U.S. v. Sandles, 93-1999
Decision Date | 27 April 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-1999,93-1999 |
Citation | 23 F.3d 1121 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John E. SANDLES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Paul Kanter, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff-appellee.
Annice Kelly (argued), Fox & Fox, Madison, WI, for defendant-appellant.
Before CUMMINGS, ESCHBACH, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
After a four-day trial, a jury convicted John E. Sandles ("Sandles") of five counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a). The district court sentenced Sandles to several concurrent terms of 180 months imprisonment and three years supervised release. On appeal, Sandles raises two issues: (1) whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Sandles' motion for substitute counsel. We vacate the conviction on the former ground, and remand for a new trial. Therefore, we do not address the latter argument.
In a three-month period commencing on December 10, 1991, John Eric Sandles committed a spree of bank robberies that netted him approximately $13,500. Following the last of the five robberies, a criminal complaint was issued and eventually Sandles was arrested. On May 21, 1992, Sandles made his first court appearance in connection with this case, at which time the court found Sandles to be indigent and appointed David E. Lowe ("Lowe") to serve as counsel. On July 7, 1992, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging Sandles with five counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a). Following his arraignment, Sandles filed a notice of insanity defense pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2. At the government's request, the court issued an order on July 23, 1992, directing that Sandles undergo psychiatric and psychological examinations. On October 13, 1992, the examination report was submitted to the court revealing that Sandles suffered from grandiose delusions about his own capabilities. About a month after the report was submitted, the court granted Sandles' motion for an independent evaluation, scheduled a pretrial conference for January 22, 1993, and set trial for February 1, 1993.
On December 30, 1992, Sandles filed a pro se motion to dismiss and discharge Lowe as his court-appointed attorney. Sandles leveled a number of rather serious accusations, including the allegations that Lowe had: (1) "demonstrated racial bias and hostilities;" (2) advised Sandles not to cooperate with the court-appointed psychologist and to deny any memory of the crimes; (3) refused to consult with Sandles' mother to obtain relevant medical records; and (4) refused to file pretrial motions to obtain said records. Sandles argued that his right to a fair and impartial trial would be compromised if Lowe continued his representation. On January 4, 1993, Lowe filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, supported by an affidavit averring that the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship warranted appointment of substitute counsel. 1
At the January 22, 1993, pretrial conference, the court heard oral statements from both Sandles and Lowe concerning the motions for new counsel. The following testimony was presented:
Before entertaining Sandles' response, the court permitted Lowe to answer the charges raised by Sandles' motion. In addition to categorically denying the allegations that he had neglected his client and exhibited racial bias, Lowe made the following statement:
MR. LOWE: I've been--I think it's past the point where he's attacking me or making comments on my professional conduct. It's now personal.
I have represented in this district for at least ten years many, many defendants, and I've practiced before this court. And appointments, most of them because of the district we're in, I suppose, are made up of minority individuals. I have represented them to the point quite honestly, Judge, where my family and I economically have been disadvantaged because of the fees and I accept that. It's because it's something I have wanted to do. And to be accused of being racially biased and making racial comments I find reprehensible. I deny them.
. . . . .
In sum, Judge, I think the only thing that I do agree with in Mr. Sandles' motion is that at this point because of the personal nature of the way this has come out, I don't believe it's in his best interests for me to continue to represent him. I do not believe because of the personal nature of this that I can zealously represent him and follow the ethics guidelines that I would be bound to follow should I be his attorney. It's for those reasons, Judge, that I'm requesting to be relieved from any further representation of Mr. Sandles.
Sandles then responded to Lowe's statement and simply reiterated much of what he had alleged in his motion. The following discussion then ensued:
After Sandles informed the court that he wished to have Lowe as his attorney rather than go pro se, a conversation took place concerning Sandles' ability to obtain certain medical records prior to trial. The conversation degenerated into the following exchange:
Thus, when court recessed, Lowe remained Sandles' trial counsel. On January 26, however, Lowe submitted a motion to reconsider his request to withdraw, citing Sandles' belief that Lowe was both ineffective and racist. Again, Lowe stated the belief that his continued representation of Sandles would be against Sandles' best interest and possibly would deny Sandles' right to counsel. The court denied Lowe's motion without a hearing. The following day, January 27, Sandles filed a notice of...
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