and marijuana.
While Agent Buszko questioned Sanders, Agent Beyer noticed a maroon bag in the bed of the pickup truck. Before touching the bag, the Agents questioned Sanders and Standon regarding its ownership. After both Sanders and Standon denied any knowledge of the bag, Agent Buszko removed the bag from the pickup and placed it on the ground between Sanders and Standon. Once again, the Agents asked Sanders and Standon whether they knew who owned the bag or how it got into the truck. Sanders and Standon again denied any knowledge of the bag. Agent Buszko then searched the bag and found a .22 caliber Ruger handgun.
Standon later admitted that he owned the bag but claimed that Sanders had the gun with him when they began their trip to South Dakota. Agents later determined that Sanders's wife, Tina Sanders, owned the handgun. Sanders moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. Upon de novo review of the suppression hearing transcripts and exhibits, the District Court denied the motion. After a jury convicted Sanders of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the District Court sentenced him to forty-one months' imprisonment.
Sanders first challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. Sanders argues that Officer Jorgenson lacked probable cause to stop the truck and that the Agents lacked probable cause to search his person and the maroon bag. We review findings of historical fact made by the District Court for clear error but review the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to make a warrantless search de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
Sanders argues that Officer Jorgenson lacked probable cause to stop the truck because the taillights on the trailer in fact were not in violation of South Dakota law. The statute in question provides in relevant part:
Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer, except as otherwise provided in this section, and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles shall be equipped with at least two tail lamps mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required in § 32-17-4 shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of one thousand feet to the rear. However, motor vehicles, trailers, semitrailers and pole trailers manufactured and assembled prior to July 1, 1973, shall have one tail lamp mounted on the left side of the rear which when lighted as required in § 32-17-4 shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear. . . . On vehicles with more than one tail lamp, the lamps shall be mounted on the same level and as widely spaced laterally as practicable.
S.D. Codified Laws § 32-17-8 (Michie 1998). The District Court found that Officer Jorgenson stopped the vehicle because "one of the [two] taillights on the trailer was missing a red lens and was emitting white light from the exposed bulb." Mem. Op. & Order Den. Mot. to Suppress at 2. Because the trailer was manufactured before 1973, however, Sanders argues that the trailer, with one red taillight, was not in violation of the statute.
The Government argues that, regardless of whether the trailer needed one or two taillights, it violated the statute because one of the taillights was missing a red lens.2 The District Court apparently agreed with this interpretation of the statute. A picture of the trailer Mem. Op. & Order Den. Mot. to Suppress at 6.
We find it unnecessary to parse the words of the South Dakota statute in determining whether Officer Jorgenson had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Regardless of whether or not the trailer actually was in violation of the South Dakota statute, Officer Jorgenson was justified in making the stop if he "objectively ha[d] a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law.'" United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999). Even if the trailer was not technically in violation of the statute, Officer Jorgenson could have reasonably believed that the trailer violated the statute because one light was missing a red lens or because he believed that the trailer was manufactured...
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